

INDIA
AND
CHINA

SUDHAKAR BHAT

POPULAR BOOK SERVICES
NEW DELHI-3

INDIA
AND
CHINA

For My Wife
MALATI
For Patience and Courage

© SUDHAKAR BHAT

First Published, 1967

Printed in India

at Today & Tomorrow's Printers & Publishers, Faridabad, and
Published by Gulab Vazirani, for Popular Book Services,
D-332, Defence Colony, New Delhi-3.

C O N T E N T S

1—The Phase Of Friendship	9
2—Tantrums Over Tibet	20
3—The Border Problem	43
4—The Chinese View Of The Border	55
5—The Not So Cold War	66
6—Longju And After	77
7—The Officials' Report	91
8—The McMahon Line	106
9—The Demise Of The Five Principles	111
10—On The High Seas And Elsewhere	120
11—The Himalayan War	137
12—Ceasefire And Withdrawal	155
13—The Move For Negotiations	171
14—The Colombo Proposals And After	189
15—Sikkim, Pakistan And China	205
16—India, China And The Soviet Union	227
Appendix	247
Index	257

M A P S

Map I—India’s Northern Borders	4
II—The Traditional Customary Boundary Line— Chinese Version	47
III—China’s Dream Empire	59
IV—“The Line of Actual Control”—Chinese Version	81
V—A Part of the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian Border	147
VI—The September 7, 1962, Line of Actual Control— Western Sector	170

THE PHASE OF FRIENDSHIP

INDIA was the second non-communist country to recognise the People's Republic of China. While its birth was proclaimed on October 1, 1949, the Government of India extended diplomatic recognition on December 30.

The recognition was based on the late Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru's own assessment of the situation in China:

“When the revolution came within two or three years of our independence, we discussed this matter with our ambassador there and others concerned. It was clear that this was no palace revolution but a basic revolution involving millions and millions of human beings. It was a stable revolution with strength behind it and popularity behind it at that time, whatever might have happened later. It produced a perfectly stable government entrenched strongly enough; and it was popular. That has nothing to do with our liking it or disliking it. Naturally, we came to the decision that this government should be recognised, and within two or three months we did recognise it.”¹

Earlier, while the Chinese civil war was still on, Nehru had said:

“China, that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour, has been our friend through the ages, and that friendship will endure and grow. We earnestly hope that her present troubles will end soon and a united, democratic China will emerge, playing a great part in the furtherance of world peace and progress.”²

In 1948, India's measures to deal with the violent uprising in

Telengana in Hyderabad state (now part of Andhra Pradesh) were described by the communist leaders of China as an act of aggression against the exploited masses.³ Moreover, the same year, Chairman Mao Tse-tung had sent a message to the Indian communist leader, B. T. Ranadive, that the Chinese Communist Party was “relying on the brave Communist Party of India” to ensure that “India would not long remain under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborator (meaning Nehru).”⁴

Nevertheless, the early recognition of the People’s Republic was a manifestation of India’s desire to revive the old and traditional ties between the two countries.

India received something of a shock when in 1950 Chinese forces entered Tibet. Speaking in the Indian Parliament on December 7, Nehru said:

“It is not right for any country to talk about its sovereignty or suzerainty over an area outside its own immediate range. That is to say, since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail, and not any legal or constitutional arguments. That, I think, is a valid point.

“Whether the people of Tibet are strong enough to assert their rights or not is another matter. Whether we are strong enough or any other country is strong enough to see that this is done is also another matter. But it is a right and proper thing to say, and I see no difficulty in saying to the Chinese Government; that whether they have suzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Tibet, surely, according to any principles, the principles they proclaim and the principles I uphold, the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and nobody else.”⁵

Peking retaliated by branding Nehru and his colleagues as “running dogs of imperialism;” together with Sukarno he was described as belonging to “the political garbage group in Asia.”⁶

The intention of the Chinese communists to “liberate” Tibet had been proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung himself on January 1, 1950. The entry of the People’s Liberation Army of China into Tibet

produced the first instance of diplomatic friction between New Delhi and Peking.

The Government of India expressed surprise and regret at the march of Chinese troops into Tibet. A memorandum from the Indian Government to Peking delivered by the Indian ambassador, K. M. Panikkar, on October 21, 1950, pointed out that "military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs."

The memorandum said that opinion in the United Nations had been steadily veering round to the admission of China into that organisation "before the close of the current session." Therefore, military action on the eve of a decision by the General Assembly would have serious consequences and would give powerful support to those who were opposed to the admission of the people's government into the U.N. and its Security Council.

The memorandum added:

"At the present time when the international situation is so delicate, any move that is likely to be interpreted as a disturbance of the peace may prejudice the position of China in the eyes of the world. [The Government of India's firm conviction is that one of the principal conditions for the restoration of a peaceful atmosphere is the recognition of the position of the People's Republic of China and its association with the work of the U.N. They feel that an incautious move at the present time even in a matter which is within its own sphere will be used by those who are unfriendly to China to prejudice China's case in the U.N. and generally before neutral opinion. The Government of India attach the highest importance to the earliest settlement of the problem of Chinese representation in international organisations and have been doing everything in their power to bring it to a successful conclusion . . .

"The Government of India's interest in this matter is, as we have explained before, only to see that the admission of the People's Government to the U.N. is not again postponed due to the causes which could be avoided and further that, if possible,

a peaceful solution is followed, while military action may cause unrest and disturbance on her own borders.”⁷

When Chinese forces did move into Tibet, the Government of India branded it as an invasion that was deplorable and contrary to the interests of China and of peace.

“The Government of India can only express their deep regret that in spite of the friendly and disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet by force instead by the slower and more enduring methods of peaceful approach.”⁸

Peking retaliated by saying:

“Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China.

“The problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People’s Republic of China in the U.N. are entirely unrelated, and if certain countries hostile to China use the Tibetan question as a pretext for excluding the Chinese People’s Government from the U.N., they would merely be demonstrating their hostility and unfriendly attitude towards China...

“With regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express their deep regret.”⁹

Peking also alleged that the Tibetan delegation (led by Tsepon Tshagabpa) was being prevented by the Government of India from going to Peking for negotiations with the Chinese People’s Government.

New Delhi stoutly denied that it was subject to foreign influences and asserted that its “advice” to China that Chinese sovereignty

over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiations was not unwarranted interference in China's internal affairs but well-meant advice by a friendly government "which has a natural interest in the solution of the problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods."

New Delhi also categorically told the Chinese that it could not advise the Tibetan delegation, which was then in Kalimpong, to proceed to Peking in view of China's military operations in Tibet.

However, the Government of India suggested that India's political agent in Lhasa and trade agents in Gyantze and Yatung, as also the small military escort to protect the trade route and the maintenance of post and telegraph offices along the route up to Gyantze should continue as before.

The Government of India added:

"Recent developments in Tibet have affected friendly relations and the interest of peace all over the world; this the Government of India deeply regret."¹⁰

An editorial in *The People's Daily* of Peking of November 17, 1950, commented:

"Not only will the peaceful settlement of the Tibet question not be damaged by the march of the People's Liberation Army into Tibet; but, on the contrary, any peaceful settlement should involve peaceful acceptance of the People's Liberation Army's entry into Tibet."¹¹

Then came the Korean war. Then a member of the Security Council, India voted for branding North Korea as an aggressor. But six months later when China massively intervened in the Korean war by sending hundreds of thousands of "people's volunteers," India opposed the labelling of China by the General Assembly as an aggressor.

Nehru explained that China always had an intimate interest in Korea and she could not possibly remain indifferent to the tremendous upheaval in that peninsula. Secondly, a revolution (in this case the Chinese communist revolution) carries with it a certain

momentum, and it takes time for that momentum to get exhausted. While the momentum lasts, the country which has gone through the revolution might do things which may not seem rational or correct. But one must understand the rash actions against the background of the revolutionary momentum.

Thirdly, it was through India that China had issued the warning to the United Nations forces in Korea that should they cross the 38th parallel—after the North Koreans were pushed northwards after the spectacular Inchon landings—Chinese “people’s volunteers” would intervene massively.

As Nehru put it in the course of a broadcast from London on January 12, 1951:

“Great nations have arisen in Asia with long memories of the past they have lived through and with their eyes fixed on a future of promise. India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia have recently acquired their freedom. China has taken a new shape and a new form. But whether we like that shape and form or not, we have to recognise that a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength.

“China in her new-found strength has acted sometimes in a manner which I deeply regret. But we have to remember the background of China—as of other Asian countries—the long period of struggle and frustration, the insolent treatment that they received from imperialist powers and the latter’s refusal to deal with them on terms of equality.

“It is neither right nor practical to ignore the feelings of hundreds of millions of people. It is no longer safe to do so. We, in India, have had 2,000 years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts, but when we hark back to that long past, something of the wisdom of that past also helps us to understand each other. And so, we endeavour to maintain friendly relations with this great neighbour of ours; for the peace of Asia depends upon these relations.”¹²

India sent a military medical mission to Korea to serve with the U.N. forces as a token of New Delhi’s approval of the initial U.N.

action in Korea. The Indian medical team won a citation from General Matthew Ridgeway who succeeded General Douglas Macarthur as commander of U.N. forces in Korea. It was explained in New Delhi that India did not send regular troops to Korea because India's defence forces could not be spared for deployment overseas.

New Delhi served as a channel of communications between Peking and the rest of the world, and in September 1951, India declined to participate in the conference in San Francisco for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan because, among other reasons, China was not a party to it.

The middle of 1953 saw the end of the Korean crisis and the establishment of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission with India as chairman to deal with the prisoners of the Korean war among whom were thousands of Chinese who refused repatriation to China.

On the last day of the year, on the initiative of New Delhi, negotiations began in Peking on the relations between India and Tibet, and an agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India was signed in Peking on April 29, 1954, and ratified on June 3.

This was an important document, for it enunciated for the first time the five principles of peaceful co-existence or Panch Sheel. They are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.

The five principles presumed, according to Nehru, that there were no problems pending between the two countries and that such issues as might arise thereafter would be settled in accordance with these principles.

The Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, visited India in June 1954 and was given a warm reception; the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was heard in New Delhi and

elsewhere. The slogan was first coined by C. N. Malaviya, former chief minister of Bhopal and later India's representative in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation's secretariat in Cairo, during a visit to Peking. It was set to music by the Indian poet, Harindranath Chattopadhyaya.

In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of their talks, Nehru and Chou declared:

“If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security, and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence. . . The prime ministers expressed their confidence in the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as the other countries of Asia.”

The agreement allowed both China and India to establish trade agencies in New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong (by China) and in Yatung, Gyantze and Gartok (by India). It permitted traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in Indo-Tibetan trade to carry on their activities at several places in India and Tibet.

Pilgrims from India were permitted to visit Kailas and Mansarovar in Tibet, while Tibetan pilgrims were allowed to come to Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India. Pilgrims “customarily visiting Lhasa” could continue to do so in accordance with custom.

The notes exchanged in connection with the signing of the agreement led to the withdrawal by India, within six months of its ratification, of the Indian military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyantze in Tibet. The Government of India also handed over to China the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with all the equipment. These services until then were solely being operated by India. The 12 rest houses which were being run by India in Tibet were also handed over to China.

Within six weeks of the agreement being ratified, China, for the first time, charged India with violation of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. In a note given by the counsellor of China in

India to the Indian ministry of external affairs on July 17, 1954, Peking said that "Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti pass on June 29 and intruded into Wuje (the Chinese name for Barahoti) of the Ali area of the Tibet region of China."

The note said that this was "not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India." ¹⁴

Coming as it did so soon after the expression of feelings of friendship and mutual respect, the Chinese claim to Barahoti was regarded by India as having been made through "ignorance." Accordingly, New Delhi sent a note pointing out that there was no question of violation of Tibetan territory by India since Barahoti is south of the Niti pass which is one of the six border passes specifically mentioned in the agreement of April 29, 1954, and is therefore indisputably within Indian territory. India in turn protested against an attempt by Chinese officials to cross into Barahoti.

When Nehru visited China in October 1954, he took up with the Chinese leaders the question of maps then just published in China. These maps, according to New Delhi, showed some 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh as belonging to China.

Nehru drew Chou's attention to these maps, and the Chinese Premier, in reply, said they were merely reproductions of old Kuomintang maps which his government had no time to revise.

In June 1955, Chinese troops camped on Barahoti plain, and in September they proceeded ten miles south of Niti pass to Damzan.

In April 1956 an armed Chinese party intruded into the Nilang area of Uttar Pradesh. Five months later, in September, there were two Chinese intrusions south of Shipki pass which is the first of the six border passes mentioned in the 1954 agreement. The Government of India had constructed a road up to this point and had been maintaining it for several years; and in 1954 the words "Hindustan-Tibet" were engraved on a rock flanking the pass on the left.

On September 20, 1956, a Chinese patrol came up to Hupsang Khud, four miles from Shipki pass on the Indian side. On encountering an Indian patrol, the Chinese party threatened to open fire.

Chou En-lai visited New Delhi again in November 1956. During the talks between the two prime ministers, Chou, according

to Nehru, had stated that the Chinese Government had accepted the so-called McMahon line in the case of the Burma-China boundary, and, regardless of what happened in the past, proposed to recognise this border with India also. Nehru, in the minute which he had written about his talks with Chou, recorded:

“Premier Chou referred to the McMahon line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by the British imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so.”¹⁵

The Chinese version of the conversation is different. A note from the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs to the Indian embassy in Peking said:

“The fact is that at that time Prime Minister Nehru took exception to the delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary line on Chinese maps and, therefore, Premier Chou En-lai explained that the delineation of the boundary on Chinese maps followed that of the old maps and that it would not be fitting for the Chinese Government, on its own, to change the delineation of the boundary before conducting surveys and consulting with the countries concerned. In particular, Premier Chou En-lai pointed out at that time that China has undelimited boundaries with India and some other south-western neighbouring countries. Prime Minister Nehru said, however, that he considered that no boundary question existed between China and India.

“It can be seen from this conversation that there was an obvious difference of views between the two sides regarding the boundary, and that Premier Chou En-lai clearly expressed his

disagreement to any unilateral revision of maps. . .

“In fact, when Premier Chou En-lai referred to the so-called McMahon line, he said that it was illegal and had never been recognised by the Chinese Government. He explained at the same time that despite this, in order to ensure the tranquillity of the border and out of consideration for the friendship of the two countries, Chinese military and administrative personnel would strictly refrain from crossing this line and expressed the hope that a proper survey to settle the eastern sector of the boundary might be found at a later date. This statement of Premier Chou En-lai can by no means be interpreted as recognition of this line by the Chinese Government.”¹⁶

Notes

- 1 Quoted in *China's Betrayal of India*, publications division, ministry of information and broadcasting, Govt. of India, New Delhi, Nov. '62.
- 2 Broadcast from New Delhi as Prime Minister in interim national government of India on Sept. 7, '46, Foreign Affairs Reports, special issue, vol. XIII, no. 6, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
- 3 *China's Betrayal of India*.
- 4 This was stated in the Lok Sabha by M. R. Masani, Swatantra Party member; *The Times of India* Bombay, Nov. 26, '59.
- 5 *China's Betrayal of India*
- 6 Ibid. and *March of India* magazine article reproduced by *The South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, Oct. 25, '62'
- 7, 8, 9 & 10 The hitherto unpublished texts of the four diplomatic documents exchanged by New Delhi & Peking on the question of Tibet in 1950 are reproduced in the appendix.
- 11 New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking, Nov. 18, '59.
- 12 Foreign Affairs Reports, special issue, vol. XIII, no. 6, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi,
- 13 *China's Betrayal of India*.
- 14 White Paper (1954-59), ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, p. 1.
- 15 *China's Betrayal of India*.
- 16 NCNA, Peking, Jan. 5, '60,

TANTRUMS OVER TIBET

ON March 30, 1959, Nehru said in the Lok Sabha that when Chou En-lai visited India in 1956 he had on his own volition given the assurance:

“Tibet is not China; Tibet is not a province of China. Tibet is an autonomous region which has been a part of the Chinese state. Therefore, we want to treat it as an autonomous region and give it full autonomy.”¹

About the same time, China’s policy towards nationalities was enunciated by Radio Peking in the course of two broadcasts on the subject of “Basic Marxism-Leninism” on May 9 and 16, 1956, as follows:

“Recognition of the principle that each nationality has the right to self-determination does not mean that each nationality must be independent and isolated. Whether it is appropriate for a nationality to be independent is for the Communist Party (of China) to decide . . . Lenin expressed the essence of the right of nations to self-determination in a simple formula: ‘To separate in order to unite.’

“The various national minorities are politically, economically and culturally backward as compared to the Han (Chinese) nationality . . . They live in extensive areas of rich natural resources, highly significant to the socialist construction of the motherland. . . In accordance with the situation the Chinese Communist Party formulated its policy towards nationalities. This is a policy to consolidate and build up the great motherland.”²

The decision of the Chinese to “liberate” Tibet was first proclaimed on September 2, 1949, when the official New China News Agency announced that Tibet must be “liberated” and that “the Chinese people will not permit any part of Chinese territory, however small, to remain outside the Chinese People’s Republic.”

Throughout history, until the Chinese invasion in 1950, Tibet had enjoyed independence. Even under the suzerainty of the Manchus, the Tibetan Government conducted its own foreign affairs, maintained its own army, coined its own money, and exercised complete sovereignty in all its affairs.

Tibet had been a theocratic state and the seat of Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) for centuries. According to Lamaist belief, two Grand Lamas, the Dalai, Tibet’s absolute sovereign, and the Panchen, are incarnations of the Buddha.

The fifth Dalai Lama declared Panchen to be an incarnation and granted him the powerful Trashi Lhumpo monastery at Shigatse. Since that time, however, there has been considerable rivalry between the two Lamas. On three occasions the Panchen worked with foreign powers in an effort to establish himself in the seat of government, the Potala, or Palace of the Dalai. This made him unpopular and he was forced to flee in 1920.

In the 18th century, the Manchus, who had previously conquered China, sent an army into Lhasa. However, the suzerainty claimed by the Manchus was only nominal. Even the eastern border regions which the Manchus had placed under the jurisdiction of Yunnan and Szechwan provinces, were never effectively controlled by the Chinese.

When the communists came to power in China in 1949, Tibet was ruled by the youthful 14th Dalai Lama through a regent appointed to exercise control during his minority, and a cabinet equally divided between monks and nobles. Trashi Lhumpo monastery at Shigatse was directed by an adviser, pending Tibetan recognition of a tenth incarnation of the Panchen.

A Chinese-sponsored claimant, discovered by a few of the ninth Panchen’s followers in 1939 but never sent to Lhasa for recognition, was dwelling in Tibetan inhabited territory on the Chinese side of the Sino-Tibetan defacto boundary.

The population of Tibet within the defacto boundary was barely

about a million and a half; one-third of them were monks. The Tibetan army consisted of fewer than ten thousand troops with little modern equipment or training. Tibet's only real defence was its terrain.

In May 1949, units of the Chinese armed forces in Sinkiang moved up to the Sino-Tibetan defacto boundary along the Yangtze river. Simultaneously, an intense propaganda campaign designed to wear down the little resistance that the Tibetans were capable of, was launched. Radio Peking broadcast "appeals" by the Panchen Lama to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the People's Liberation Army of China to "liberate" Tibet.

On October 7, 1950, orders were issued to the Chinese armed forces to move into Tibet. At the same time, Peking asked the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa to send delegates to the Chinese capital "to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet." These delegates who had come to India from Tibet with the intention of going to Peking—there was then no direct route between Lhasa and Peking—called off their visit.

The invading forces crossed the Yangtze river into Tibet on October 17, 1950. The primitive, ill-equipped Tibetan army units stationed near the frontier made a vain bid at resistance, but were overwhelmed and annihilated by the advancing Chinese.

NCNA on November 2, 1950, described the encounter thus:

"According to initial figures, 4,000 men and officers (of the Tibetan army) were taken prisoner or killed by the invincible People's Liberation Army, including more than 20 high-ranking Tibetan officers and a high official whom the Tibetan authorities had despatched to Changtu."

Peking then ordered the construction of two major communication arteries linking Tibet with China; these were the Sinkiang-Tibet and Tsinghai-Tibet highways.

By the time winter set in, making large-scale military operations impossible, the Chinese had sacked Chamdo and occupied it, and two principal army divisions were converging on Tibet, building roads as they progressed, one from Sinkiang and the other from Tsinghai.

Realising that further resistance would be futile, the authorities

in Lhasa sent a delegation to negotiate for peace with the Chinese. It arrived in Peking in late April 1951. It was headed by Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, a Tibetan nobleman and governor of Chamdo. Ngapo Ngawang Jigme had earlier been captured by the Chinese at Changtu. He has since been, judging from Chinese communist propaganda, one of the main props of Chinese communist rule in Tibet; he was designated vice-chairman of the preparatory committee for the Tibet autonomous region.

Negotiations between the Tibetan delegation and the Chinese began in Peking on April 29, 1951, and on May 23 “an historic agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet” was signed. The “peaceful” entry into Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army and its permanent presence there were ensured under the agreement.

The agreement, among other things, said:

“The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the People’s Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.

“The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland, the People’s Republic of China.

“In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the common programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People’s Government.

“The Central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

“The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngoerdeni (Panchen Lama who is also called by the Chinese ‘Panchen Erdeni Chuji Geltzeng’) shall be maintained.

“Tibetan troops shall be reorganised (integrated) step by step into the People’s Liberation Army and become a part of the national defence forces of the People’s Republic of China.

“In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will

be no compulsion on the part of the Central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

“The People’s Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people.

“The Central People’s Government shall have centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

“In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People’s Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and military area headquarters in Tibet.”³

The provisions of this agreement, particularly regarding the status, functions and powers of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, were systematically broken by the Chinese until the Dalai sought refuge in India in 1959 and the Panchen just disappeared from the scene in 1965. With some 13 army divisions stationed in Tibet, its “autonomy” vanished.

The official representative of the Peking government, General Chang Ching-wu, arrived in Lhasa on August 8, 1951, and on October 26 the Chinese army divisions which had moved into Tibet from the east marched into the Tibetan capital under Lieut-Gen Chang Kuo-hua. On December 1, they were joined by the Chinese divisions which had entered Tibet via Sinkiang.

The Tibet military district of the Chinese army was formally established in Lhasa under the command of General Chang Ching-wu on February 10, 1952. In less than a fortnight, Peking asserted its economic authority over Tibet by setting up in Lhasa a branch of the Bank of China. By the end of the year, branches of this bank were functioning in all the principal towns of Tibet.

In April 1952, the Panchen Lama was established in the monastery at Shigatze—a challenge to the authority of the Dalai Lama.

The changes which China instituted in Tibet since then were aimed at the introduction of communism at the earliest possible date. Steps were energetically taken to exploit the natural resources of Tibet and to colonise it.

In the summer of 1952, Peking sent “some 57 well-qualified Chinese scientists to study nature and society on the entire Tibetan plateau.” They reported, according to the Chinese pictorial magazine, *China Reconstructs*, of November-December 1954, that they had found “over 30 valuable minerals in approximately 100 localities.” They added: “We have no doubt whatsoever that copper, iron, electrical, chemical and cement industries, among others, can be set up in Tibet . . . that there is oil in Tibet . . . and coal, certainly worth mining.”

The Sinkiang-Tibet highway—which has been a point of contention between India and China—was opened to traffic as far as Changtu on November 20, 1952.

The first local congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Lhasa in December the same year. The first secretary of the party, Lieut-Gen Chang Kuo-hua, reported that 14 primary schools with 1,300 pupils had already been opened, and over 400 Tibetans trained as cadres. Vast quantities of literature in the Tibetan language was distributed.

It was evident that even at this early stage, when the Chinese were proceeding with their “reforms” somewhat cautiously, they were encountering opposition. *The Times of India* reported from Kalimpong on April 22, 1953, that “members of the secret Tibetan People’s Party, whom the Chinese describe as agents of an underground ‘reactionary’ movement, were arrested in Lhasa after they had submitted a multi-point memorandum to the Chinese through the Dalai Lama.”

The memorandum demanded: 1) that the Dalai Lama be given full control over Tibet; 2) the overall strength of the Chinese occupation troops be reduced to a minimum; 3) conditions in Tibetan monasteries be improved; and 4) the food situation in the land be improved.

Indian newspapers reported that the price of food in Tibet had

risen by 50 per cent in the preceding fortnight and grain was beyond the reach of the common man, while butter and meat were practically unobtainable.

The Times of India of April 29 said that forcible procurement of grain had resulted in discontent and many clashes had taken place between Tibetan peasants and Chinese grain requisition officials.

Reports of difficulties were later confirmed by General Chang Ching-wu, the principal Chinese representative in Tibet. He told the state council in Peking in 1955:

“Due to communications and transport difficulties and many other factors . . . what we have achieved is very little so far as the construction of Tibet and the consolidation of national defence are concerned . . . There have been grave misunderstandings among the nationalities (Han and Tibetan). This, coupled with the non-thorough education on the implementation of the agreement of 1951 caused misunderstandings and doubts on the part of Tibetan personnel, thus hindering the smooth progress of our work.”⁴

The Dalai and Panchen Lamas visited China together in 1954. NCNA and Radio Peking said they received a warm welcome in Peking.

In a speech in Lhasa on April 26, 1956, General Chang quoted Chairman Mao Tse-tung as saying:

“Tibet is a huge area but is too thinly populated. Efforts must be made to raise the population from the present level of two million to more than ten million. Besides, the economy and culture need development. Under the heading of culture, schools, newspapers, films and so on are included, and also religion.”⁵

The formal opening to traffic of the two highways linking Tibet with China was announced by Radio Peking on December 22, 1954, which said that the Tsinghai-Tibet highway is 2,100 kilometres long and the Sinkiang-Tibet highway 2,538 kilometres long.)

Nineteen-fiftyfive was a crucial year in Tibet, for, with the

completion of the highways, China was able to exercise stricter control over that land:

Peking's plan for the reorganisation of the Tibetan governmental system on communist lines became evident early in 1955 when the state council, which is the highest administrative organ of state in China, adopted a resolution to set up a preparatory committee for the Tibet autonomous region. As an autonomous region, Tibet became "an inseparable and integral part of the People's Republic of China under the leadership of the Central Government," according to Communist China's constitution.

The establishment of the preparatory committee gave legal form to the state of affairs which already existed, namely the fact that Tibet was being governed directly by Peking through the Tibet military command of the Chinese army. The Tibetan local government headed by the Dalai Lama was allotted only 15 out of 51 seats on this committee.

At the inaugural meeting of the preparatory committee on April 22, 1955, Marshal Chen Yi, China's vice-premier and foreign minister, said that the "necessary reforms will be introduced to rid Tibet of its backward situation" and to bring Tibetans up to the level of "the advanced Han (Chinese) nationality."

NCNA releases at this time quite frankly referred to disturbed conditions in Tibet and quoted Hsi Jao Chia Tso, the Chinese chairman of the Buddhist Association of China, as saying that "these measures (such as compelling lamas to take part in agricultural cultivation and manual labour and the seizure of weapons kept in monasteries for worship) have created worry on the part of the lamas and the lamaseries and opened the door for enemies to sow dissension . . . Any impetuous and eager attempt for success under unripe conditions only leads to unfavourable results. We must guard against their recurrence."

On August 7, 1955, NCNA, in a report from Peking, admitted that the Chinese army had suppressed a revolt on the eastern border of Tibet. The report said the revolt had started around the end of February in western Szechwan in the Kanze autonomous chou (which is mainly inhabited by Tibetans). Military measures against the rebels became necessary, the report added.

Indoctrination of the young was pushed ahead. On August

15, 1955, NCNA reported from Lhasa that "the first Tibetan Young Pioneers' (the communist youth organisation) summer camp was opened here yesterday."

The abortive revolt of 1955 in western Szechwan made the Chinese apply the brakes slightly on their programme of "socialist transformation" of Tibet. At the eighth congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Liu Shao-chi, who was then vice-chairman of the Politburo, said that in carrying out "socialist transformation of the national minorities, we must pursue a prudent policy." He added:

"In regard to religious belief in the areas of the national minorities, we must for some time adhere to the policy of freedom of religious belief and must never interfere in that connection during social reform."⁶

At the inaugural meeting on April 22, 1956, of the Preparatory Committee in Lhasa, the Dalai Lama made a speech which at once betrayed the plight in which he was. He referred to the "many people who have sacrificed their valuable lives in the construction of the highways," and said:

"Tibet is the centre of lamaism; the whole population has a deep belief in lamaism. The people treasure and protect their religious belief like their life... Recently, news of neighbouring provinces and municipalities where reforms are being carried out or under preparation has reached Tibet and caused suspicion and anxiety among some people here... I wish therefore to express some views on this subject... Tibet has no other alternative but to take the road of socialism. But present conditions in Tibet are still a far way off from socialism. We must carry out reforms step by step..."

"My report is at an end. I ask for criticism on the inappropriate portions. I also ask Vice-Premier Chen Yi to rectify mistakes. Long live the Chinese Communist Party! Long live our great respected leader, Chairman Mao!"⁷

In late June 1956, a group of prominent Tibetans addressed a petition to the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, complaining that

the Chinese had massacred at least 4,000 Tibetans, and that "to us Tibetans the phrase 'Liberation of Tibet' is a deadly mockery."

The petition said:

"It is an irony of history that the people of Asia who have recently cast off the yoke of western colonialism should now be treated to the spectacle of one great Asian nation invading and colonising her weaker Asian neighbour. It was a great blot on the conscience of Asia that not a single finger was lifted by an Asian power to prevent this forcible occupation of a free country."⁸

Eventually, when the revolt got out of hand, the Chinese could no longer suppress the truth. They had to take drastic measures, including the extermination of thousands of Tibetans.

On April 3, 1959, Nehru announced in the Lok Sabha that the Dalai Lama had arrived safely in India. He crossed the frontier at the Indian checkpost of Chutangmu in the area of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), outwitting the Chinese army units which were pursuing him.

The granting of asylum by India to the Dalai Lama was in conformity with international law and convention.

A great debate, spread over several months and punctuating normal business, went on in the Indian Parliament on the question of Tibet, beginning March 1959.

In his very first statement in the Lok Sabha, Nehru explained India's position. He said in reply to points raised by members:

"We had always, not only our government but the previous governments in the world, you might say, recognised the suzerainty of China over Tibet. That had varied; when the Chinese Government was strong, it exercised it, and when weak it did not exercise it. That was for the last several hundred years. But so far as I know, no country had ever recognised the independence of Tibet. We certainly did not; and it was inevitable therefore for us to recognise the suzerainty; call it suzerainty, call it sovereignty—these are fine distinctions and they are determined on the power of the state and how far it goes."⁹

Nehru said that at some periods the autonomy enjoyed by Tibet gave it the right to make treaties. Nevertheless, Tibet was part of the larger Chinese state. From this basic stand various policies of the Government of India flowed in relation to Tibet.

A member reminded Nehru that in his autobiography he had stated that Tibet was independent; what then was the reason for the prime minister's retraction from that position?

Nehru replied that his autobiography dealt chiefly with other matters and he did not remember in what connection Tibet was mentioned in that book. If indeed he had made any such observation in the book it was because of the lack of full knowledge.

As for the alleged political activities in which the Dalai Lama was supposed to be engaged in India, Nehru told the communist member, Hiren Mukherjee, that the assurance which India has asked of the Dalai Lama was that India should not be made the base for activities outside. But it was rather difficult to draw a line between making a statement about the Dalai Lama's views and making India a base for political activities. On the whole, the Government of India took a liberal view in these matters.

At the peak of the revolt, when the Chinese were directing machine-gun fire on Tibetans in Lhasa, a large crowd of Tibetans entered the premises of the Indian consulate-general in the Tibetan capital and implored the consul-general to accompany them—men, women and children—to the Chinese foreign bureau and be a witness to their presentation of a charter of demands.

The consul-general declined to associate himself with it and drew the attention of the Chinese authorities in Lhasa to the incident. "He had rightly decided not to interfere in those affairs," Nehru said.

On March 20, 1959, fighting broke out in the vicinity of the Indian consulate-general in Lhasa and some bullets hit the building. The following day a Chinese official asked the Indian consul-general and his staff to move to the Chinese foreign bureau "for their own protection." This the Indian consul-general refused to do.

On March 30, Nehru said that regardless of what happened in Tibet or China or anywhere, India could not, according to her policy, maintain forces in a foreign country. He was referring to the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement under which India withdrew her military escorts from Tibet.

Nehru did not openly side with the Tibetans. But he went to the extent of saying that "our sympathies go out very much to the Tibetans."

India received thousands upon thousands of refugees from Tibet, and the problem of rehabilitating them in a country which has had more than its share of displaced persons was an additional burden on the Government of India.

Nehru said in Parliament on May 8, 1959:

"We have been moved naturally. We have had a kind of emotional upheaval, by recent happenings, and it is quite understandable that should be so because of certain intimate emotional and other bonds with Tibet, with the people of Tibet or the mountains of Tibet, or Kailash or Manasarovar and so on—a mixture. We are sad, we are distressed at events in Tibet." ¹⁰

Expressions of sympathy for the Tibetan people and concern for their well-being by Indian leaders were answered by China by a propaganda campaign.

The People's Daily of Peking, mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, launched the attack on April 24, with a banner headline across its front page:

"Serious warning to the Indian expansionists." A double-deck sub-heading said:

"The shameless expansionist intrigues of taking advantage of the Tibet rebellion will never succeed. Any action of the imperialists and reactionaries to disrupt China's national unity will be firmly rebuffed." ¹¹

This theme was repeated by practically every newspaper and periodical in China, by Radio Peking and the New China News Agency, and hundreds of thousands of words were devoted to the condemnation of "Indian expansionists, imperialist agents, reactionaries" and so forth, to begin with in general, and later by name. Those specifically named by Peking included Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi, the Indian home minister, the late Govind Vallabh Pant,

and the Sarvodaya leader, Jayaprakash Narayan and Acharya Kripalani.

The verbal onslaught culminated in a personal attack on Nehru by the entire editorial department of *The People's Daily* in its issue of May 6. This form of authorship, by an entire department, is resorted to when Peking wishes to give added emphasis to its views. It epitomised China's objection to the role played by India *vis a vis* the revolt in Tibet.

The 11,500-word article said, among other things:

“Prime Minister Nehru says that the Indian reaction on the question of Tibet is essentially not political but instinctive, largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons, also on a feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts with the Indian people.

“We understand that the Indian people have a feeling of kinship for the people of China's Tibet. Not only that, the Indian people have a feeling of kinship for the whole of the Chinese people. When Premier Chou En-lai visited India, the ardent slogan, ‘Indians and Chinese are brothers’ (Hindi-Chini bhai bhai) was heard everywhere, and these scenes and sentiments seem like a matter of only yesterday.

“But how can feelings towards the people in Tibet be used by certain political figures as a pretext for impairing feelings towards the Chinese people and for interference in China's internal affairs? This kind of logic is fraught with obvious dangers, because if such logic can stand, then, when Tibet has taken the road of democracy and socialism, the road of strength and prosperity, could not a ‘people's committee to support Assam’ and a ‘committee for Uttar Pradesh affairs’ be set up to interfere in the affairs of India's state of Assam or Uttar Pradesh under the pretext of ancient religious and cultural links?

“If the Indian Government can demand certain assurances from the Chinese Government on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the people of Tibet, could it not on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with all the people of China make the outright demand for certain assurances from the Chinese Government as regards all its internal affairs?

Similarly, could not the Chinese Government, also on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the Indian people, demand certain assurances from the Indian Government as regards its internal affairs? Where would peaceful co-existence and the five principles be? Would not the world sink into the chaos of mutual interference?

“Although the Indian Government has no desire to occupy Tibet or make Tibet formally independent, it really strives to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its own territory of Tibet. In this respect certain political figures in India have followed the tradition of the British Government of the past—they only recognise China’s ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet, like India’s ‘suzereinty’ over Sikkim and Bhutan. What they call ‘autonomy’ for Tibet is different from regional autonomy as laid down in clear terms in the constitution of China . . . rather it is a kind of semi-independent status.

“True, Tibet is not a province but an autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China, with greater powers and functions than a province as laid down in the constitution and by law; but it is definitely no protectorate—neither a protectorate of China nor a protectorate of India, nor a joint Chinese-Indian protectorate, nor a so-called buffer state between China and India.”¹⁹

Making a distinction between “the people” and the bourgeoisie of India, with Nehru caught between the two, *The People’s Daily* editorial department said:

“India is a country that has gained independence after shaking off the colonial rule of British imperialism. It desires to develop its national economy in a peaceful international environment and has profound contradictions with the imperialist and colonialist forces. This is one aspect of the picture. Another aspect is that the Indian big bourgeoisie maintains innumerable links with imperialism and is, to a certain extent, dependent on foreign capital. Moreover, by its class nature, the big bourgeoisie has a certain urge for outward expansion. This is why, while it opposes the imperialists’ policy of interven-

tion, it more or less reflects, consciously or unconsciously, certain influences of the imperialist policy of intervention.

“In international affairs, the Indian Government, headed by Prime Minister Nehru, has been reflecting generally the will of the Indian people and playing an important, praiseworthy role in opposing war and colonialism and safeguarding peace, in carrying out a foreign policy of friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and with other socialist countries, of not joining in the military blocs of United States imperialism. But for historical reasons India’s big bourgeoisie has inherited and is attempting to maintain certain legacies from the British colonial rulers. Of course, the great Indian people are not in the least responsible for this dual character of the Indian bourgeoisie.

“We also believe that not only the Indian people, but all far-sighted and wise members in the Indian Government acknowledge that the way for India lies in progress, in looking forward not backward. We, as they do, hold that the authorities of a country which gained independence not long ago and is now still subjected to threats from imperialist interventionists to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbour is a regrettable phenomenon in contemporary international politics.”¹³

The process of communising Tibet began in right earnest on December 26, 1958, when the preparatory committee for the autonomous region of Tibet at its 27th session decided:

1. Universally and penetratingly launch the patriotic and socialist propaganda and education programmes.
2. Train and foster cadres by rotation in a planned way. Cadres will be organised in groups to visit and study in the various minority areas of the interior in 1959.
3. Give all-out aid to the construction of railways and highways.
4. Consolidate the working system of various organisations and raise efficiency.
5. Organise the cadres to take part in physical labour.¹⁴

China’s physical hold on Tibet was strengthened with the construction and opening to traffic in 1959 of the Gartok-Pulan

highway. Starting from Gartok, the terminal of the Sinkiang-Tibet highway, it proceeds southwards for a distance of 250 kilometres to Pulan Dzong at the foot of the Himalayas. The highway, NCNA said in a report from Lhasa on September 18, 1959, crosses more than ten rivers, girdles a number of lakes and passes over mountains that are 5,000 metres above sea level.

The first session of the second National People's Congress of China, held in Peking, discussed the Tibetan question and greeted the People's Liberation Army units stationed in Tibet for quickly putting down the revolt. It decided, among other things, "resolutely to implement national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government."

The resolution on Tibet adopted by the National People's Congress said the existing social system in Tibet is an extremely backward system of serfdom . . . With the putting down of the revolt started by the "reactionary elements of the former Tibet local government who are opposed to reform, conditions have been provided for the smooth realisation of the desire for reform of the broad mass of the Tibetan people." The congress enjoined upon the preparatory committee to carry out "democratic reform step by step so as to free the Tibetan people from suffering and lay the foundations for the building of a prosperous, socialist Tibet."

The resolution declared Tibet to be an inalienable part of China and as belonging to the big family of the Chinese people, and the suppression of the revolt as wholly the internal affair of China, permitting no interference by foreigners.

The National People's Congress noted "with regret that certain people in Indian political circles have recently made extremely unfriendly statements and committed extremely unfriendly acts which interfere in China's internal affairs."¹⁵

Subsequently, in July 1959, the preparatory committee met in Lhasa, when Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, its vice-chairman and secretary-general, reported that "conditions are now ripe for carrying out democratic reform in Tibet."¹⁶ He said the rebels had now been virtually suppressed and the armed rebellion "launched by the upper strata reactionary clique of Tibet has met with shameful defeat."

What the Chinese Communist Party was planning to do was to divest the monasteries of all power by dispossessing them of their

land and property. For this it utilised the services of Ngapo Ngawang Jigme. He told the preparatory committee that "democratic reform" would be carried out in two stages. The first would be the launching of a campaign to suppress the rebel elements, to abolish the system of unpaid forced labour and enslavement, and reduction of rent and interest. The second would be the redistribution of land.

In accordance with the directive of the central authorities (in Peking), the manorial lords would be dealt with differently according to whether or not they joined the rebellion. Land owned by the rebellious manorial lords would be confiscated and the tillers of the land would harvest the year's crop without paying rent. As regards land owned by the manorial lords who had not joined the rebellion, rent would be reduced during the year and the policy of "buying out" would be followed at the time of land reform.

Ngapo Ngawang Jigme also envisaged a programme of "emancipating" poor monks who, he said, were mere slaves within the monasteries. The campaign launched within the monasteries against "rebellious elements, privileges and exploitation" would be intensified.

The Tibetan labouring people believed in religion, but at the same time they hated the monasteries which cruelly exploited and opposed them under the cloak of religion, he said.

The Chinese communist authorities went about confiscating the land and property of those monasteries which they alleged had aided the rebellion; the land owned by the monasteries and temples which did not take part in the rebellion was "bought out." Payment was made in "bonds."

The backbone of the theocratic system in Tibet was thus broken. The dispossession of the monasteries and temples received the blessings of the Panchen Lama, who in his speech at the second plenary session of the preparatory committee held in Lhasa on July 2, 1959, said:

"In the course of reforming, temples and monasteries will inevitably be involved, since the temples and monasteries and some of the high-ranking lamas in them also possess manorial estates and are serf-owners. It would be impossible to launch

reform in society while the feudal exploitation of temples and monasteries remains unchanged. It would not be beneficial to religion if the serfs of the aristocratic feudal government are emancipated while the serfs of the lamaseries remain in bondage. Genuine and philanthropic religion must not retain any stigma of serfdom. Therefore, many feudal systems of oppression and exploitation existing in the lamaseries would also be reformed.

“Socialism has been realised among all the other nationalities of the fatherland. Democratic reform in Tibet has been delayed owing to obstruction and disruption by the former Tibet local government in the past eight years since Tibet’s peaceful liberation. Now we are glad to see the Tibetan people setting out along the highroad to democracy and socialism.”¹⁷

On December 21, 1959, the Chinese communist authorities set up in Lhasa the Tibetan committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) with the object of—to quote General Tan Kuan-san, deputy secretary of the working committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet and political commissar of the Tibetan military area command of the Chinese army—“continuing the task of consolidation and expansion of the people’s democratic united front, strengthening political consultative work, and helping the people’s government in the completion of democratic reform.”¹⁸

By the end of 1960, China had prepared the groundwork for establishing people’s communes in Tibet, thus pushing the “democratic reforms” to their logical conclusion. The first hint of Peking’s plan to set up communes was given by *The People’s Daily* of Peking on August 8, 1960. The journal reported that “like the star-studded firmament, all places are dotted with agricultural producers’ mutual aid teams. They vitalise the Tibetan plateau to an extent unknown before.”

Over 8,400 agricultural producers’ mutual aid teams, embracing more than 100,000 peasant households or 85 per cent of all the peasant families, had been established by then, the paper reported, adding: “Mutual aid teams are the bud of socialism.”

The pattern followed was similar to that adopted in China. During the brief period of land reform, land confiscated from the

monasteries and landlords was distributed among the peasants. But soon thereafter the parcels of land given to the peasants during the land reform phase were quickly pooled into communes and was supposedly owned by the entire people. *The People's Daily* said:

“...They pooled their shares of land and organised mutual aid teams for joint operation, and resolved to make distribution according to work...”¹⁹

As early as October 1959, the Panchen Lama, in his report to the tenth enlarged session of the standing committee of the National People's Congress (of China) had said:

“The working people (of Tibet) who have stood up now know clearly what to love and what to hate; they have drawn a clear distinction between right and wrong... They sincerely thank the Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. They describe Chairman Mao as their sun, their lodestar, and their Living Buddha.”²⁰

On December 15, 1960, the 400 hand-picked delegates to the 12-day conference in Lhasa of outstanding groups and individuals from all fields of work in Tibet issued an appeal to the Tibetan people “to advance determinedly along the road indicated by the Chinese Communist Party.”

A month earlier, the second plenary session of the Tibetan committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference had passed a resolution “calling on members of the middle and upper strata in Tibet to carry out ideological remoulding, work hard and rally round the Chinese Communist Party and march forward under the illumination of Mao Tse-tung's thinking and the three red banners of the general line for building socialism, the great leap forward, and the people's communes.”²¹

By the end of 1960 there were no less than half a million Han (Chinese) nationals in Tibet. Lhasa, Shigatze and Gyantze had virtually become Chinese cities. In Lhasa itself, the Chinese outnumbered Tibetans. About 25,000 Chinese soldiers and 30,000 Communist Party workers with their families had settled down in

and around the city. The municipal administration of Lhasa had been taken over by the Chinese, with Tibetans occupying only very subordinate positions. The Potala (the Dalai Lama's palace) was sealed and none was permitted to enter even the sacred monasteries within the Potala grounds. The Dalai Lama's summer residence in Norbulingka was also sealed, and the fabulous treasures and ancient relics stored inside the Potala were taken away by the Chinese. Images of the Buddha were melted down or removed to museums.²²

The Panchen Lama outlined before the standing committee of the National People's Congress in Peking on December 14, 1960, the tasks that lay ahead of Tibet. He said:

“Our main task in the coming period is to complete democratic reform in full and consolidate the people's democratic dictatorship still further, carry through the people's democratic revolution to the end and energetically develop agriculture and animal husbandry. Under the wise, correct leadership of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, under the radiance of the three red banners—the general line for socialist construction, the big leap forward and the people's communes—and with the help of the people of the brother nationalities, we are full of confidence and determined to work well and devote our energies to building a democratic, socialist and new Tibet.”²³

The distinctive Tibetan language and script—the latter is derived from Pali and is written from left to right—came to be replaced gradually by the Han (Chinese) language and hieroglyphs.

An article entitled, “A year of democracy and new life,” by Kao Lai in *The People's Daily* of Peking on April 26, 1960, quoted Chiang-chin-wang-ch'iu-chieh-pu, deputy director of the general office of the preparatory committee of the Tibetan autonomous region as saying:

“The whole body of nationality (Tibetan) cadres in the preparatory committee study business administration and the Han language every Wednesday and Friday, and Chairman Mao's works, nationalities policy, the Tibetan editions of

Hung-chi (*Red Flag*) and current affairs every Tuesday and Thursday.”²⁴ (*Red Flag* is the Chinese communist theoretical journal).

Thus, the Dalai Lama’s charge that the Chinese were aiming at the obliteration of the culture and race of Tibet seemed justified.

The only factor that prevented the Chinese Communist Party from going full speed ahead with the establishment of communes in Tibet was the difficulty especially on the food front which the party and government were encountering in China itself. The most sympathetic and sanguine accounts of conditions on the Chinese mainland during 1960 and 1961 reported a grave food shortage, the prevalence of nutritional diseases, notably oedema, the lack of enthusiasm among the people for constructive labour, and a near halt in industrial expansion because the foreign exchange earned by China was required for huge imports of food. By early 1961, Peking signed contracts with Australia and Canada for the import of several million tons of wheat and other cereals.

The party and government realised that the communes were largely responsible for this state of affairs, because they had destroyed the individual initiative of the people by depriving them of incentives. The government did not long remain indifferent to this situation, and put the communes in reverse gear. The emphasis during the latter half of 1960 and subsequently was on the higher agricultural co-operatives, while the communes remained largely in name only. The commune messes, which were instrumental in enforcing the most rigid economy on food consumption, however remained.

The new slogan of 1961 in China was: “No change for five years.” The decision to let things as they are for five years was taken by the party and government to give the people some incentive for increased agricultural production. Simultaneously, farming families were allowed to raise a pig or two on small private plots of land where they could also grow cabbages and other vegetables. The products of such “private enterprise” were allowed to be sold in rural fairs which came to be encouraged in 1960 and subsequently.

Parallel with this policy of “no change for five years,” the Chinese in Tibet applied the brakes on the move to set up communes

in that region. The programme for the "socialist transformation" of Tibet was postponed early in 1961 for five years. This policy retreat was first announced by Lhasa Radio on April 2, 1961. It was amplified and the new policy outlined in a series of daily broadcasts of the proceedings of the fifth plenum of the preparatory committee for the Tibetan autonomous region held in Lhasa from April 2 to 14. General Chang Ching-wu, representative of the Peking Government in Tibet and secretary of the Chinese Communist Party's work committee, announced the backtracking at the meeting of the preparatory committee'

Lhasa Radio reported on April 4, 1961:

"General Chang Ching-wu pointed out that the current party policy towards Tibet is to concentrate all efforts to further consolidate the achievements of the democratic revolution as soon as possible; not to launch socialist transformation in Tibet in the next five years; not to establish agricultural and livestock breeders' co-operatives and people's communes; and to create favourable conditions for carrying out the socialist transformation in the future."²⁵

On April 2, Lhasa Radio quoted Pebala Cholieh Namje, deputy chairman of the preparatory committee, as saying:

"Tibet is still in the stage of democratic revolution. Socialist transformation will not be carried out and agricultural and livestock breeders' co-operatives will not be established in the Tibetan region during the next five years, so that efforts can be concentrated on completing the democratic reform movement and leading the broad masses of the Tibetan people to further develop production and practise economy."²⁶

In December 1963, Chou En-lai, in his report to the National People's Congress, disclosed that the Panchen Lama had been dismissed from his position as acting chairman of the preparatory committee for the Tibetan autonomous region. Chou said the Panchen Lama had led the Tibetan serfs to carry out activities "against the people of the motherland and against socialism." But the Panchen

continued to be a member of the committee so that he might have a chance "to repent."²⁷

The five-year moratorium given to Tibet expired in 1965. The formal declaration of Tibet as an autonomous region of China took place on September 1, 1965. But it had by no means finally extinguished the independent spirit of the Khampa tribesmen who rose in open revolt against the Chinese in 1959 and, five or six years later, were still putting up resistance from their mountain hideouts.

The Panchen, who in earlier stages had co-operated with the Chinese, disappeared from the scene altogether and was never heard of again. He evidently had not availed himself of the chance to repent.

NOTES

- 1 *The Hindu* Madras, March 31, '59.
- 2 Quoted by Henry Barnes, *Peaceful Liberation—Its Real Meaning* U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong.
- 3 Text of the agreement was released by New China News Agency (NCNA) in Peking (Current Background, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, No. 76, May 28, '51).
- 4 Quoted by Henry Barnes, *Peaceful Liberation: Its Real Meaning*.
- 5 NCNA, Peking, April 27, '56.
- 6 *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, '55.
- 7 *Ibid.*, April 24, '56.
- 8 "*Peaceful Liberation—Its Real Meaning*."
- 9 *The Times of India*, Bombay, March 25, '61.
- 10 *Ibid.*, May 9, '59.
- 11 NCNA, Hong Kong, Apr. 25, '59.
- 12 & 13 NCNA, Peking, May 7, '59.
- 14 NCNA Lhasa, Dec: 28, '58 (Survey of China Mainland Press—SCMP—U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong).
- 15 NCNA, Peking, April 29, '59.
- 16 *Ibid.*, July 8, '59.
- 17 Current Background No: 584, July 15, '59, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong.
- 18 NCNA, Lhasa, Dec. 22, '59.
- 19 NCNA, Peking, Aug. 9, '60.
- 20 *Ibid.*, Oct. 15, '60.
- 21 *Ibid.*, Nov. 26, '60.
- 22 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Feb. 7, '61.
- 23 NCNA Peking, Dec. 15, '60.
- 24 *Ibid.*, April 27, '60.
- 25 & 26 *Current Scene*, Hong Kong, vol. 1, no. 1.
- 27 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Dec. 31, '64.

THREE

THE BORDER PROBLEM

NEW Delhi's view of the Sino-Indian boundary is that it is well defined by geography, tradition and treaty and needs no further delimitation.

Peking, on the other hand, maintains that the boundary has never been delimited. But there is a traditional, customary line, as also a "line of actual control." The problem could be tackled only when conditions were ripe.

The frontier between India and China—including the frontiers of Sikkim and Bhutan which have special treaty relationships with New Delhi and whose external affairs are the responsibility of the Government of India—extends over 2,640 miles (approximately 4,250 kilometres).

The boundary follows the geographical principle of the watershed which in most places is the crest of the Himalayas. Because of the high altitude and inhospitable climate, the border area is sparsely populated and, in certain areas, not at all.

The Indian administration has extended right up to the border, though a desire not to interfere unduly with the local inhabitants, and the terrain itself, have conditioned the exercise of administrative jurisdiction such as the collection of taxes and the enforcement of law and order.

Until Communist China invested the border issue with a measure of urgency, no previous Government of China had questioned the exercise of defacto and dejure jurisdiction by India up to the customary border.

Peking however claims the subjective right to reverse a process of history. Peking's argument is that it is British imperialism that has created the political frontiers of India, and independent India has committed "aggression" against China by inheriting these frontiers.

Thus Peking claims the right to undo the British imperialist creation by resorting to counter-aggression or counter-force which, in Peking's subjective judgment, is not aggression and, therefore, justified.

According to this logic, any step taken by India to defend her territorial integrity is tantamount to aggression and expansionism. The argument assumes that it does not devolve upon China to prove that her jurisdiction has actually extended up to the geographical limits claimed by her; it rejects the principle in international law that a successor government necessarily inherits the acts of omission and commission of its predecessor. Hence China's claim to territory to which it did not even have access for centuries.

*

*

*

*

The publication in China of a map claiming large parts of Soviet Central Asia, India and South-East Asia as historically belonging to the realm of Peking, therefore, caused a stir in some Asian capitals. The map is included in a book entitled *A Brief history of Modern China*, published in Peking in 1954.

According to this map the proper historical realm of China includes parts of the three Soviet Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghiz and Tadjikistan, which the Chinese legend on the map says were seized by the Russians in 1864.

Nepal, as also Sikkim and Bhutan, are shown as belonging to China. So are the state of Assam in India, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, North and South Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and the Sulu islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Besides Taiwan, a large part of the Soviet Far East is also included within the historical frontiers of China.

*

*

*

*

The Eastern Sector: The Sino-Indian boundary in the north-east, often called the McMahon line, was given formal approval at a tripartite conference held in Simla from October 1913 to July 1914. It was attended by the plenipotentiaries of the Governments of India, Tibet and China, all of them having equal status. An exchange of

notes between the Tibetan and Indian representatives in March 1914 confirmed the boundary between India and Tibet east of Bhutan. It was actually delineated on two large-scale maps after full discussion, and these maps were signed and sealed by the Indian and Tibetan plenipotentiaries.

The boundary, as delineated on the maps, was later confirmed by a formal exchange of notes, and the map itself was attached to the draft convention. This was never challenged by the Chinese representatives at that time or later.

As for the Tibetan plenipotentiaries, they were not displeased at all with the delineation of the boundary. As a matter of fact, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan representative at the conference, stated clearly in the letters exchanged that the government in Lhasa had ordered him to agree to the boundary as drawn on the map.

The natural, traditional, administrative and ethnic boundary between India and Tibet was merely confirmed by the McMahon line. For the most part, it runs along the crest of the high Himalayan range which forms the natural border between the Tibetan tableland to the north and the sub-mountainous region to the south. The Aka, Abor, Dafia, Miri, Mishmi and Monba tribal people who inhabit the foothills to the south of the McMahon line belong to the same ethnic groups as the other hill tribes of Assam. They have no kinship with the Tibetans who regard them with contempt and call them Lopas or southern barbarians who are not worth looking at. India's jurisdiction over this area has extended for a long and unbroken period.

The decisions reached at the Simla conference, embodied in the shape of a convention, and the map appended to it were signed by the Chinese plenipotentiary, Ivan Chen. Although his signature was later repudiated by the Chinese Government, its objections in memoranda dated April 25, May 1 and June 13, 1914, were solely to the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet, and not between Inner Tibet and China. The boundary between India and Tibet, as laid down by the convention, was not challenged by China; neither was any modification of it sought by China.

China has accepted the McMahon line, which forms the frontier between that country and Burma for about 120 miles (approximately 193 kilometres), as the accepted, traditional and firm border between

the two countries. Therefore, China's objection to the McMahon line so far as the boundary between India and Tibet is concerned, does not stand to reason.


The British—and independent India—maintain that Tibet had the power to conclude treaties, and exercised it on many occasions. According to that eminent authority on international law, Oppenheim, states which are not sovereign “often enjoy in many respects the rights, and fulfil in other points the duties, of international persons. They frequently send and receive diplomatic envoys, or at least consuls. They often conclude commercial and other treaties.” (International Law, 8th edition, vol. 1, p. 119).

Tibet had, in the past, entered into a number of treaties which were not only considered valid by the parties concerned but were in actual operation for decades and, in some cases centuries. The treaties of 1684 and 1842 between Tibet on the one hand and Ladakh and Kashmir on the other had confirmed Tibet's traditional boundaries in the west and regulated trade relations. These treaties were in actual operation until the Chinese occupation of Tibet.

Similarly, the Nepal-Tibet treaty of 1856 was in force for a hundred years, until abrogated by the Sino-Nepalese treaty of 1956. Article 3 of the 1956 treaty between China and Nepal reads: “All treaties and documents which existed in the past between China and Nepal including those between the Tibet region of China and Nepal are hereby abrogated.” This proves that Tibet was in a position to enter into treaties and that even the communist Government of China recognised such treaties as valid.

Abrogation of a treaty presupposes validity till the time of abrogation. The 1956 Nepal-China treaty contains the clearest recognition that Tibet had the power in the past to conclude valid treaties on her own with foreign states without the participation of China.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Tibet had independent and direct relations with her neighbours as far as her border interests were concerned, without China exercising any control. Even if Tibet had been a vassal in 1914, the validity of the 1914 agreement on the Indo-Tibetan boundary and its binding nature on Tibet, and on China since 1950, cannot be affected. The prevalence today of Chinese authority in Tibet and Tibet's lack of treaty-making powers at present cannot be projected backwards nor can it in inter-



MAP No. 2

national law affect the status and treaty-making powers of Tibet in 1914.

It is true that China never ratified the Simla convention and, therefore, it never came into force. But the McMahon line was formalised independently of the Simla convention by a direct exchange of letters between the British and Tibetan representatives. The Simla convention, and the map attached to it, are of significance in showing that China recognised the treaty-making powers of Tibet and that China was aware of the formalisation of the McMahon line by India and Tibet.

The Western Sector: This boundary, which should more properly be called the boundary between Tibet and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, is 1,100 miles long. Two-thirds of this frontier consists of the border between Ladakh and Tibet. The treaty of 1842, signed by the plenipotentiaries of Kashmir on the one hand and the then Dalai Lama and the emperor of China on the other, gave renewed sanction to the customary and traditional frontier.

The treaty did not again define the frontier because it was already well defined by custom, usage and tradition. Actually, the Chinese Government in 1847 informed the British authorities in India that since this sector of the India-Tibet boundary was already well known and well defined, additional measures in respect of it would be unnecessary. After Indian survey parties obtained first-hand and detailed knowledge of the boundary, it was accurately shown in Indian maps. An official Chinese map of 1893 also showed the frontier in this sector as depicted in authentic Indian maps.

The Middle Sector: The frontier of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab with Tibet forms the central section of the Indo-Tibetan border. The boundary between Uttar Pradesh and Tibet follows the watershed between the Sutlej on the one hand and the Ganga or Ganges (Kali, Alaknanda and Jadhganga) on the other. Revenue records with the Government of India are said to establish the fact that in this part of the boundary, the high Himalayan range, with passes at elevations of up to 17,000 feet, forms the traditional and well-known boundary. It again follows the watershed principle. Authentic Chinese maps, even as late as 1958, showed this as the boundary. The Nilang-Jadhang area, Bara Hoti, Laphthal and Sang-

cha Malla, which according to the contention of the Chinese Government lie within the limits of Tibet, are in fact well on the Indian side of the watershed. The boundary between Himachal and Tibet is the water-parting between the eastern and the western tributaries of the Sutlej. The border between the Punjab and Tibet is the major watershed between the Pare Chu and Spiti river systems.

The Sikkim-Tibet and Bhutan-Tibet Boundary: The frontiers of Sikkim and Bhutan with Tibet are closely connected with the boundary between India and Tibet as a whole. The convention of 1890 between India and China recognised India's "direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations" of Sikkim. The convention also laid down that the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet as the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Teesta in Sikkim from the waters flowing into the Mochu of Tibet. The boundary was demarcated on the ground five years later. There can therefore be no controversy over the Sikkim-Tibet boundary.

The border between Bhutan and Tibet, however, has not been so precisely defined. But it is a traditional one following the crest of the Himalayas. Chinese maps, however, show a sizeable part of Bhutan as being in Tibet. The Government of India contends that under treaty relations with Bhutan, India has exclusive authority to take with other governments matters pertaining to Bhutan's external relations. The Indian Government accordingly has assumed responsibility for the rectification of what it alleges to be erroneous Chinese maps which show well over 300 square miles of Bhutanese territory as Tibetan. New Delhi, in fact, has taken up with Peking a number of matters on behalf of the Government of Bhutan, including the boundary question.

Debates in the Indian Parliament betrayed India's fears that China's ambitions in Sikkim and Bhutan were to incorporate these states in a "Himalayan federation." Several members of parliament drew the attention of Nehru to the reported speeches by Chinese representatives in Tibet that the ultimate aim of China was to form a "Himalayan federation" comprising Tibet, Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) of India.

Chinese propaganda followed the line that Bhutan and Sikkim were part of Chinese territory in the past and were bound to return

to the (Chinese) motherland; that China would give them unconditional economic aid, that India had inherited, and was preserving, a vestige of British imperialism by treating Sikkim as a protectorate and exercising responsibility for the foreign affairs of Bhutan.

At a mass meeting in Lhasa in July 1959, China's General Chang Kuo-hua said:

“Bhutanese, Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united family in Tibet. They have always been subject to Tibet and to the great motherland of China. They must once again be united and taught the communist doctrine.”¹

Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on August 28, 1959, that he had seen occasional reports in the press of Chinese propaganda on the foregoing theme. But it was not possible for the Government of India to establish the authenticity of these reports. Such reports were naturally causing concern to the people of Sikkim and Bhutan and elsewhere in the border regions of India. Nehru said:

“Our position is quite clear. The Government of India is responsible for the protection of the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan and of the territorial integrity of these two states, and any aggression against Bhutan and Sikkim will be considered as aggression against India.”²

In a note given to the Chinese foreign office in Peking on August 19, the Government of India said that the Bhutan Government had requested it to bring to the notice of the Chinese authorities the following facts:

There are eight villages within Tibet over which Bhutan has been exercising administrative jurisdiction for more than 300 years. They were never subject to Tibetan law, nor did they pay any Tibetan taxes. However, the local Chinese authorities seized all arms, ammunition and ponies belonging to the officers of Bhutan who were in charge of these enclaves at Tarchen. This was a violation of traditional Bhutanese rights and authority.

China also closed the Bhutan-India road which, for a short distance, passes through Tibetan territory south of Yatung. This

was also the subject of a diplomatic note delivered to China on behalf of Bhutan by the Government of India. The note referred to the arrest and ill-treatment by the Chinese of Bhutanese couriers using this road. In particular, it protested against Bhutanese couriers being prevented from approaching the Indian trade agency.

Furthermore, in his letter of September 26, 1959, to the Chinese Premier, Nehru said:

“It is not for me to comment on the reports of largescale movements of Chinese forces in the Tibetan frontier areas. We hope that these moves do not signify a new policy of actively probing into Indian territory along the whole length of the Sino-Indian frontier.

“Reports have reached us that some Chinese officers in Tibet have repeatedly proclaimed that the Chinese authorities will before long take possession of Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and our North-East Frontier Agency. I do not know what authority they had to make these remarks, but I would like to draw your excellency’s attention to them as these remarks have naturally added to the tension on the frontier.”³

Peking has officially remained silent over the Bhutanese protest through the Government of India against the Chinese claim to some 300 square miles of Bhutanese territory in the north and north-eastern sector of the state.

Although the Chinese did not intrude into Bhutanese territory, some concern was caused by the movement of Tibetan refugees into Bhutan. As a counter-move, the Bhutanese augmented their check-posts on the northern border and intensified patrolling. Orders were also issued for the recruitment and training of an army at Wangduphodrang under the direction of a colonel and three captains, all of whom had their training in India. Until then Bhutan had only a 2,500-strong militia.

*

*

*

*

Bhutan’s relations with India have been very friendly, cordial and co-operative. Both the Maharaja and the people have been

appreciative of India's goodwill and varied assistance. Criticism, if any, has been offered without rancour and in the belief that candour is better than secretiveness.

In June 1960, Bhutan addressed a communication to the Government of India, requesting that the boundary between India and Bhutan on the map be denoted as an international frontier and not as a provincial boundary. This is merely a manifestation of Bhutanese nationalism and the desire of the Bhutanese Government to retain a distinction between Sikkim, which is an Indian protectorate, and Bhutan, which is not a protectorate.⁴

Constitutionally, Bhutan, is not a part of India; it is a country. But its sovereignty is qualified by the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949, which incorporates the vital article two of the Bhutan-British India treaty of 1910. It says:

“The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.”⁵

In the event of any difference of opinion over the interpretation of this article, the treaty provides that negotiations be carried on, followed by arbitration by two persons nominated respectively by the Governments of Bhutan and India and presided over by a judge of an Indian high court to be selected by Bhutan. The treaty subsists so long as it is not terminated or modified by mutual consent.

Bhutan says that it always seeks India's advice so far as its external relations are concerned, and accepts the advice in principle. But Bhutan contends that it has the right to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries independently of India. In 1960, Nehru wrote to the Maharaja of Bhutan advising him against any move for the establishment of diplomatic relations with any country.⁶

*

*

*

*

There is no animosity in Bhutan against India. Nehru's declaration in October 1959 that India would defend Bhutan against aggression—which was made with the knowledge and consent of the

Bhutanese Government—was therefore welcomed by Bhutan.

Peking's tactics have been to overstress Bhutan's independence by offering to negotiate directly with it for a settlement of the boundary issue. The attempt has been to play on Bhutanese gullibilities so as to alienate it from India and bring it within the Chinese orbit—eventually perhaps to be included in the plan for the formation of a Himalayan federation under Chinese leadership.

China has sought to cause embarrassment to India by refusing to negotiate through India on the subject of the Sino-Bhutanese boundary and by suggesting to Bhutan that the frontier question can be amicably settled if it directly establishes relations with China. Coupled with this move was Peking's offer of "unconditional" economic aid to Bhutan.⁷

The Maharaja of Bhutan told a press conference in Calcutta on January 23, 1961, that his government had ignored Peking's overtures.

In February 1961, the Maharaja of Bhutan met and had talks with Nehru and the then President of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad. The Maharaja agreed that in accordance with Bhutan's treaty with India, he would not negotiate directly with China but would leave it to India to deal with China on the question of the Chinese occupation of some 300 square miles of Bhutanese territory.

*

*

*

*

Subsequent developments in regard to Bhutan were in the direction of strengthening Indo-Bhutanese ties. A 120-mile road from Phunchuling on the Indo-Bhutanese border to Paro in north-western Bhutan, establishing a direct road link between the two, was completed in 1961 and was formally declared open to traffic in April 1962 when Nehru visited Bhutan.

A number of technical and administrative personnel were recruited by Bhutan from India, including directors of the newly-created Bhutanese departments of agriculture, health, forests and a financial adviser. An Indian was also appointed director-general of development in Bhutan. Large numbers of school teachers from India were recruited and Hindi was prescribed as a medium of instruction in Bhutanese schools, although Bhutanese remained a

compulsory language. English was prescribed as a compulsory language from the middle-school stage.

The new mineral survey department of Bhutan is manned largely by experts loaned by the Geological Survey of India. India also offered aid amounting to Rs. 175 million towards the implementation of Bhutan's first five-year plan.

* * * *

The Chinese position regarding Sikkim and Bhutan was stated in a Chinese foreign ministry note to the Indian embassy:

“With regard to Bhutan and Sikkim, some explanation may be given in passing. China has no other intentions than that of living with them in friendship without committing aggression against each other. Concerning the boundary between China and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy between the delineations on the maps of the two sides in the sector south of the so-called McMahon line. But it has always been tranquil along the border between the two countries.

“The boundary between China and Sikkim has long been formally delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any disputes in practice. All allegations that China wants to ‘encroach on’ Bhutan and Sikkim, just like the allegations that China wants to commit aggression against India and other south-western neighbouring countries, are sheer nonsense.”⁸

NOTES

- 1 This statement was referred to in the Lok Sabha by Dr. Ram Subhag Singh and Raghuvir Sahai who asked Nehru whether he was aware of it. (*The Times of India*, Aug. 29, 1959).
- 2 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Aug. 29, 1959.
- 3 White Paper No. II, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 34-46.
- 4 *The Times of India*, Bombay, June 10, '60.
- 5 & 6 Ibid.
- 7 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Jan. 24, '61.
- 8 NCNA, Peking, Jan. 5, '60.

FOUR

THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE BORDER

THE first public acknowledgement of the existence of a boundary problem between China on the one hand and her Asian neighbours on the other was made by Chou En-lai on April 18, 1959.

Addressing the National People's Congress in Peking, Chou En-lai, in his marathon 15,000-word report, said:

“As is well known, the undetermined boundary lines between our country and certain neighbours are the result of many historical causes, first and foremost the prolonged imperialist aggression. Our country has always stood for a reasonable settlement of this question, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence, through peaceful negotiations with the countries concerned.”¹

Chou added that pending a settlement, China considered it to be in the interest of both the parties to maintain the status-quo and not let “the imperialists succeed in their scheme of sowing discord between us.”

This statement makes it clear that, 1. China regards her boundaries with Asian countries as being “undetermined” or undefined, undelimited and undemarcated, and, therefore, subject to settlement through negotiation;

2. It is not only with India that China has, or had, “undetermined” boundaries, but also with other countries, notably Burma and Nepal; and

3. The “undetermined” boundary lines are the result of “imperialist aggression.”

The term “imperialist aggression” made it evident that where the boundary is not favourable from China's point of view, it is to

be regarded as a product of "imperialist aggression".

As Marshal Chu Teh, the then chairman of the standing committee of China's National People's Congress, put it:

"The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated one left over by British imperialist aggression during a long period in the past against China's Tibet, and the so-called McMahon line is precisely a product of this British imperialist aggression against China's Tibet. This line was never recognised by the Chinese Governments before liberation, including the governments of the northern warlords and the Kuomintang.

"Taking into consideration the historical background of the Sino-Indian boundary question and the fact that the boundary between the two countries had never been formally delimited in the past, the Chinese Government consistently stands for an overall settlement of the boundary question between the two nations through friendly negotiations and in accordance with the five principles. For the sake of upholding Sino-Indian friendship, Chinese troops and administrative personnel have never crossed this so-called McMahon line, pending a settlement and delimitation of the boundary by the two governments.

"This good will and good intention of the Chinese Government was, however, not understood by the Indian Government. . . The facts today are that it is Indian troops who have encroached on China, not Chinese troops encroaching on India; and it is not China but certain persons in India who have violated the five principles and Sino-Indian friendship and created tension on the border. These facts are crystal clear; nobody can deny them."²

By saying that China has never crossed the McMahon line, she conceded one point to India: the right of customary usage. As *The People's Daily* of Peking said in an editorial on September 12, 1959:

"Although China has never recognised the McMahon line, we have never taken any unilateral action to alter the long-existing status of the Sino-Indian border, but advocated that this

state should be temporarily maintained pending an official delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary.”³

The resolution adopted by the eighth session of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress in Peking on September 13, declared:

“The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question should be sought by both sides, taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the five principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way and step by step.

“Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing status quo and not seek to change it by unilateral action, still less by force; as to some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning individual places could be reached through negotiations to ensure the tranquillity of the border areas and uphold the friendship of the two countries. This stand and policy represent the strong will of the people throughout the country to defend the sacred territory of their motherland and their sincere desire to preserve Sino-Indian friendship.”⁴

By “historical background” China refers only to the background of what it calls British imperialist aggression, and not to its own past. But Nehru alluded to the historical background as a whole when he said in the Indian Parliament:

“How did China’s frontiers extend over such a vast area? They did not come out of Brahma’s head. (Brahma is the Creator in the Hindu Trinity). The Chinese state had built itself by conquest obviously, whether it took a hundred, two hundred or three hundred years, as all great states had been built. The Chinese state was not born complete in itself when civilisation began. The argument of British imperialism could be countered with Chinese imperialism. The same way it could be argued that the empires of Asoka or other great Indian

emperors had once spread over to Central Asia. But could it now be argued that India should lay claim to those territories on that basis? These are really the arguments of a strong and aggressive power. Nobody else would use them.”⁵

Chou En-lai subsequently qualified the term “historical background” by saying that it referred to “modern history” only.

China also attributed motives to India. Chou En-lai, for instance, told a British correspondent on September 5, 1960,—the interview was released on November 4—that India was using her boundary dispute with China for political aims at home.⁶ Subsequently, he told another western correspondent that India was expecting increased foreign aid by keeping alive the border question with China. This brought forth the comment from Nehru that “he did not expect a man of Chou’s position to make such an assertion.”

Chou also accused India of attempting to perpetuate an “unequal arrangement” while China had done away with all unequal treaties which had been imposed on her by western powers when she was weak and disunited.

*

*

*

*

Chinese data concerning the border is at total variance with that produced by India.

China holds that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited. The boundary problem is a complicated one left over by history and is a product of the aggressive policy of British imperialism. When India was under British rule, Britain “harboured aggressive ambitions against China’s Tibet region and did everything in its power to create a state of ‘independence’ or ‘semi-independence’ in Tibet so as to put it under British control. At the same time, using India as its base, Britain conducted extensive territorial expansion into China’s Tibet region, and even the Sinkiang region. Britain repeatedly altered the maps, causing an ever greater disparity between the maps published in China, Britain and India as regards the drawing of the Sino-Indian boundary.”

According to Peking, the Government of independent India has

persisted in taking over the boundary line unilaterally announced by Britain, insisted on one-sided revision on Indian maps of the traditional drawing of the Sino-Indian boundary and tried to impose it on China. It is this "unreasonable attitude on the part of the Indian Government" which has come in the way of a settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question and has led to many new disputes and impaired the friendly relations between China and India.

The boundary between China's Sinkiang and Tibet regions and India's Ladakh: Peking maintains that this sector of the boundary has never in history been formally delimited. Chinese maps have shown this sector of the boundary in accordance with "the traditional customary line which actually exists, and this is in conformity with the sphere of China's administration at all times."

According to Peking, the way this section of the boundary is drawn in existing Indian maps cuts about 38,000 square kilometres deep into Chinese territory. India claims this territory to be Indian, but China says that neither British nor Indian administration has ever extended to these places either in the past or at present. Peking says:

"The Indian Government insists that this boundary is drawn in Indian maps in accordance with a treaty concluded between Tibet and Kashmir in 1842 and confirmed by the Chinese Government in 1847. But this is a complete distortion. Following an armed clash between the two sides, the local authorities of China's Tibet and the Kashmir authorities signed a peace treaty in 1842. But this treaty only mentioned in general terms that the two sides would each keep to its boundary and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary.

"In his reply to the request of the British representative in Canton to delimit this section of the boundary in 1847, Chi Ying, governor of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, merely said that delimitation was unnecessary since there was a traditional boundary. The reply neither mentioned any boundary treaty nor did it agree to any boundary proposal by the British side.

"Thus it can be seen that the so-called statement that this section of the boundary has been fixed by treaty is entirely

groundless. Prime Minister Nehru had to admit recently that 'this was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkistan. Nobody had marked it.'"

Peking says that many maps published in Britain in earlier periods, such as the map of the Punjab, western Himalayas and the adjoining parts of Tibet compiled in 1854 by the Briton, John Walker, by order of the court of directors of the East India Company, show this section of the boundary to be closer to that on Chinese maps than the present Indian maps. Therefore, the boundary which India has inherited is simply that invented by Britain in later periods for the purpose of territorial expansion. Britain's boundary claims have no legal grounds, nor do they conform to the actual situation of the boundary at all times. In order to occupy Chinese territory which India has unilaterally assumed to be her own, the Indian Government has repeatedly despatched armed personnel to enter Chinese territory illegally and carried out reconnaissance and surveying activities in recent years.

The section of the boundary between the Ari area of Tibet and the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh states of India: China contends that this section of the boundary also has not been formally delimited. But there is a customary line to follow, and the marking of this section on Chinese maps has been and is in conformity with this customary line.

The Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan: China says that this section of the boundary has also not been delimited. But the "customary" line followed by China cartographically extends down to the southern foothills of the Himalayas. China rejects the delimitation of this section of the boundary at the Simla conference of 1913-14.

The Simla conference, according to Peking, was planned by Britain in an attempt to force China to recognise the semi-independent status of Tibet, to include "large tracts of Chinese territory in Tibet" and to strengthen Britain's extraordinary position in Tibet. The territory south of the McMahon line, the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) area of India, has always belonged to China and was fundamentally under the control of the Tibetan Government until 1940 when British troops began to occupy certain points in this

rugged region.

After the advent of the communist regime in China, Indian troops according to Peking, "pushed forward on a big scale to the south of the so-called McMahon line." The Chinese say they explained to the Indian Government that China does not recognise the McMahon line, but for the sake of Sino-Indian friendship and the maintenance of amity in the border area, Chinese troops would not cross this line, so that the border question could be peacefully negotiated later. It was only because of China's "friendly attitude" that nothing had happened in this sector of the frontier.

But, after the revolt in Tibet, large numbers of Tibetans crossed the McMahon line into India and the Indian troops continued to press northward. They not only crossed the McMahon line but even overstepped the boundary as indicated in current Indian maps. This boundary, according to Peking, cuts even deeper into Tibet than the McMahon line proper.

Indian troops, China alleges, invaded and occupied Longju and intruded into Yasher, Shatze, Khinzemane and Tamadem which, according to Peking, are north of the McMahon line. Indian troops also carried out provocations against the guard units despatched and stationed by the Chinese Government to the north of the so-called McMahon line to prevent remnant armed Tibetans from going back and forth across the border to carry out harassing activities.

The Chinese version of the incident at Longju on August 26, 1959, states that Indian troops intruded into Longju and launched unprovoked armed attacks on the Chinese units stationed in Migyitun, creating the first instance of an armed clash along the Sino-Indian border.

*

*

*

*

In the summer of 1958, in order to ascertain the exact alignment of the Sinkiang-Tibet road which the Chinese built through the Aksaichin region of Ladakh, two reconnaissance parties were sent, an army party to the north and a police party to the southern extremity of the road. It took some time for the police party to return as the trip was a long and arduous one. The army party did not return; it was ambushed and arrested. It was released some time later.

The police party reported that a part of the Sinkiang-Tibet road did cut through Indian territory; and New Delhi lodged a protest.

On the initiative of India, talks were held in New Delhi in April-May 1958 between Indian and Chinese representatives on the question of Barahoti. The Government of India suggested that, pending a settlement, neither side should send armed or civilian personnel into the area. China, however, consented not to send armed personnel, but insisted on the presence of Chinese civilian personnel.

The talks thus proved fruitless, but served to demonstrate that China did not even know which area they were referring to as Wuje. They insisted on a local inquiry, evidently to ascertain details of the area they were claiming.

In July 1958, Khurnak fort in Ladakh was occupied by the Chinese; subsequently there were intrusions into the Lohit frontier division of NEFA, and Laphthal and Sangchamalla in Uttar Pradesh, while Chinese aircraft approaching from Tibet flew over the Spiti valley in the Punjab and over Himachal Pradesh.

In view of these numerous incursions, Nehru addressed a comprehensive letter to his Chinese opposite number on December 14, He said:

“A few months ago, our attention was drawn again to a map of China published in the magazine *China Pictorial* which indicated the border with India. A large part of our North-East Frontier Agency as well as some other parts which are and have long been well recognised as parts of India, and been administered by India in the same way as other parts of our country, were shown to be part of Chinese territory.

“I could understand four years ago that the Chinese Government, being busy with major matters of national reconstruction, could not find time to revise old maps. But you will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People’s Republic came into power, the continued issue of these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India.

“I am venturing to write to you on this subject as I feel that any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries

should be removed as soon as possible. I am anxious, as I am sure you are, that the firm basis of our friendship should not only be maintained but should be strengthened.”⁸

Chou En-lai, in his reply dated January 23, 1959, said that the border question had not been raised in 1954 because, as he put it, “conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement.”⁹

In other words, China signed with India the 1954 agreement embodying the five principles of peaceful co-existence including respect for the territorial integrity of India, without knowing what were the territorial limits of India, or for that matter, of China herself. About the McMahon line, Chou said:

“An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the question of the so-called McMahon line. I discussed this with Your excellency as well as with Prime Minister U Nu. I would now like to explain again the Chinese Government’s attitude. As you are aware, the McMahon line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically too it cannot be considered legal . . . On the other hand, one cannot of course fail to take cognisance of the great and encouraging changes. India and Burma, which are concerned in this line, have attained independence successively and become states friendly with China. In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand, finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter.”¹⁰

Later, Chou said :

“The Chinese Government absolutely does not recognise the so-called McMahon line.”¹¹

The Indian position regarding the McMahon line was amplified by Nehru thus:

“Our boundary is what has been called the McMahon line, but the boundary was not laid down by McMahon. It was a recognition of the long-standing frontier on the high ridge of the Himalayas which divided the two countries at the watershed.”¹²

All this while, from 1950, when the first diplomatic dialogue took place between India and China on the question of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, until the uprising in Tibet and the Longju incident in 1959, the exchange of protest notes, memoranda and letters as well as the Chinese intrusions were kept a closely guarded secret by the Government of India. Peking did not choose to divulge them to the public either, while friendship and goodwill delegations from both countries kept chanting slogans of friendship. Thus the five principles of peaceful co-existence turned out to be a confidence trick. As Nehru himself put it:

“Despite our friendliness, China’s behaviour towards us has shown such utter disregard of the ordinary canons of international behaviour that it has shaken severely our confidence in her good faith. We cannot, on the available evidence, look upon her as other than a country with profoundly inimical intentions towards our independence and institutions.”¹³

NOTES

- 1 NCNA, Peking, April 19, '59.
- 2 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 14, '59.
- 3 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 13, '59.
- 4 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 14, '59.
- 5 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Sept. 13, '59.
- 6 NCNA, Peking, Nov. 5, '60.
- 7 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 11, '59.
- 8 White Paper, 1954-59, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 48-51.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 *China's Betrayal of India*, publications division, ministry of information and broadcasting, Govt. of India, New Delhi, Nov. '62.
- 12 *India's Fight for Territorial Integrity*, publications division, ministry of information and broadcasting, Govt. of India, New Delhi, Aug. '63.
- 13 Article by Jawaharlal Nehru in “Foreign Affairs,” published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, reproduced by *The Times of India*, March 31, '63.

FIVE

THE NOT SO COLD WAR

THE border question between India and China assumed an aspect of vital urgency when Chinese armed forces stormed the Indian police outpost at Longju in the eastern sector of the frontier, killing two men and taking three prisoner. The other Indian pickets were forced to evacuate the post.

The incident occurred on August 26, 1959, and the Indian Parliament was told about it by Nehru on August 29. He said his government had protested strongly to the Chinese and had placed the entire Sino-Indian frontier under direct military control. Until then, only police pickets, coming under the jurisdiction of the Indian home ministry, were in charge of the border.

The incident, evidently, provided the necessary shock to the Government of India, compelling it to revise its thinking not only regarding the border, but also the whole gamut of relations with China.

As a matter of fact, New Delhi had not remained totally idle while the Chinese advanced into Tibet. In 1950, when the Chinese started their operations in Tibet. India had only five check-posts along the northern border—three in the NEFA region and two in Himachal Pradesh in the middle sector of the frontier. The number was increased to 55 within a year, thus covering most of the routes linking India with Tibet. A further increase followed and NEFA and the entire middle sector (Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh) were provided for. In 1954, the year of the birth of the five principles, these check-posts were moved closer to the border.

In Ladakh, some check-posts were established in 1951 and expeditions were organised to the farthest limits of Indian territory, and the frontier outposts as a whole came under the jurisdiction of the central government in New Delhi. Until then they were con-

currently administered by the respective state governments under the overall control of the ministry of home affairs in New Delhi.

Describing how the Chinese moved into Ladakh, Nehru told the Lok Sabha on February 23, 1961, that they had often used the caravan routes in the area. In 1955, the Chinese began levelling one of these routes to convert it into a motorable track. The Government of India had its first suspicion that this might be passing through Indian territory some two years later, that is in 1957. In the summer of 1958, two patrols were sent out to locate the extremities of the road. One succeeded in this and came back to confirm that the road did cut through Indian territory. The other party failed to return; it was ambushed and overpowered by the Chinese.

In March 1961, the Government of India appointed a committee under Lieut.-Gen. L.P. Sen to inquire into the problems of India's border defence with a two-month deadline for the submission of its report.

* * * *

The Longju incident—the first involving fatal casualties between Communist China and India—evoked worldwide interest. Newspapers in New York and Washington splashed the news across their front pages, and questions were asked of state department spokesmen whether the United States contemplated any action.

On April 11, 1961, the Indian defence minister, V.K.Krishna Menon, told the Lok Sabha that troops had been deployed along the borders with China in such a way as to render any Chinese incursion impossible. Although it was not possible for India to raise an army equal to China's or to have armaments similar to those of the big powers, the Government of India had taken steps to defend the country. Troops were now stationed at heights where human beings could not carry on for more than 40 minutes without oxygen.¹

The first white paper containing the notes and other documents exchanged between the Governments of India and China between 1954 and 1959, showed that China's territorial claims and border intrusions increased after the India-China agreement on Tibet, embodying the five principles of peaceful co-existence, was signed in April, 1954.

Five years later, on May 23, 1959, the Indian ministry of external affairs bluntly said :

“It appears that, according to them (the Chinese) Panch Sheel or the five principles of peaceful co-existence may or may not be applied according to convenience or circumstances.

“This is an approach with which the Government of India are not in agreement. They have proclaimed and adhered to these principles as matters of basic policy and not of opportunism.”²

The white paper disclosed that while Chou En-lai was toasting India-China friendship, Chinese troops were advancing towards Shipki La. The Indian Government, in its *aide memoire* given to the Chinese charge d'affaires in India on September 24, 1956, said that any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel will be considered as aggression which the Government of India would resist.

The *aide memoire* added :

“The Government of India have ordered their border security force not to take any action for the present in repulsing this aggression. . . . The Government of India have, however, directed their border security force on no account to retire from their position or to permit Chinese personnel to go beyond where they are even if this involves a clash.

“The Government of India attach great importance to this matter and request immediate action by the Chinese Government. Otherwise there might be an unfortunate clash on our border which will have undesirable results.”³

China warned that India too “cannot have two fronts”—presumably implying that India was already preoccupied with the Pakistan front.

The basic difference between the positions adopted by the two governments became evident from Chou's letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959. In it the Chinese Premier said “there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question.”

Chou said :

“The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated ques-

tion left over by history. In tackling this question, one cannot but, first of all, take into account the historical background of British aggression on China when India was under British rule. . .

“Unexpectedly to the Chinese Government, however, the Indian Government demanded that the Chinese Government give formal recognition to the conditions created by the British policy of aggression against China’s Tibet region as the foundation for the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. What is more serious, the Indian Government has applied all sorts of pressures on the Chinese Government, not even scrupling the use of force to support this demand. At this the Chinese Government cannot but feel deep regret.”⁴

Chou went on to say that the Chinese Government had consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides, “taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the five principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way, step by step.”

Chou stated his government’s views on the different sectors of the boundary :

Western Sector: It is a fact that in 1842 a peace treaty was concluded between the local authorities of Tibet and the Kashmir authorities. However, the then Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the conclusion of this treaty, nor did it ratify the treaty subsequently. However, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary. Therefore, this treaty could not be used to prove that this section of the boundary has been formally delimited by the two sides; even less could it be used as the basis for demanding that the Chinese Government must accept “the unilateral claim of the Indian Government” regarding this section of the boundary.

Chou used one of Nehru’s own impromptu remarks in the Lok Sabha that “this was the boundary of the old Kashmir State. . . with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan; nobody had marked it,” against him.

“It can thus be seen,” Chou said, “that this section of the boun-

dary has never been delimited. Between China and Ladakh, however, there does exist a customary line derived from historical traditions, and Chinese maps have always drawn the boundary between China and Ladakh in accordance with this line.”

The boundary east of Bhutan: Chou said that the Indian Government insisted that this section of the boundary had long been delimited, citing as its grounds the so-called McMahon line which was jointly delineated by the representatives of the Chinese Government, the Tibet local authorities and the British Government at the 1913-14 Simla conference.

“As I have repeatedly made clear to your excellency, the Simla conference was an important step taken by Britain in its design to detach Tibet from China...The so-called McMahon line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and has never been recognised by any Chinese Central Government and is therefore decidedly illegal. As to the Simla treaty, it was not formally signed by the representative of the then Chinese Central Government, and this is explicitly noted in the treaty.”⁵

Referring to the territory involved in this sector, Chou said:

“This piece of territory corresponds in size to the Chekiang province of China and is as big as 90,000 square kilometres. Mr. Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line which would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself by selling out its territory—and such a large piece of territory at that ?”⁶

Sikkim and Bhutan: This part of the boundary, Chou said, does not fall within the scope of the Indian and Chinese Prime Ministers’ present discussion.

“I would like however to take this opportunity to make clear once again that China is willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression against each other, and has always respected the proper relations between them and India.”⁷

There was some controversy subsequently in India whether Chou

had used the term “proper relations” or just “relations” in the course of his discussion on Sikkim and Bhutan with Nehru in New Delhi on April 25, 1960. The report of the officials of the Government of India on the boundary question published in February 1961 stated: “Premier Chou En-lai had stated in his press interview at Delhi on 25 April 1960 that China respects India’s relationship with Bhutan and Sikkim.” *Peking Review* which the Chinese side referred to as containing the text of the interview, qualifies the assurance by adding the adjective ‘proper’ before ‘relations’.

Eastern Sector: Chou repeated the Chinese stand that the Chinese Government “absolutely does not recognise the so-called McMahon line, but Chinese troops have never crossed that line. This is for the sake of maintaining amity along the border to facilitate negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, and in no way implies that the Chinese Government has recognised that line.”

The Chinese Premier went on:

“Since the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, however, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeing of large numbers of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary, changing unilaterally the long-existing state of the border between the two countries. They not only overstepped the so-called McMahon line as indicated in the map attached to the recent notes exchanged by Britain and the Tibet local authorities, but also exceeded the boundary drawn on current Indian maps which are alleged to represent the so-called McMahon line but which in many places actually cuts even deeper into Chinese territory than the McMahon line...

“Nevertheless, the Indian Government has directed all sorts of groundless charges against the Chinese Government, clamouring that China has committed aggression against India and describing the Chinese frontier guards’ act of self-defence in the Migyitun area as armed provocation. Many political figures and propaganda organs in India have seized the occasion to make a great deal of anti-Chinese utterances, some even open-

ly advocating provocative actions of an even larger scale such as bombarding Chinese territory. Thus a second anti-Chinese campaign has been launched in India in six months' time. The fact that India does not recognise the undelimited state of the Sino-Indian boundary and steps up bringing pressure to bear on China militarily, diplomatically and through public opinion cannot but make one suspect that it is India's attempt to impose upon China its one-sided claims on the boundary question..."⁸

Chou En-lai went on to tell Nehru that China looks upon her south-western border as one of peace and friendship. He assured the Indian Premier that it was merely for the purpose of preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border "back and forth to carry out harassing activities" that the Chinese Government had in recent months despatched guard units to be stationed in the south-western part of the Tibet region of China. This was obviously in the interests of ensuring the tranquillity of the border and would in no way constitute a threat to India.

*

*

*

*

Nehru said in parliament:

"It (the Chinese claim) involves the whole geography of India—the Himalayas being handed over as a gift. This is an extraordinary claim, and whether India exists or not, it cannot be conceded."⁹

In China a great "hate India" campaign was mounted. The standing committee of the National People's Congress was summoned and its members made speeches denouncing Indian "imperialists, reactionaries and expansionists."

The People's Daily of Peking of September 13, 1959, while editorially accusing India of aggression and Nehru of making inappropriate remarks, stated what it called the attitude of the Chinese Government:

1. The Chinese Government is willing to seek an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through friendly negotiations.

2. Pending an overall settlement, the two sides must maintain the long-existing status quo of the boundary.

3. As to local disputes that have occurred, negotiations could be held on the provisional measures for a solution.

“We are willing to settle outstanding issues through peaceful negotiation but to deny the existence of any outstanding issue is to deny the need for negotiations.”¹⁰

The eighth session of the standing committee of China’s National People’s Congress, meeting in Peking, passed a resolution on September 13, 1959, which said:

“The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question should be sought by both sides, taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the five principles through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way and step by step.”¹¹

China’s disappointment over the granting of asylum by India to the Dalai Lama was given expression to by Marshal Chen Yi, China’s deputy premier and foreign minister. He said at the NPC standing committee:

“I would like to point out particularly that, although the Indian Government has repeatedly stated that it has only granted asylum in India to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan rebels, but does not recognise the presence in India of a Tibetan Government led by the Dalai Lama, nor allow the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan rebels to engage in political activities against China, nor favour the submission by them of the so-called Tibet question to the United Nations, yet, under the instigation of the Tibetan rebels, the Dalai Lama has all along been engaged in political activities against China and has raised the so-called Tibet question in the United Nations in the name of the so-called Government of Tibet, thus exceeding by far what is allowed under the international practice of asylum. Prime

Minister Nehru said the Government of India always tried to steer a middle course. As a matter of fact to put it more frankly, the Indian Government has always used two-faced tactics. It is indeed extraordinary to adopt such tactics towards a friendly country."¹²

Following the Longju incident, India withdrew its outpost from Tamadem, a few miles east of Longju. A close examination of the alignment of the McMahon line showed that Tamadem is not within Indian territory, and this had been brought to the notice of the Indian Government by a Chinese note.

There was no reciprocal withdrawal by China from Longju, however. On the other hand, Peking tried to exploit the Indian pullout from Tamadem as proof of the correctness of China's stand in regard to Longju and the entire boundary.

On April 1, 1961, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that it was important to avoid taking any steps that might create an unbridgeable chasm between India and China, as the future relations between these two great Asian neighbours was a matter of the highest importance.

Nehru said he did not rule out the possibility that "the strength and correctness of the Indian position may dawn on the Chinese." Meanwhile, India must strengthen herself, prepare for all eventualities and not give in on matters of importance. To those who advocated strong action against China, Nehru counselled:

"Strong action needs preparation and should be resorted to only when all other action is precluded. The consequences of strong action will be vast and far-reaching."¹³

Peking's reaction to such an approach was not altogether one of indifference. Although it did not yield to India on the boundary issue, the Chinese Government, by some astute diplomacy and at a feverish pace, settled its boundary differences with Burma and Nepal, came to a temporary understanding with Indonesia on the overseas Chinese question, and signed treaties of friendship and non-aggression or merely of friendship with Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Guinea, Indonesia and Nepal.

Indian diplomatic officials in Asian capitals often heard the

remark that China was trying to “isolate” India. Opposition members in the Lok Sabha also raised apprehensions about China trying to isolate India from Asian countries and of bracketing her with the “imperialists.”

Acharya J. B. Kripalani veteran Praja-Socialist leader, and Nath Pai, also a Praja-Socialist, saw in Peking’s signing of friendship and non-aggression treaties a grand strategy to woo Asia and show up India as an intrasigent neighbour.¹⁴ A counterfeit Panch Sheel, Nath Pa. said, was now circulating in South-East Asia under Peking’s auspices; and according to Gresham’s law¹⁵ it was displacing genuine Panch Sheel advocated by Nehru.

Nehru however gave the assurance that apprehensions about China succeeding in the diplomatic encirclement of India were not supported by facts. India herself had told Burma to go ahead with negotiations with China and secure the best border agreement that she could.

Kripalani said Nehru was so absorbed with “hundreds of things” including petty squabbles inside his own party that he had had no time to look into the details of the external affairs ministry. Evidence of this was to be found in the fact that India had lost 12,000 square miles of her territory (in Ladakh) to China without striking a blow.

“This is something unique in history,” he said. “I do not think that in any democratic country a government which has lost so much of national territory will be allowed to continue to function.”

Similar remarks about Nehru’s handling of the border issue had earlier been advanced by other members. M. R. Masani of the Swatantra Party, for instance, said sarcastically that when Nehru’s Government was sworn in, its members had taken the oath that they would never surrender a single inch of India’s sacred territory. Now, they were “playing the drawing board game” and calculating how many square inches were 12,000 square miles on the map.

NOTES

1 *The Times of India*, Bombay, April 12, '61.

2 and 3 White Paper 1954-59, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 77-78.

4 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 10, '59.

- 5 and 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid. Chou En-lai was referring to Longju in mentioning the "Migyitun area."
- 9 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Sept. 13, '59.
- 10 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 13, '59.
- 11 Ibid., Sept. 14, '59.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 *The Times of India*, Bombay, April 1, '61.
- 14 Ibid., April 4, '61.
- 15 Gresham was an Elizabethan economist to whom is attributed the law: Bad money drives out good money from circulation.

SIX

LONGJU AND AFTER

WHILE feelings were still running high in India over the Longju incident, Chinese armed forces ambushed and killed ten Indian frontier policemen in Ladakh on October 21, 1959.

The incident occurred at the Kongka pass in the Chang Chenmo valley at a point 48 miles west of Lanak La which marks the Sino-Indian border in this region. The Indian constables had been out on patrol in search of two other members of their party who were missing. They were surprised by sudden and heavy fire by a strong detachment of Chinese troops occupying a hill. The Indians were overwhelmed.

Seventeen Indian constables were originally believed to have been killed, including Karam Singh, who had been a target of China's ire for his successful leadership of patrols to seemingly inaccessible regions along the border. The Chinese did not contradict Indian reports, splashed across the front pages of newspapers, that 17 men were killed. They waited until the late Dr. A. V. Baliga, a Bombay surgeon and president of the Indo-Soviet Society, visited Peking and met Chou En-lai.

At this meeting, Chou very casually told Baliga that Karam Singh was alive, and so were six of his companions. Baliga revealed this news equally casually to this writer in Hong Kong in November. It was appropriately played up on the front pages by both the Bombay and Delhi editions of *The Times of India*.

The captured men, and the bodies of the dead, were handed over by the Chinese to the Indian side on November 14, Nehru's birthday. Until then, the captured Indian constables were kept in pits dug in the hard ground and left exposed to the sub-zero weather of the Himalayas. As was to be expected, the captured Indians made "confessions."

Chou revealed the news about the confessions to Baliga, and Baliga in turn disclosed it to this writer. It was promptly published in *The Times of India*.

The Chinese quickly followed up the attack with a protest, forestalling the Indian protest note by 48 hours.

While the communique issued by the Government of India said that the "serious incident involving heavy casualties" had occurred in Chang Chenmo valley in Southern Ladakh at a place approximately within 40 miles of Indian territory, the Chinese accused India of violating China's frontiers and carrying out armed provocation.¹

A statement issued by the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs said that on October 20, 1959, three Indian armed personnel unlawfully intruded into China's territory in the area south of the Kongka pass in the northwestern tip of the Tibet region of China. The Chinese frontier guards promptly advised them to leave Chinese territory immediately, but were met with refusal. In order to defend the territory of their country from violation, the Chinese frontier guards had to disarm them and put them under detention.

On October 21, the Chinese foreign ministry statement continued, a detachment of Indian troops numbering more than 70 again intruded into Chinese territory in the same area and "unwarrantedly carried out armed provocation against the Chinese frontier guards patrolling there." Relying on their superior strength, the statement said, they encircled and came upon the Chinese patrol, who were comparatively few in number, from two sides, at 13.09 hours, local time, and for the first time opened fire on the Chinese patrol. The Chinese patrol gesticulated to them to withdraw from Chinese territory and stop firing. But the Indian troops paid no heed and opened fire for the second time at 13.19 hours. The Chinese patrol once again gesticulated to them. The Indian troops still paid no heed, and on the contrary, continued to press forward, took away by force horses left in the vicinity by the Chinese patrol, and even opened heavy fire and launched an armed attack on the Chinese patrol at 13.27 hours.

Under these conditions, the Chinese patrol, in self-defence, could not but fire back, the statement said. In the clash which lasted for about two hours, both sides suffered casualties and seven

Indian soldiers were captured by the Chinese patrol. The Indian troops withdrew from Chinese territory at about 16.00 hours, local time, and the Chinese frontier guards found the corpses of nine Indian soldiers on the spot.

Following this incident, there was a great debate in the Indian Parliament not only on the Sino-Indian border question, but on the whole problem of India-China relations and the wisdom or otherwise of Nehru's policy of non-alignment in the international sphere.

India's basic approach to the problem was stated by Nehru. China, he said, had committed a breach of faith with India, a friendly country. Nevertheless, India could not brashly confront Peking with a choice between surrender and war.

China, Nehru said, was in the "abnormal" state that generally followed any major revolution. History had shown that China had always exhibited expansionist tendencies whenever she was strong. Today, the combination of growing strength as a result of rapid industrialisation in China, with the fact of a rapidly growing population, had created a "dangerous and explosive situation." The "abnormality" of a revolution gradually underwent a normalising process, which was clearly evident in the Soviet Union.

Nehru went on to say that the Government of India had always had this appreciation of the situation and felt that it was wrong and dangerous to keep China out of the United Nations. It was in this context that the problem of China had to be assessed. India and China are two great countries, and a conflict between them would affect every aspect of the life of the Indian people and the peace of the world.

It was on the basis of this appreciation of the situation that India had pursued a policy of friendship towards China in the past and preferred an honourable, negotiated settlement of the present disputes. India was not frightened of China. He was proud of the way in which the Indian people as a whole had reacted to the situation. He had again and again asked for calm, because it was undesirable and futile to indulge in brave talk and forget the basic issues.²

Nehru also said that the Chinese had violated the Geneva convention on prisoners of war, which she had accepted, by subjecting the Indian constables taken prisoner in the Kongka pass incident to

interrogation.

Acharya Kripalani accused Nehru of appeasement in the face of Chinese aggression. "Will free India accept the challenge thrown by expansionist China, as did slave India—slave in body but not in spirit—against the British?" he asked, adding that the estimate that Nehru had made of the character of the Chinese revolution and rule were proved to be incorrect.

No one, Kripalani said, had suggested that India should abandon her policy of non-alignment and join the western bloc. Today, even the west might not want it because it might prove to be an embarrassment in western negotiations with the Soviet bloc. But what the critics of Nehru's Government wanted was not an abandonment of neutrality but of passivity; they wanted an assurance that the defence of India's borders would no longer be neglected.

"No country in the world today can hope to resist successfully foreign aggression single-handed, neither America nor Russia. The critics (of the government) want the authorities to make our position clear in this respect: it is that India will not hesitate to get military aid from any quarter to defend the country."³

Kripalani pointed out that Yugoslavia did not hesitate to accept military aid from the United States in 1948 "when attacked by Russia." Because of this, Yugoslavia did not give up her faith in socialism.

"Nobody here has suggested that India should allow the establishment of foreign military bases here. A declaration of readiness to accept foreign military aid in an emergency, I feel, will be very helpful at the present juncture. It does not in any way minimize our present strength to deal with the limited problem that has arisen. It only provides for a contingency which we hope will never arise."⁴

Kripalani joined issue with Krishna Menon on the question of Russian aviators flying helicopters bought by India from the Soviet Union over strategic areas in Ladakh. He said that in

November 1960 the Indian Air Force commander in Jammu and Kashmir consulted the senior military headquarters in the area about the proposal to permit Russian pilots into the forward area. The Indian army, which was responsible for the defence of the border, felt that it was wrong for the Russians to fly to the advance outposts and observe the defence arrangements there. They, therefore, sought the advice of army headquarters. The reply never came despite various reminders. Subsequently, orders were given over the telephone to the local Air Force commander in Jammu and Kashmir by the defence minister (Menon) himself to allow the Russians to go ahead. The Russians, Kripalani alleged, then flew over the area and presumably obtained all the information they and the Chinese needed.

“Why was this extraordinary procedure adopted of issuing orders by ‘phone to a junior local Air Force commander by the defence minister himself?” Kripalani asked.⁵

Krishna Menon did not specifically answer this point, beyond saying that the Russians had flown the helicopters and planes up to Leh, capital city of Ladakh, and that Leh was not a place where foreigners were not permitted to go. As for issuing orders by telephone, Menon said that on the day on which the Soviet pilots flew the planes (December 2, 1960) he (Menon) was in New York.⁶ He did not actually deny that he issued orders by telephone. He could have done so even from New York, as one member pointed out.

Menon went on to say that the Russian pilots were only helping the Indian pilots to gain experience of Soviet planes. The planes did not carry photographic equipment, and what was more, nothing could be seen from that height in that part of the year.

The acquisition of Soviet aircraft, Menon said, did not represent any departure from India’s policy of non-alignment. India had not passed any self-denying ordinance; she would buy the weapons and equipment needed from any source which she regarded to be in her interests.

Minoo R. Masani, Swatantra party member, said that right from the beginning the Chinese had a grand design and they had always been consistent in finding out how much of their nonsense

India would stand. But the Government of India had never shown an awareness of these realities. Nehru had suppressed facts and vital information regarding Chinese aggression, and he would have to bear a heavy responsibility in this connection before the bar of history. However good the intentions of Nehru might have been in withholding facts from the Indian public, they had just the opposite effect. It also helped the Chinese to keep India under a false sense of security and take the country by surprise with superior force.⁷

Masani went on to say that it was wrong, in the first place, to have allowed the buffer state of Tibet to be conquered by the Chinese, as that threw open India and the whole of South-East Asia for domination by the Chinese. The occupation of Tibet was the first step in that direction. Having made a mistake on that score, India should have at least committed China to the acceptance of the traditional frontier. This was a grave lapse and criminal negligence on the part of the Government of India to protect the vital interests of the country. On the other hand, a sentimental misreading of history had been inflicted on the people. For nine long years, the Indian people were told of the 2,000-year-old history of friendship with China. Those who had warned of the dangers of Chinese intentions then were described as alarmists.

Masani then referred to a message which Mao Tse-tung had sent in 1948 to the Indian Communist Party leader, B. T. Ranadive during the communist insurrection in Telengana, then part of Hyderabad state. In that message, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party had said that talk of neutrality was a fraud and that there was no third force. Expressing his reliance in the Communist Party of India, Mao had declared that "India would not long remain under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborator."

While this great debate was on Chou En-lai came forth with the proposal:

"In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called

McMahon line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order.”⁸

This was the famous November 7, 1959, proposal of the Chinese prime minister and was contained in his letter to Nehru of that date. In it the Chinese premier said that if there was any need to increase this distance (of 40 kilometres separating the troops of the two sides) the Chinese Government would consider it. (See chapter on *The Himalayan War*). Chou also proposed that Nehru and he meet for talks in the immediate future.

On November 16, Nehru came forth with counter proposals:

1. In Ladakh, the Chinese withdraw to the east of the boundary claimed by India, and the Indians withdraw to the west of the boundary claimed by China in their official 1956 maps.

2. Since this area is very sparsely populated or not at all; there should be no need to station administrative personnel of either side there.

Chou En-lai rejected this proposal and said to Nehru, “Your Excellency’s proposal is unfair.” Since the Ching dynasty, the Chinese premier said in his letter of December 17, this area (the part of Ladakh under Chinese occupation) has been the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang and western Tibet.

Chou claimed that Chinese soldiers had penetrated this area as far back as the latter half of 1950 “to guard the frontiers.” During the nine years since then, they had been making regular and busy use of this route to bring supplies. He said:

“On the basis of this route, a motor-road over 1,200 kilometres long from Yehcheng in south-western Sinkiang to Gartok in south-western Tibet was built by Chinese frontier guard units together with more than 3,000 civilian builders working under extremely difficult natural conditions from March 1956 to October 1957, cutting across high mountains,

throwing bridges and building culverts.

“For up to eight or nine years since the peaceful liberation of Sinkiang and Tibet, when units of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army began to be stationed in and patrol this area till September 1958 when the intrusion of the area by armed Indian personnel occurred, so many activities were carried out by the Chinese side in this area under its jurisdiction. And yet the Indian side was utterly unaware of them. This is eloquent proof that this area has indeed always been under Chinese jurisdiction and not under Indian jurisdiction. Now the Indian Government asserts that this area has all along been under Indian jurisdiction. This is absolutely unconvincing.”⁹

Chou hypothetically asked Nehru whether, if the Chinese agreed to withdraw to the east of the boundary line claimed by India in Ladakh, the Indians would withdraw to the south of the boundary claimed by China in the NEFA region.

The Chinese premier went on to say that China is a socialist country of the working people, and this predetermines her peaceful intentions and actions. The People’s Republic, he said, is consistently faithful to the five principles of peaceful co-existence; she absolutely does not permit herself to take an attitude of big-nation chauvinism towards other countries, let alone encroach even one inch upon foreign territory.

“Further, China has such a vast expanse of territory, more than half of which, moreover, is sparsely populated and will take great efforts to develop. It would be extremely ludicrous to think that such a country would still want to seek trouble in some desolate areas of a neighbouring country. Therefore, although there are some undelimited sections in the boundaries between China and some of her neighbouring countries in South Asia (whether they are big or small, friendly or unfriendly towards China) China has not taken and will never take advantage of this situation to make any change in the state actually existing on the border by resorting to unilateral action. China is moreover prepared, even after the settlement of the outstanding boundary issues, to work in unison and co-operation with

all her neighbouring countries for the creation of a most peaceful, secure and friendly boundary.”¹⁰

Subsequent moves by China on the boundary question were in the direction of seeking a meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries. The note of the Chinese foreign ministry of December 26, 1959, which dealt in detail with the Chinese interpretation of the boundary issue, said:

“In view of the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary question is rather complex and that it would be extremely difficult to bring about a settlement through the exchange of letters, the Chinese Government has always maintained that face-to-face talks should be held speedily between the representatives of the two governments, first of all between the prime ministers of the two countries, so as more effectively to exchange views and reach agreement.”¹¹

*

*

*

*

News of Chou En-lai's invitation to his Indian opposite number for a meeting in Peking, or alternatively, in Rangoon, gave rise to demands by members of parliament, political leaders and the press in India that Nehru should not meet the Chinese premier “whose hands are smeared with the blood of Indians,” as one member put it, so long as the Chinese did not “vacate their aggression.”

But Nehru was not quite restrained by this clamour. On February 5, 1960, he invited Chou to come to New Delhi. In his letter, the Indian prime minister said that there could be no negotiations on the basis that India's northern border is entirely undelimited, adding that the viewpoints of the two governments were so wide apart and opposed to each other that there appeared to be little ground left for useful talks.

Nevertheless, Nehru thought a meeting might be helpful, as every effort must be made to explore avenues which might lead to a peaceful settlement.¹² The letter inviting Chou was accompanied by a note containing an elaborate refutation of the historical data quoted by the Chinese in support of their border claims.

Even after the fact was known that Nehru had invited the

Chinese premier, criticism persisted. M. R. Masani of the Swatantra Party, for instance, said:

“The people of India do not want him here; they do not want to shake hands with a murderer.”¹³

It was against such a background that Chou arrived in New Delhi on April 19, 1960. The reception he got was rather cold. The bear-hugs of the years gone by were absent, and according to a news agency report of the arrival, Nehru even hesitated to shake hands with the Chinese leader. It was only when photographers prodded the Indian prime minister that he extended his hand to Chou for the sake of pictures. Chou was accompanied by his vice-premier and foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, and deputy foreign minister, Chang Han-fu, as also several officials.

As was expected, no solution to the boundary question was found. But the two leaders agreed that officials of the two governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question, on which each side relies in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two governments.¹⁴

At the conclusion of the talks, Chou En-lai, at a press conference in New Delhi said there were certain common points, or points of proximity, between the two sides which, in his view, could be summarised as follows :

1. There exist disputes with regard to the boundary.
2. There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.
3. In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.
4. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountain.
5. Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as

preconditions, but individual adjustments may be made.

6. In order to insure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.¹⁵

* * * *

While Indian and Chinese officials grappled with the heaps of documents, data and maps—in accordance with the agreement between Nehru and Chou—Chinese intrusions continued.

India discovered that the Chinese had built another road through north-eastern Ladakh which cut even deeper into Indian territory.¹⁶ The new road enters India from the Qara Qash river pass from Malik Shah in Sinkiang. Thereafter it follows the valley of the Qura Qash river in a southerly direction and turns south-east to the Kongka pass and then east to Lanak La, at which point it enters Tibet. The new road's alignment runs more or less parallel to the older highway through Aksaichin and is about 30 to 50 miles to the west of the latter.

The Chinese also constructed a string of airfields in the Tibet-Sinkiang region bordering Ladakh. They are located at Rudok, Gartok and Tashigong south-east of the border village of Demchok.¹⁷

On June 3, 1960, a Chinese patrol consisting of about 25 soldiers crossed into Indian territory in the Kameng frontier division of NEFA and came up to the Taksang monastery which is about four and a half miles inside Indian territory. The patrol soon withdrew when the local inhabitants became aware of its presence. Nehru described the intrusion as "highly reprehensible," but said that nothing much could be done when people trespassed secretly.

"What exactly are we supposed to do except take some local steps? We cannot get hold of them. A report came to us from that little monastery that they were there for a few minutes and then ran away. Except protesting against this small intrusion, we cannot chase them into Tibet. We do not know where to chase and whom to chase."¹⁸

Nehru went on to say that by sending out patrols, the Chinese

had committed a breach of the understanding which Chou and he had provisionally arrived at, namely that both the sides shall cease to send out patrols so as to minimize the chances of contact and clashes.

Between March and November 1960, the Government of India protested against a total of 101 instances of violations of Indian air space by the Chinese, while border violations since Chou En-lai's visit to India in April, numbered three.

On September 17 the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs advanced an explanation for the appearance of foreign aircraft over Indian territory. The information department of Peking's foreign ministry said in a statement that during his visit to India in April, Chou En-lai had informed Nehru on the 25th of that month that it had been found through investigations by the Chinese Government that the intruding planes were U.S. aircraft. They took off from Bangkok, the statement alleged, passed over Burma or China and crossed the Sino-Indian border to penetrate deep into China's interior to parachute secret agents, weapons, supplies and wireless sets, and then flew back to Bangkok, again passing over the Sino-Indian border.¹⁹

India rejected this explanation. In its note of October 24, the Government of India said that it was difficult to believe that the planes which violated Indian air space in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary were based anywhere other than Chinese territory.²⁰

NOTES

- 1 NCNA, Peking, Oct. 27, '59.
- 2 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Nov. 28, '59.
- 3 and 4 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Nov. 26, '59.
- 5 The Government of India bought several helicopters and transport aircraft from the Soviet Union in 1960 as they were considered to be suitable for high altitude operations along the Sino-Indian border.
- 6 *The Times of India*, Bombay, April 13, '61.
- 7 Ibid. Nov. 26, '59.
- 8 NCNA, Peking, Nov. 10, '59.
- 9 Ibid. Dec. 19, '59.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid. Jan. 5, '60.
- 12 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Feb. 16, '60.
- 13 *The South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, Feb. 17, '60.
- 14 NCNA, New Delhi, April 25, '60.

15. **Ibid.**
16. *The Times of India*, Bombay, May 9, '60.
17. **Ibid.** June 13, '60.
18. **Ibid.** Aug. 13, '60.
19. NCNA, Peking, Sept. 18, '60.
20. *The Times of India*, Bombay, Nov. 15, '60.

SEVEN

THE OFFICIALS' REPORT

THE Indian officials nominated for the study of documents, data, maps and other relevant material connected with the boundary question were J.S. Mehta, director of the China division, ministry of external affairs (leader); Dr. S. Gopal, director, historical division, ministry of external affairs; V. V. Paranjpe, T.S. Murty and G.N. Rao, advisers.

The Chinese officials were Chang Wen-chin, director of the first Asian department of the ministry of foreign affairs (leader); Yang Kung-su, director, Tibet bureau of foreign affairs; Chien Chia-tung and Liao Teh-yen, advisers.

They held three sessions: the first in Peking from June 15 to July 25, 1960, during which 18 formal meetings were held; the second in New Delhi from August 19 to October 5, during which 19 formal meetings were held; the third and final session, which consisted of 10 formal meetings, was held in Rangoon, culminating in the signing of the voluminous 555-page report.¹

Actually, this prodigious document consists of two reports, one prepared by the Indian side which runs to 342 pages, and the other prepared by the Chinese side running to 213 pages.

The only element of humour to enliven the dismal series of exchanges was a sally by Dr. Gopal at a reception in Peking. A Chinese official approached him and, obviously, with the intention of being light-hearted, asked: "Where does your evidence begin?"

"From the Peking Man," Dr. Gopal said.²

At the start of the discussions, the Indian side offered to exchange maps on the standard international scale of one to one million. But the Chinese side was unwilling to provide a map of a scale larger than one to five million.

The description in the report of the traditional Indian alignment

is detailed as regards both the natural features and the co-ordinates, while the description provided by the Chinese side is in general terms. Both sides sought further elucidation of the respective alignments during the discussions; whereas the Indian side answered fully all the questions put to them regarding their alignment, the Chinese side only answered half of those put by the Indian side, and only a few of them were precise or complete.

This led the Indian officials to suspect that China deliberately refused to specify the exact delineation of her claim, even for segments where her forces are firmly entrenched, and about which precise information was in her possession.

The Indian side demonstrated that the boundary shown by them lay along the main watershed in the region and was the natural dividing line between the two countries. The Chinese alignment, on the other hand, follows no natural features at all. Where the Indian and Chinese alignments coincide, it is along the Himalayan watershed line; but when the two alignments differ, it is because the Chinese alignment swings westwards and southwards, away from the watershed line and always towards India and never towards Tibet.

A statistical analysis of the evidence furnished by the two sides, on the basis of a commonly applied index showed:³

<i>Basis</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Indian Evidence</i>	<i>Chinese Evidence</i>
Legal basis	Western Sector	23	114
	Middle Sector	44	
	Eastern Sector	47	
Traditional basis Administration	Western Sector	51	159
	„ „	108	
Traditional basis Administration	Middle Sector	89	235
	„ „	146	
Traditional basis Administration	Eastern Sector	40	122
	„ „	82	
Total			630
			245

The evidence relating to the western sector produced by the Indian side showed that at least from the tenth century onwards important points on the present Indian alignment were recognised as the traditional limits of Ladakh on the one hand and Tibet on the other.

The Indian side demonstrated that from the sixth century onwards the southern limits of Sinkiang did not lie south of the Kuen Lun ranges and only reached up to these ranges towards the end of the 19th century. This would mean that the Aksai Chin plateau and the Lingzi Tang plains were never a part of Tibet, and hence of China. There was also documentary evidence establishing that these areas had been utilised by the people of Ladakh and administered by the governments of Ladakh and Kashmir. One document, for example, showed that police checkposts had been maintained by the Kashmir Government in the northern Aksai Chin area as far back as in 1865. There was also a continuous series of revenue and assessment reports covering in detail all the areas now claimed by China. Trade routes running through this area were maintained by the Kashmir Government, and in 1870 the British Indian Government signed an agreement with the Government of Kashmir securing permission to survey the trade routes in these areas.

*

*

*

*

In the middle sector, the Indian evidence showed that, apart from the natural and geographical basis of the high Himalayan watershed range, literary and religious tradition and ancient chronicles corroborated the Indian alignment in a precise way. The areas now claimed by China were also, from the dawn of history, parts of Indian kingdoms and were administered by Indian rulers. Innumerable contemporary records and accounts by explorers and travellers of the last 150 years testified that the boundary in this sector lay along the Himalayan watershed.

In the eastern sector, the submontane region has been repeatedly mentioned in ancient chronicles as part of India, that it had been administered continuously by Indian dynasties. Since 1828 Indian political authority has been exercised continuously over this area.

For all the three sectors, the Indian side showed that the traditional boundaries had received the sanction of treaties : in the wes-

tern sector the treaties of 1684 and 1842 and subsequent diplomatic correspondence; in the middle sector formal communications of 1890, 1914 and 1950 and the agreement of 1954; and in the eastern sector the formalisation of the boundary in 1914.

The traditional boundary represented by the so-called McMahon line was confirmed in a bilateral instrument signed by the plenipotentiaries of India and Tibet. China had not only acknowledged the equal and plenipotentiary status of the Tibetan representative at the Simla conference of 1914 but was aware of the agreement and had never raised any objection to it.

Among the documents brought forward by the Indian side was a note presented by the Government of China in 1947 recognising the validity of this agreement. The Chinese side finally resorted to the allegation that India regarded Tibet as an independent country. This was emphatically denied by the Indian side. But the present status and powers of Tibet could not be projected backwards or allowed to colour the nature of the relations subsisting between China and Tibet in 1914, when Tibet enjoyed treaty making powers.

Regarding the status of Tibet, the Chinese side asserted that Tibet was always a part of and under the sovereign control of China and has had no right to have any dealings with other countries; but at the same time they quoted disputes which showed Tibetan representatives holding negotiations in attempts to resolve boundary differences, and, in the case of Nilang-Jadhang, even constituting an international commission, without any trace of Chinese presence or concurrence or objection.

The result was that the Chinese side referred to Indo-Tibetan boundary discussions, produced Tibetan documents and quoted Tibetan claims in frontier areas even while they asserted that Tibet never had any right to discuss these matters with her neighbours or to conclude boundary agreements.

The Chinese officials sought to dismiss much of the evidence produced by the Indian side on the ground that it came from British sources and merely represented the ambitions of British imperialism. But at the same time the Chinese themselves adduced evidence from British official and non-official records.

As a matter of fact, China benefited from British imperialism so far as her relations with India are concerned. During the years after

1880 the British Government was eager to buttress rather than belittle the position of China in Tibet. This was because the British were anxious to prevent Russia from obtaining a foothold or influence in Tibet.

* * * *

Throughout the discussions, the Chinese side declined to deal with questions pertaining to the boundary of Kashmir state west of the Karakoram pass and to the northern boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan. The refusal to discuss the boundary west of the Karakoram pass was tantamount to questioning the legality of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India.

The Indian side maintained that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan were the legitimate responsibility of the Government of India and within the purview of the talks. In the case of Sikkim, the Chinese Government has recognised the continuing validity of the 1890 convention which expressly acknowledges India's responsibility for the external relations of Sikkim. In the case of Bhutan too, the Government of India has, at the request of the Government of Bhutan, represented to the Chinese Government in matters pertaining to Bhutan's boundary and her interests in Tibet.

* * * *

From the 19th century onwards, the Government of India had been active in all the areas right up to the boundary, and several legislative enactments and official documents had recorded these areas as parts of India.

On every occasion the erroneous depiction of the boundary alignment on Chinese maps (from New Delhi's point of view) came to the notice of the Government of India, prompt action was taken to bring it to the attention of the Chinese authorities.

It was only in September 1959, five years after the Indian Government had first pointed out the errors in the Chinese maps, that the Chinese Government justified and upheld these maps and claimed that they showed the traditional boundary of China.

Having failed until September 1959 to specify her border claims

or to protest against India's open declarations and direct communications on the boundary question, Peking, according to New Delhi, could be deemed to have accepted and acquiesced in the Indian alignment and to have been estopped from advancing claims to what India regards as her territory. This is so under international usage. The Chinese state practice regarding "two Chinas" and the lodging of "serious protests" against alleged violations of her territorial waters and air space along her eastern seaboard by American craft illustrates the truth that it is the duty of a sovereign state, in the protection of its national interests, to challenge any action or statement that adversely affects these interests.

On this point, the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the "Case concerning the temple of Preah Vihear" is important in more than one respect.⁴

The case relates to a dispute between Cambodia and Thailand regarding territorial sovereignty over a border area. Cambodia submitted the question to the International Court of Justice on October 6, 1959. The Court, in its judgment of June 15, 1962, found in favour of Cambodia.

The judgment is mainly based on the reasoning that Siam (Thailand) by her silence and failure to protest against the boundary line shown in a map (deriving indirectly from a treaty settlement) received by her from France (the then protecting power of Cambodia) recognised, adopted and acquiesced in that boundary line and thus conferred on it a binding character. The court found that this binding character was not offset by acts of administration performed over a long period by the Siamese authorities.

With regard to delimitation and demarcation, the International Court stated :

"There are boundary treaties which do no more than refer to a watershed line, or to a crest line, and which make no provision for any delimitation in addition."⁵

*

*

*

*

Friendly relations between countries presume a frank and forthright exchange of views in such vital matters concerning national terri-

tories; and it would unsettle the very basis of trust and amity between nations if vast territorial claims are kept undisclosed and brought forward by a country at its own unilateral convenience when it regards them as "ripe for solution."

Indeed, as far back as 1954, China had signed the five principles of peaceful co-existence with India which included respect for territorial integrity. If the alignment now claimed by China was regarded as the correct one, to have kept undisclosed claims of such a magnitude was contrary to the spirit of mutual confidence and respect for territorial integrity explicitly affirmed in the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement.

The Chinese side contended that the boundary between the two countries had not been formally delimited and, therefore, required to be negotiated between the two countries and, if necessary, settled through joint surveys. The Indian side pointed out that they had never maintained that the Sino-Indian boundary had been formally delimited; but they had no difficulty in showing that the traditional boundary was by itself valid and required no further or formal delimitation.

In stressing the importance of formal delimitation, the Chinese side referred to the examples of Burma and Nepal, which had just then concluded boundary agreements with China. However, the differences between the Indian and Chinese Governments regarding their common boundary have no parallel in the boundaries of China with Burma and with Nepal. In those cases, the boundary alignments were more or less identical and large areas totalling about 50,000 square miles were not involved. With such vast discrepancies between the Indian and Chinese alignments, no demarcation, joint surveys or agreed definition as part of formal delimitation would be possible, unless the Chinese imply large-scale adjustments.

The formal delimitation of traditional boundaries, India contends, is only an optional procedure—for a traditional boundary is valid without it—and a matter of convenience of the governments concerned. It is but an extra process of confirmation, and in the case of the Sino-Indian boundary it could only be with reference to the traditional Indian alignment.

In any case, the agreements concluded by China with Burma and Nepal confirm in fundamental respects the Indian and not the

Chinese position. In both the cases, the boundary was acknowledged to run along the watershed formed by the same continuing mountain system which provides the natural divide between the Indian sub-continent and Tibet.

The Sino-Burmese agreement of 1960 was cited by the Indian side to be particularly instructive in its implications; for, from this agreement it became clear that there was a traditional boundary between China and Burma in the northern sector running along the Himalayan watershed and that there was an exact coincidence between this traditional boundary and that delimited in the McMahon line agreement in 1914.

The Sino-Burmese boundary treaty was also illustrative of the fact that Chinese maps had been grossly erroneous in the past, because until 1953 Chinese maps had shown at least 25,000 square miles of Burmese territory as lying within China. So, the very agreements with Burma and Nepal which China presented as examples as well as vindications of her point of view serve to vindicate the Indian case.

The Indian contention was that the practice of the Chinese governments in the past and since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and international boundary law precedents, all fully establish that a traditional boundary which conforms to natural features and has been accepted in tradition and custom, does not require formal delimitation to establish its sanctity.

The Indian position is that this traditional boundary had already been delimited through a historical process. Traditional boundaries have an ancient validity and they do not naturally suffer change; the Indian side could not accept the Chinese suggestion that the strength or weakness of the respective governments, or the effective exercise of military control in the border areas can in any way change the boundaries or affect the legitimate title of the countries concerned to the territories on their side of the boundary.

The crux of the Sino-Indian boundary question is not the nature of the boundary, because both sides contend that their alignment has been accepted for centuries, but which of the two alignments is the true traditional boundary.

The majestic arc of the Kuen Lun and the great Himalayan ranges form the most impressive natural boundary in the world.

It has been recognised in tradition and custom for centuries, has determined the limits of administration on both sides and has received confirmation for different sectors at different times during the last 300 years in valid international agreements.

The Chinese contention throughout the discussions was that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited, and that there is only a traditional customary line as shown in Chinese maps. This line was formed by the extent up to which each side "always exercised jurisdiction."

The Chinese officials contended that up to now no treaty or agreement delimiting the entire boundary has ever been concluded between China and India, nor has there been any treaty or agreement delimiting a certain sector of the boundary concluded between them; and none of the treaties and agreements between the two countries in the past contain terms pertaining to defining the Sino-Indian boundary.

The treaty of 1684 was dismissed by the Chinese as fragmentary and "without a proper beginning and end." Therefore it does not exist. In any case, the Chinese officials said, they were unaware of its existence until India drew Peking's attention to it.

The 1842 treaty was rejected by the Chinese as a mere exchange of notes between the two sides after a war to ensure mutual non-aggression.

The Chinese position was that since India claims that the boundary is well defined by history, geography, tradition and treaty, the onus of proof lies with the Indian side. It does not devolve on China to prove its claims which it had already asserted by actual occupation, except in NEFA.

As for the McMahon line, besides the point that it was a product of British aggression against China which the latter never recognised, the Chinese side argumentatively asked why the Indian boundary should extend right up to the crest of the Himalayas in NEFA while westwards, so far as Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal are concerned, the Indian border ends at the foothills of the Himalayas.

By the same token it could be asked why the Chinese frontier should extend down to the foothills of the Himalayas in NEFA while so far as Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal are concerned it ends on the high Himalayan watershed ridge.

The Indian side had suspected that the reason why Peking agreed to a detailed examination of all the historical documents, records, accounts, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question was to know the Indian case so that the Chinese could, accordingly, take a decision on whether to submit the dispute to arbitration or not.

When arbitration either by the International Court or by some other body acceptable to both the sides was actually offered by India, it was turned down by Peking.

*

*

*

*

During the discussions, the two sides submitted various maps in support of their respective claims. Among the cartographic documents presented by India were :

1. "The Oldest Chinese Map" of the region, drawn towards the end of the sixth century, which showed clearly that the Kuen Lun mountains formed the southern limits of Sinkiang.

2. A map drawn in 1607 by a Buddhist priest, Jen Chao, which though not accurate showed that the Tungling or Pamir and Kuen Lun mountains lay between India on the one hand and Sinkiang and Tibet on the other.

3. A map from the Chinese work, 'Chin ting huang yu hsi yu tu chih' or the *Annals and Maps of the Western Territories of the Empire*. This was published in 1762 and had a number of maps of the area, all of which showed that Sinkiang did not extend even up to where the Indian alignment is now being shown, that is along the Kuen Lun mountains.

4. A map from 'Chin ting hsin Chiang chih lueh' or *An Account of Sinkiang* published by a commission set up by the scholars and officials of Peking in 1821. Book III of this work contains a number of maps of Sinkiang, but only one out of them was submitted by the Indian side as being sufficient. It showed the Tsungling mountains, by which was meant the Kuen Lun range, formed the southern limit of Sinkiang.

5. A map from 'Hsi yu shui tao chi' or *Remarks on the Rivers of the Western Countries*, which showed the Kuen Lun mountains as the southern limit of Yarkhand and Khotan.

6. A map published by Peking University in November 1925 showing the maximum extent of China under the Ching dynasty, that is before 1911. This showed that even in the days of its maximum expansion before 1911, China did not include the Aksaichin area.

7. A map published in 1908 of Tibet in *The Atlas of the Chinese Empire*. It showed the Indian boundary in the western sector more or less in consonance with the traditional Indian alignment.

8. A map from 'Ta ching ti kuo chuan tu' or *The Atlas of the Chinese Empire*, published on June 15, 1908, by the Commercial Press, Limited, Shanghai. Although the Sino-Indian boundary was shown by a thick line, it was precise enough to show that it cut across Pangong lake and that the Chang Chenmo valley is in India.

9. A map of western Tibet in the *New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China* published in Shanghai some time after 1917 by *The North China Daily News and Herald* on the basis of authoritative official surveys. In this map the northern and eastern boundaries of Ladakh are shown more or less similar to the present Indian alignment.

10. Apart from these official maps, the Indian side submitted a map drawn by John Arrowsmith in 1876 in which the boundary from the Muztagh pass in the north-west right down to the Hanle region in the south-east was shown more or less in accordance with the Indian alignment.

11. A German map of Central Asia compiled by Dr. Joseph Chavanne and published in Leipzig in 1880 which showed an alignment very close to the traditional Indian boundary.

12. A map published in March 1912 in *The Geographical*, the official publication of the Royal Geographical Society. This map showed what were called "the Chinese frontiers of India" which approximated very closely to the Indian alignment.

13. A map published by the same society in September 1916 which again tallied more or less with the Indian alignment.

14. The Chinese emperor, Kang Hi, had a systematic map of Tibet prepared by certain Jesuit missionaries and lamas who were in his employ between 1711 and 1717. A copy of this map was sent to Paris and published by Du Halde in his *Description de la Chine* and by d'Anville in his *Nouveau Atlas de la Chine*, 1737. It showed that

the southern limit of Tibet corresponded to the traditional Indian alignment.

15. Another Chinese map in several sheets prepared in the Tao Kwang reign (1821-1850) showed the boundary corresponding to the Indian alignment.

16. The Ta Tsing map of 1863 again showed the southern limits of Tibet as corresponding to the Indian alignment.

17. The Hsitsang-tu-kaos written in 1886 by Huang Pei-chiao showed the southern frontier of Tibet in the same way as in the above two maps.

18. Map 25 in the atlas, *Ta ching ti kuo chuan tu*, published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai, in 1908, clearly showed a boundary more or less in consonance with the traditional Indian alignment.

19. The map of Tibet in *The Atlas of the Chinese Empire* published by the China Mission in 1908 showed the Indo-Tibetan boundary in the eastern sector more or less in conformity with the traditional Indian alignment.

20. The map on page 30 of *Chung kuo chin shih ya ti tu show* published by the Chao Chung Academy, Canton, in 1910, also showed a boundary largely in conformity with the traditional Indian alignment.

21. The map of Tibet in *The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China* which was based on authoritative surveys and was published in 1917, that is subsequent to the Simla conference, showed a boundary which largely conformed to the Indian alignment.

22. The map published by Peking university in November 1925 depicting the maximum extent of China in the days of the Ching dynasty, again showed the frontier of India in the eastern sector as lying approximately where the present Indian boundary lies.

23. A German map prepared by Stulpnagel and published in Gotha in 1885 showed the Indian boundary in the eastern sector north of the southern Himalayan slopes.

24. The sketch map of some parts of southern and eastern Tibet as used many years ago by Catholic missionaries, published in 1871, showed the Abor, Mishmi and other tribal areas to be outside Tibet.

25. Similarly, a map of *Asie Meridionale*, published by Andrievau Coujon in Paris in 1876 showed the tribal territory as lying outside Tibet.

26. A map specially prepared for the Royal Geographic Society of London in 1912 showed a boundary which approximated closely to the traditional Indian alignment.

27. Another map published in September 1916 in *The Geographical Journal* published by the Royal Geographic Society, corresponded to the Indian alignment.

The Chinese side produced eleven maps. 1. *A Map of India* drawn and engraved by a geographer of the East India Company, John Walker, in 1825 with additions in 1826. In it, Kashmir is shown as extending eastwards only up to 77 degrees and not 80 degrees east longitude as shown in current Indian maps.

2. *India* published by the surveyor-general's office, Calcutta, in 1865. The western sector of the boundary is not drawn on this map, while the eastern sector corresponds to the traditional Chinese alignment.

3. *India* re-edited by the Survey of India in 1889. In it the western sector of the boundary is shown up to 80 degrees east as in current Indian maps, but a segment is marked as undefined. The delineation in the eastern sector corresponds to that shown in Chinese maps.

4. *District Map of India* published by the Survey of India in 1903. In it, the Chinese say, the western and middle sectors are not drawn, while the eastern sector concurs with Chinese maps.

5. *Tibet and Adjacent Countries* published by the Survey of India in 1917. The western and middle sectors are not shown in it, while the eastern sector boundary is the same as in Chinese maps.

6. *Southern Asia Series—Kashmir* published by the Survey of India in 1929. The western sector of the boundary is not shown on this map.

7. *Highlands of Tibet and Surrounding Regions*, first edition, published by the Survey of India in 1936. The western and middle sectors are not drawn, while the McMahon line is drawn with the legend 'boundary undemarcated.'

8. *Tibet and Adjacent Countries* published by the Survey of India in 1938. The western and middle sectors of the boundary are not drawn, while in the eastern sector the McMahon line is also not shown.

9. *India and Adjacent Countries*, first edition, published by the Survey of India in 1945. The western and middle sectors are not drawn, but a colour wash applied to the eastern part of Kashmir spreads beyond 80 degrees east. But this portion is marked 'boundary undefined' while the McMahon line is shown as depicting the 'approximate' boundary line.

10. *India Showing Political Divisions in the New Republic* first edition, published by the Survey of India in 1950. In it the western and middle sectors are not marked except for an outline shown by a colour wash. Although the McMahon line is shown in the eastern sector, the boundary is marked undemarcated.

11. *India and Adjacent Countries*, second edition, published by the Survey of India in 1952, does not show the western and middle sectors, only a colour wash indicating the extent of the frontiers as they are in current Indian maps,. In the eastern sector, the McMahon line is drawn but marked 'boundary undemarcated.'

*

*

*

*

An attempt at understanding the mind of China regarding the border wrangle was made by India during the Geneva parleys on Laos. The then defence minister of India, V. K. Krishna Menon, had occasion to talk to the Chinese foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, and it was then agreed that the secretary-general of the Indian external affairs ministry, R. K. Nehru, should visit China while on his way back from the 40th anniversary celebration of the Mongolian Communist Party at Ulan Bator. R. K. Nehru had in all six hours of discussions with Chou En-lai and Chen Yi in July 1961.

Following this meeting, the Government of India made public five notes exchanged between the two countries on the question of the trijunction of the boundaries of India, Burma and China. In one of them, Peking categorically asserted that it will "absolutely not retreat an inch from its stand on the question of the Sino-Indian boundary" so long as India is not prepared to negotiate with China on the basis that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited and that it is the product of British imperialist aggression which India has inherited

NOTES

- 1 Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, ministry of external affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.
- 2 The Peking Man is a prehistoric type of man represented by the remains first found in 1929 in Peking.
- 3 *China's Betrayal of India*, publications division, ministry of information and broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi.
- 4 *The Preah Vihear Case and the Sino-Indian Boundary Question* by Dr. K. Krishna Rao, legal adviser and director, legal and treaties division, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, and vice-president of the Indian Society of International Law, published under the auspices of the Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi, originally appeared as an editorial comment in the *Indian Journal of International Law* (vol. 2, no. 3), pp. 2 and 3. The case has not been mentioned in the officials' report.
- 5 Ibid.

EIGHT

THE McMAHON LINE

SOME are born great; some achieve greatness; some have greatness thrust upon them. Without intending to tarnish the memory of the late Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, political adviser to the Viceroy of India, one might say that he belongs to the last category. Little could he have thought that some day the boundary line named after him would make world news.

The line was not drawn by McMahon; the Simla conference which he convened merely formalised the long-existing boundary along the highest watershed ridge.

Extending westwards from the trijunction of India, Burma and Tibet up to the north-eastern tip of Bhutan, the line is 830 miles or 1288 kilometres long.

To trace the background to the line, it is necessary to recall the Manchu emperor's expedition to Tibet. The Chinese monarch ordered Feng Chien to go to Tibet. He took up residence in Batang. The ruthlessness with which he treated the local people, particularly the lamas, led to a revolt, and he was killed.

The Chinese emperor ordered troops into Tibet. The Chinese army, led by General Chao Erh-feng, sacked Batang and occupied it and the surrounding area in 1906.

The general appointed Chinese administrators in place of the local authorities, curtailed the power of the monasteries, and sought to settle Chinese immigrants.

The Chinese went ahead with their conquest. Derge fell in 1908, and Chamdo and Markam the following year. In 1910, the Chinese army marched into Lhasa, and the then Dalai Lama fled.

During the subsequent operations, the Chinese occupied the Mishmi hills area in NEFA which had never been a part of Tibet.

This caused concern in India, and the then British Indian authorities came to recognise the necessity of formalising the long-existing boundary so that the Chinese may not extend their sway over the submontane region of the southern slopes of the Himalayas.

At the time Burma was a part of the British Indian empire. The larger part of Burma's northern frontier with China had been demarcated following discussions between the two governments between 1824 and 1900. But there was a gap between the western tip of the Burma-Tibet frontier and the northern-eastern end of Bhutan.

The then Government of India proceeded with the task in a systematic and scientific manner. Exploratory parties surveyed the area between 1911 and 1913 to determine the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction. This done, the Government of India convened a tripartite conference in Simla to settle this and other related issues.

It was only after the fall of the Manchu empire that the Dalai Lama was able to return to Lhasa. President Yuan Shih-kai acted on April 12, 1912, by proclaiming Tibet as a province of China and by mobilising troops in Szechwan and Yunnan provinces with a view to ordering them into Tibet. But in the face of British protests, the move was abandoned.

Before the Simla conference opened, Britain and China agreed that the Tibetan plenipotentiary would participate on an equal footing. At the conference, the Tibetan representative, Lonchen Shatra, demanded the right to complete independence and insisted on the return to Tibet of all territories up to Tachienlu. The Chinese delegate, on the other hand, pleaded that Tibet be recognised as an integral part of China.

Sir Arthur Henry McMahon suggested the division of Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet. This was accepted by China, and the subsequent discussion was confined to the location of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet.

The negotiations dragged on, and the British delegate, in March 1914, submitted a draft convention on the basis of the division of Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet. The latter was to be autonomous with Chinese troops and personnel excluded from it. The convention was then initialled by the three parties.

The Chinese Government raised objections to it subsequently,

but informed the British that their reservations were only in regard to the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet.

The negotiations leading to the Simla conference showed that, far from the British entertaining ambitions in Tibet, the Tibetan side was concerned at the attempts of the Chinese side to convert Tibet into a Chinese province.¹

The Chinese argument is that their government was forced to attend the Simla conference. The fact however is that the Chinese participated in it wholeheartedly and took an active interest in the proceedings. In any case, Peking cannot seek support from the actions of previous Governments of China when it suits its purpose and disown them when they do not. Such a position would make a mockery of international relations.

It is an accepted principle of international law that all commitments entered into by previous governments are binding on successor governments until and unless they are renegotiated.

The other Chinese argument is that China never ratified the Simla treaty; that China was not a party to the agreement between India and Tibet concerning the McMahon line.

As for the non-ratification by China of the Simla treaty, under international law, the failure of one of the parties to a multiple treaty to ratify it cannot affect its binding value on the other parties.

During the period under discussion, Tibet had independent and direct relations with her neighbours as far as her interests along the border were concerned, without any interference by China. Such nominal suzerainty over Tibet which China claimed was virtually extinguished during the period concerned. The authority which Peking exercises over Tibet at present cannot be projected backwards to the time when Tibet did enjoy treaty-making powers.

The Chinese have never established that they exercised authority over and had personnel in Tibet during the period 1912 to 1950. The very fact that the Chinese Government considered it necessary in 1950 to "liberate the Tibet region" is proof enough of the absence of Chinese authority there prior to the "liberation."

In the latter half of the 19th century, when Nepal invaded Tibet, China was unable either to assist Tibet or to represent it at the conclusion of the peace treaty of 1856 under which Tibet granted to Nepal certain extra-territorial rights. Unless Tibet had absolute and

unrestricted control over its own territory it could not possibly have granted to Nepal—and the latter accepted—such extra-territorial rights. As a matter of fact, the Chinese themselves gave formal recognition to this Nepal-Tibet treaty by finding it necessary in 1956 to abrogate it in agreement with Nepal through the Sino-Nepalese treaty of that year. Abrogation presupposes validity until the time of abrogation.

The 1956 Sino-Nepalese treaty contained the clearest recognition that Tibet had the power in the past to conclude treaties on its own with foreign states without the participation or permission of China.

Even as late as 1942-43, when Britain and China were allies in war, the combined pressure of these two countries and that of the United States could not persuade the Tibetan Government to extend facilities for sending supplies to China. The neutrality of Tibet in the face of pressure from three great powers is further proof of Tibet being in full control of its own affairs, including external affairs, during that period.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that Tibet was a vassal of China, vassal states, under international law, do enjoy treaty-making powers. For instance, Bulgaria and Egypt did conclude, on their own, treaties with foreign governments while they were vassals under the Ottoman empire. At The Hague peace conference of 1899, Bulgaria in fact ratified on her own a declaration forbidding the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons even though Turkey did not ratify it.

India herself enjoyed such treaty-making powers before becoming independent in 1947. She concluded various international agreements. Even China conceded this; for, otherwise, there would have been no need for the 1954 India-China agreement on Tibet under which India gave up her extra-territorial rights in Tibet.

The only Chinese answer to these facts and arguments is that the concept of vassal states is an "imperialist" one. If this were so, it would amount to Tibet holding Ladakh as a vassal till the 19th century and the present Chinese claims being based on it.²

Therefore, irrespective of whether Tibet was a vassal or not in 1913-14, the validity of the 1914 agreement and the Simla convention

cannot be questioned merely because China since 1950 has occupied Tibet.

The only objections which China raised to the Simla treaty were in relation to the division of Tibet into inner and outer zones. The Chinese Government was completely aware of the formalisation of the boundary agreement between India and Tibet and had raised no objections whatsoever to it either during the Simla conference or after it. The refusal of the Chinese Government to ratify the Simla treaty had no bearing on the formalisation of the Indo-Tibetan boundary by India and Tibet through an exchange of letters.

NOTES

- 1 and 2 Report of the officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the boundary question, ministry of external affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.

THE DEMISE OF THE FIVE PRINCIPLES

THE 1954 agreement between India and China on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India, which embodied the famous five principles of peaceful co-existence or Panch Sheel, lapsed on June 3, 1962.

[The expiry of the agreement involved the closure by India of her trade agencies in Yatung, Gyantze and Gartok in Tibet, and by China of her trade agencies in Kalimpong, Calcutta and New Delhi.

Pilgrim traffic between India and Tibet also came to a halt as a result of the non-extension of the agreement. The document had enabled Indian pilgrims to visit Kailas (Kang Rimpoche) and Manasarovar (Mavam Tso) and Lhasa, which they had been doing since time immemorial, although since the outbreak of the revolt in Tibet early in 1959, the movement of pilgrims had all but come to a complete stop. Pilgrims from Tibet also were precluded from visiting holy places in India—Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi.

Peking proposed in a note dated December 3, 1961, which Nehru said was politely worded in comparison with the arrogant tenor of Chinese communications, that the 1954 agreement be replaced by a new one to promote “economic and cultural interflow between the two countries.”

China’s politeness was coupled with the sentiment :

“China and India are two neighbouring great powers in Asia. No force will ever emerge that can alter the geographical proximity of China and India. However long it may be deferred, the boundary question between China and India will have to be settled peacefully some day. In the interest of the Chinese and Indian peoples and of Asian and world peace, an early settlement is better than a late one. It is hoped that these

views will be given serious consideration by the Indian Government.”¹

India countered by saying that she would be willing to “consider minor mutual adjustments in a few areas of the border in the interests of friendship between the two peoples and peace in Asia, but she repudiates the suggestion that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited and should be the subject of negotiations.” This would set aside centuries of history and the sanction of a large number of treaties and agreements.

New Delhi said a new agreement to replace the 1954 document could not be negotiated unless China first reversed her “aggressive policies and restored a climate which assures the strict observance of the five principles both in letter and in spirit” by withdrawing from the 12,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh.²

The agreement of 1954 was valid only for eight years and not ten or twenty.

Why eight years ? During the negotiations preceding the signing and ratification of this agreement, India had proposed that it be valid for 20 years or even a longer period, since it embodied the five principles which both India and China declared should for ever guide the relations not only between these two countries but among all nations. But Peking insisted on eight years.

It later became evident that Peking had hoped completely to integrate Tibet with China within eight years. Peking had calculated that the Tibetans would require foodstuffs, clothing and other necessities from India only for eight years at the longest, after which the Indian traders could be ousted from Tibet.

But Peking’s programme in Tibet miscarried. It had not calculated on the Tibetans rising in revolt.

Long before the uprising, the Chinese had placed restrictions on Indian traders in Yatung, Gyantze and Gartok and had severely circumscribed the work of the Indian trade agencies there. Indian merchants were often prohibited from moving about even within the permitted limits under the pretext that they were subject to local laws and regulations. The Chinese were asked what these rules and regulations were. The reply was either that they were well known or changing from time to time,

Ironically enough, within a month of the coming into force of the five-principles agreement, the Indian trade agent's premises at Gyantze were washed away by a flood in 1954.³ The agent moved to temporary premises which were unhygienic and highly unsatisfactory, providing little convenience for heating during the bitterly cold winters. But attempts to rebuild the premises on the original land were systematically frustrated by the Chinese right from 1954, the year the agreement came into force.

As if to augment the ravages of the 1954 flood which had washed away nearly one-third of the Indian trade agency's ground in Gyantze, the Chinese demolished the spurs along the river, letting in more water into the agency's compound.⁴ The property had been acquired by the then Government of India in 1943 on a lease from the Tibetan Government valid up to April 1, 1971, and the right to continue this lease was recognised by Peking in notes exchanged in connection with the Panch Sheel agreement.⁵

But the Chinese Government repudiated this right in March 1958, stating that it could not accept the validity of the lease entered into in 1943 because it had been signed during British days and could not be recognised by the People's Republic of China.⁶

The Government of India pointed out that not only was such a contention contrary to international law and state practice regarding the rights of a successor state, but this objection was all the more extraordinary in view of the provision in the 1954 agreement and the subsequent notes exchanged and the fact that the Chinese Government had raised no objection whatsoever to the continuance of the lease at any time during the negotiations for the Panch Sheel agreement.

To prevent workmen from remaining on their job of rebuilding the agency, the Chinese fired shots in their direction under the pretext that they were carrying out firing and target practice. Two bullets whizzed above the head of the Indian assistant engineer who was examining bricks on the site.⁷ The Indian trade agent's driver was arrested and his car seized.

Even the delivery of diplomatic mail to and from Indian establishments in Tibet was prevented by restricting the movement of Indian personnel and withholding guarantees regarding their safety.⁸

The temporary premises into which the Indian trade agency in

Gyantze moved, following the demolition of its original premises, consisted of ten rooms in all. Eight of these were utilised for a dispensary and for keeping records and files, while the agency offices were confined to just two small rooms. The Chinese dug compost and manure pits around them and built a public latrine at their entrance.⁹

The Indian trade agency at Yatung was also subjected to indignities, and even minor repairs, such as fixing broken window panes, were not allowed.

A big blow at Indian traders in Tibet was struck by a series of orders issued by the Chinese authorities. India always had a favourable balance of trade in relation to Tibet, and Indian traders had been repatriating their accumulated reserves to India. By a decree in July 1959, Chinese paper currency was made legal tender in Tibet. The subsequent step which the Chinese took was to devalue Tibetan currency, with the result that the accounts of Indian traders automatically depreciated to the extent of the devaluation. The next step which the Chinese took was to compel Indian traders to exchange their accumulations of Tibetan currency and coins at the new rate of exchange.¹⁰ Consequently, Indian traders lost hundreds of thousands of rupees.

Furthermore, the Chinese authorities in Tibet prohibited the repatriation of the monetary assets of the Indian traders. When representations were made regarding the hardship caused to the Indian traders, repatriation was allowed with a commission of 100 per cent as against the customary two per cent. In other words, repatriation was effected on paper, while no money transfer actually took place, because the amount sought to be transferred was taken away by the Chinese as "commission." It actually amounted to confiscation.

The ordinary right of Indian pilgrims visiting holy places like Kailas and Mansarovar in Tibet, specifically granted in the 1954 agreement, was denied by Peking. A specific and somewhat ludicrous incident was that involving Swami Brahmachari Atma Chaitanya who was held up and harassed on May 6, 1959.¹¹ He was interrogated by Chinese soldiers, his baggage was searched, and some of his belongings were confiscated. These included some homoeopathic medicines which he was accused of taking with him

“to poison the people of Tibet.”¹² After being detained for five days he was allowed to proceed to Kailas and Mansarovar, on condition that he returned by the same route.

While he was on his way back to India, the Swami was again detained and asked to sign a prepared statement that he had been in possession of poison. This the Swami refused to do. He was however allowed to return to India—minus his homoeopathic medicine and certain other belongings.

* * * *

Thus, long before its expiry on June, 3, 1962, the famous 1954 agreement had become a deadletter. But Peking was evidently hoping to get the 1954 agreement revised—without the Indian trade agencies in Tibet, while their agencies in Kalimpong, Calcutta and New Delhi continued to function.

As early as October 26, 1959, the Government of India, in its note to the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, stated:

“The Government of India find no pleasure in enumerating the facts . . . Facts have however to be stated clearly to contrast the treatment accorded by the Chinese authorities to Indian trade posts in Tibet with the facilities and privileges enjoyed by corresponding Chinese posts in India.

“The Government of India have to say with regret that repeated requests from their representatives in the Tibet region for the minimum facilities of transport, communication and accommodation have not been dealt with by the local authorities in the Tibet region with the sympathy and attention which are due to the representatives of a friendly country. They would also like to state that unless these facilities are forthcoming, the Indian posts cannot function with dignity and discharge the responsibilities intended for them under the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954.”¹³

* * * *

On March 9, 1960, the Indian Prime Minister told the Lok

Sabha that the Chinese were in full possession of the entire area claimed by them in Ladakh, except for a small strip of territory in the Demchok area.¹⁴

At that time however the Chinese had claimed only the areas included within their 1956 map. It was only on June 27, 1960, at the sixth meeting of the Indian and Chinese officials that the Chinese produced their 1960 map making an additional claim of a little more than 2 000 square miles. The Chinese however deny this and insist that there is no difference between their 1956 and 1960 maps.

The Chinese set up military posts at Nyagzu, about a mile and a half within Indian territory, at Dambuguru some five miles inside Indian territory and established a position a few miles south-east of the Karakoram pass. They built the Tibet-Sinkiang highway through the Aksaichin plateau in 1957 and advancing further westwards through the Lanak La and Qara Tagh passes constructed another highway cutting deeper into Indian territory. This second motorable road was completed by 1959.

Nehru explained that hitherto India had concentrated on defending the NEFA region. But the government had not remained quiet in Ladakh. It established an outpost at Dauletbeg Oldi at an altitude of 17,000 feet (approximately 5,160 metres) just south of the Karakoram pass. Some ten or 15 miles south-east of it is a Chinese stronghold. The setting up of the Indian post at Dauletbeg Oldi thwarted a threatened move by the Chinese to seal off the strategic Karakoram pass.

There was a furore in the Indian Parliament when these facts were disclosed just before both the houses adjourned for the third Indian general election in February 1962. Nehru allayed the nation's fears by stating that the military situation in the Ladakh area was progressively changing in India's favour.

“We will continue to build these things so that ultimately we may be in a position to take effective action to recover such territory as is in their possession . . . (but) we have to abide by the advice of our military commanders.”¹⁵

China held out the threat of invading the NEFA region in the eastern sector if India continued her “military activity” in Ladakh

in the western sector. Declaring that India's military preparations in Ladakh were "untenable and almost dangerous" a Chinese Government note delivered to New Delhi said:

"If this logic was followed the Chinese Government would have every reason to send troops to cross the so-called McMahon line and enter the vast area between the crest of the Himalayas and their southern foot."¹⁶

This was however not the first time that such a threat was held out by the Chinese. The Chinese foreign office on October 26, 1959, had said that "if Indian troops may cross at will the traditional and customary Sino-Indian boundary in the west (Ladakh) to intrude into Chinese territory for so-called patrolling, then Chinese troops would have all the more reason in the east (NEFA) to come to the area south of the so-called McMahon line for patrolling."

Nehru said in the Indian Parliament that if Chinese forces did attempt to cross the McMahon line they would be resisted and repelled. He however cautioned against taking any precipitate action in an area which had been neglected for 100 years or more.

"If you have to take anything in the nature of military action, it should be strong, prepared action, which may not come back against you... We have arrived at a stage of preparations and the matter has gone to our military, air and defence advisers under our broad directions. But it is their decision."¹⁷

A Chinese foreign ministry statement issued in Peking on December 6, 1961, accused the Government of India and Nehru of "adopting unscrupulous means for achieving ulterior objectives."¹⁸

The statement said that the Indian Government and Nehru were "so zealous in their unfriendly policy towards China because of certain needs of their internal and external politics."

*

*

*

*

Meanwhile, relatively minor incidents between the two countries

increased in number. India ordered the deportation across Nathu La into Tibet of the manager of the Bank of China in Calcutta, the principal of the Hsinhua High School in Calcutta and the editor of *China Review* published from Calcutta, the principal of the Chung Hua School in Kalimpong and the manager of the Peking Restaurant in Calcutta.

“A most unpleasant and serious incident” as an Indian protest note put it occurred on the special train carrying members of the diplomatic corps in China to Peking after an excursion to Shaosin. The private secretary to the then Indian ambassador, G. Parthasarathy, was alleged to have “forcibly embraced” a Chinese stewardess in the corridor of the train. The Chinese acting director of protocol accompanying the diplomatic party reported the matter to the Indian ambassador and asked him to “educate” his private secretary and agree to an immediate investigation abroad the moving train. The ambassador ascertained the facts and found them to be fabricated. His private secretary was in a carriage with several others at the time of the alleged incident. He accordingly declined to accept a summary inquiry on a moving train without proper interpretation facilities and other conditions.

The acting director of protocol of China regretted the ambassador’s “judgment” and warned him of “the consequences of the indignation of the train personnel.” The consequences became apparent when the private secretary was dragged out of his carriage by members of the Chinese protocol department to a place of the alleged incident where a group of the train’s personnel violently demonstrated against him. Foreign office interpreters translated the abuse and only the timely arrival of the ambassador saved him from being manhandled.

NOTES

- 1 and 2 White Paper No. VI, ministry of external affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 188.
- 3 White Paper, 1954-59, p. 80.
- 4 White Paper No. II, p. 72.
- 5 White Paper, 1954-59, p. 102.
- 6 White Paper II, p. 99.
- 7 Ibid. p. 102.

- 8 Ibid. p. 72.
- 9 Ibid. p. 104.
- 10 Ibid. p. 74.
- 11 Ibid. p. 97.
- 12 Ibid. p. 97.
- 13 Ibid. p. 113.
- 14 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Dec. 3, '61.
- 15 Ibid., Nov. 29, '61.
- 16 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Dec. 6, '61.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 NCNA, Peking, Dec. 7, '61.

ON THE HIGH SEAS AND ELSEWHERE

THE exchange of goodwill delegations was an inevitable part of the relations between India and China during the phase of friendship. But even goodwill visits were not immune to protests from Peking as was the case with the Indian Navy's flagship *Ins Mysore*.

The incident occurred in July 1958 when the Indian cruiser was on its way to Shanghai. The Chinese protest note delivered 17 months later, acknowledged that the *Mysore* was on "a friendly visit to Shanghai, China."¹ But it alleged that the cruiser "also unlawfully intruded into China's territorial sea on July 14, sailing through the waterway west of the Chiapeng and Tankan islands. At the time the Chinese coast guard units signalled four times; yet the cruiser did not pay any heed."

The Chinese note said that when the incident took place in 1958 the Chinese Government did not lodge an immediate protest because "out of goodwill (the Chinese Government) regarded that incident as one of the nature of incursion by mistake."

But, the Chinese Government said, another Indian naval vessel, *Lst Magar*, intruded into China's territorial sea on August 9, 1959, while on its way to Hongkong. Instead of following the international route south-east of Hongkong and east of the Tankan islands, *Magar* "forcibly passed through" China's territorial sea from the direction south-west of the Wansan islands outside the mouth of the Pearl river in Kwangtung, China, and sailed through the waterway west of the Chiapeng and Tankan islands of China.

The Government of India explained that *Magar* was on its way to Japan to bring back some stores for the Government of India. The route which it took in approaching Hongkong was west of Chipang and Tankan islands.

This route is an internationally recognised one and is mentioned as such in the China Sea Pilot, volume one, page 454. However, there was no previous information that the Chinese Government had placed any restriction on the use of this channel. At no time was *Magar* challenged by the Chinese coast guard. It is correct that the ship was within 6.8 miles from the nearest Chinese island of Tankan Shan in the Lima Chuntao group. But no ship could leave Hongkong harbour without coming within the 12-mile territorial sea limit imposed by China.

The note added that since the Government of India was unaware of any official Chinese publication for the guidance of ships sailing in the neighbourhood of Chinese territorial waters other than the China Sea Pilot, which is a British publication, the Indian Government "cannot understand the reference to 'imperialist bondage' in this context."

As for the Indian flagship, *Mysore*, the Government of India pointed out that it was on a goodwill mission to China. "It is regrettable," the Indian note said, "that the Chinese Government should have brought forward an allegation against *Mysore* which was on a goodwill visit to their country, more than a year after the conclusion of the visit. It is still more regrettable that the Chinese Government should have connected the use of the channel in good faith by *Lst Magar*' with a goodwill visit paid to China by *Ins Mysore*, thereby to build up a case of violation of Chinese sovereignty over its territorial waters by two successive Indian ships."

China's propaganda activities in India were also the subject of exchanges between New Delhi and Peking. The Indian Government protested against the circulation in India of the article entitled, "The revolution in Tibet and Nehru's philosophy," by the entire editorial department of *The People's Daily* in its issue of May 6, 1959.²

The Government of India's protest pointed out that it cannot permit a diplomatic mission accredited to the Government of India to publish or circulate any material critical of the Government of India's policies or ministers. The only exception which is made as a matter of courtesy is in respect of official statements of the government of the country which is represented by the mission.

The Chinese subsequently circulated in India speeches condemn-

ing the Government of India made by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi and the resolution passed by the standing committee of China's National People's Congress, as also articles in *The People's Daily* criticising India.

New Delhi pointed out that while the Government of India raises no objection to the publication in India of official statements of the Chinese Government, even though they are critical of the Indian Government, it cannot allow the Chinese embassy in New Delhi to publish and circulate articles critical of the Indian Prime Minister and the Government of India's policy. The Indian embassy in Peking, for its part, has scrupulously avoided reprinting any articles from Indian newspapers of speeches of Indian political leaders, other than government spokesmen, which are critical of the People's Republic of China and her policies, in the official bulletins issued by the Indian embassy's information services.

Peking countered by the accusation that Indian embassies in foreign countries other than China have circulated statements issued by the Dalai Lama. New Delhi rebutted that "it is not for the Government of the People's Republic of China to decide whether Indian official news bulletins in a third country have exceeded the limits of propriety." In any case, these bulletins have not transgressed the limit of accepted international usage or diplomatic courtesy.

The Government of India pointed out that it has allowed far greater latitude to the Chinese missions in India in regard to the publication of their bulletins and the discharge of their functions generally than is permitted to the Indian representatives in China.

Subsequently, the Government of India ordered the closure of the New China News Agency establishment in India and asked its representatives to quit the country. The last straw was the lurid reporting by the New China News Agency of the contemplated nationwide strike by the employees of the Government of India in July 1960.

One report by the agency, datelined New Delhi, for instance, was captioned: "Indian Congress Party slanders government employees' strike." It said: "The parliamentary group of India's ruling Congress Party issued a statement yesterday slandering the projected strike of more than two million employees of the central

government as 'unpatriotic and fraught with risk to the future of the country', according to P.T.I."³

P.T.I. (Press Trust of India) did not use the word "slander;" it was the invention of the Hsinhua correspondent, Kao Liang. His other despatches were even more tendentious, so much so that *The Times of India* editorially demanded his expulsion.⁴

Nehru told a questioner in parliament on August 1, 1960, that the government had refused to renew the visa of the Hsinhua correspondent because he had sent "one-sided and baseless" reports from India.⁵

On August 2, Kao Liang and seven other Chinese engaged in running the New China News Agency establishment in India, left the country for China. This was the first instance of a journalist being expelled by independent India. Until his expulsion, the agency had been enjoying unrestricted facilities, including the reception of material by radio teleprinter from Peking and its distribution all over the country, and complete access to sources of information and freedom of movement throughout the country. Kao Liang was later active in Africa.

As for Indian correspondents in China, there are none. Hand-picked ones have in the past been taken on conducted tours of three to four weeks.

The closing down of the New China News Agency establishment in India was one of the steps which New Delhi took against certain Chinese institutions and residents who were suspected of being engaged in anti-Indian and subversive activities. By the end of February 1961 some 90 Chinese residents, including officials of the Bank of China in Calcutta, were ordered to leave the country and were given periods ranging from three to 18 months to quit India.

*

*

*

*

There are approximately 30,000 Chinese residing in India. In December 1959, the Government of India asked all Chinese residents to register themselves with the local authorities within one month and obtain residential permits. These regulations more or less apply to all aliens in India, except Commonwealth citizens. In the case of

the Chinese, however, the Government of India did not strictly enforce the regulations because a large proportion of them had been living in India for more than a decade, while new arrivals had their relatives in India.

The new regulations required Chinese residents, besides registering themselves and securing residential permits, to inform the authorities in writing if they wished to leave their fixed address for more than two weeks giving their addresses at various places and the reasons for their travel.

The process of registration showed that the majority of the Chinese had come to India with Kuomintang passports. And, because of the absence of any relations between India and the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan, they were in something of a quandary. A temporary solution was found to the problem by resorting to the expedient of declaring such Chinese, if they did not wish to be repatriated, as stateless persons.

Subsequent to the revolt in Tibet, a large number of Chinese flocked to Kalimpong, the frontier town near the India-Tibet border. Although this town has a population of only 20,000, the number of Chinese restaurants there increased rapidly to 20, and there sprang up sundry other Chinese establishments ranging from laundries to curio shops. The number of such Chinese establishments was found to be more than 120. Obviously enough, some of these establishments were engaged in activities other than mere catering and trade.

The Overseas Chinese Association of India, which claims to represent 85 per cent of the Chinese residents of India, says it is anticommunist, and its president, S. S. Chung, has declared his support to New Delhi in its border dispute with Peking.

The Government of India showed its determination to expel those Chinese who were ordered to leave the country by escorting two Chinese, the headmaster of a Chinese school in Calcutta and the chief editor of the overseas Chinese journal of Calcutta, *China Review*, up to the Indo-Tibetan border and leaving them across the frontier. They had overstayed in India for four months in defiance of expulsion orders. They had been asked to leave India in July 1960 and were given three months' time to do so. But until February the following year they had not moved out of the country. On February 11, 1961, they were arrested and two days later were

sent across the border near Yatung in Tibet.⁶ Several other Chinese were also deported in similar fashion after they had defied extradition orders.

Peking complained that many overseas Chinese had repeatedly applied to the local Indian authorities for permission to continue to live in India, "pleading that they have lived in India for a long time, have regular occupations, are law-abiding and have at all times safeguarded Sino-Indian friendship, and that their families and relatives are in India and depend on them for their livelihood and care. They have urged the Indian authorities concerned to grant them the legal right to continue to live in India." Peking said:

"These measures of the Indian authorities concerned have placed the overseas Chinese in question in an extremely difficult position. They are unable to carry on their normal occupations and are facing the threat of being displaced and of losing the means of earning their livelihood. These measures have caused great anxiety and uneasiness among the Chinese residents in India. They feel that their legitimate rights to residence and personal freedom are not guaranteed. They demand that the Indian authorities concerned, with a view to safeguarding the friendship between the peoples of China and India and humanitarianism, halt the above-mentioned actions and permit them to continue to reside in India."⁷

China was not slow to retaliate. By early 1961, she expelled two Indian medical practitioners—the only two Indian professional men then living in China—together with their Chinese wives and children. The two doctors have since settled in Hongkong.

An old Indian resident of Shanghai, who was arrested on October 29, 1963, on a rape charge, was sentenced subsequently to five years' imprisonment on the ground that the alleged victim of the criminal assault had given birth within three months to a child "who very much resembles an Indian."

New Delhi pointed out in a note that the Indian concerned, Makhan Lal Das, had not only been arrested on a patently false charge, but the Indian embassy in Peking had been refused permis-

sion to send a consular officer to see him in prison and arrange for his legal defence.

The note said that the Chinese Government had not even disclosed when and where the alleged offence had been committed and who the victim was.

The Chinese Government refused to permit an Indian embassy representative either to see Makhan Lal Das in prison or attend his trial on the ground that since the case was concerned with "social morals," no public hearing would be held and, therefore, no visitors would be allowed. As regards his legal defence, it was stated that "the local authorities concerned will accord the facilities in accordance with the regulations on the Chinese side."⁸

*

*

*

*

Among prominent Chinese expelled from India was the manager of the Calcutta branch of the Bank of China, Chiang Wen-kwei. On July 22, 1960, he was ordered to leave the country within three months. As he did not budge, he was arrested in November and released on bail. Still he did not leave India. So he was arrested again and detained. Peking complained of Chiang's personal freedom being curtailed by the Indian Government and asserted that he was engaged in promoting Sino-Indian friendship.⁹ He was released from detention on condition that he left India forth with, which he did on February 24, 1961.

The cold war between China and India was carried even into the meeting in New Delhi of the World Peace Council and the Rabindra nath Tagore birth centenary celebrations. At a function in the Indian capital in connection with the centenary, Prof. Humayun Kabir, then India's minister of state for scientific research and cultural affairs, reportedly said:

"Tagore had a great love for China. But if he were still alive today, he would without doubt have condemned China for the Chinese suppression of Tibet's personality and its aggression against India."¹⁰

Staff members of the Chinese embassy in India and members of the Chinese delegation to the World Peace Council meeting who attended the function, walked out after registering a noisy protest. Chao Pu-chu, one of the Chinese delegates, said:

“If Tagore were still alive, he would without doubt have expressed his regret at hearing that his name was used to impair Sino-Indian friendship. He would definitely regard this as a great shame . . . If Tagore were still alive, it would not be the Chinese people who would be criticised, but those who wanted to put a finger in the internal affairs of China.”¹¹

On March 27, 1961, Nehru was asked in parliament why the Chinese communist delegates to the World Peace Council session in New Delhi were permitted to come to India and indulge in anti-Indian propaganda. Hem Barua, Praja-Socialist member, asked why the Chinese campaign of “calumny and slander” was allowed to be carried right into the heart of India.¹²

Nehru replied that the basic question was whether the government should prevent the holding of conferences in India if it disagreed with the views of its sponsors. The government preferred to be liberal rather than restrictive in these matters.

*

*

*

*

Chinese propaganda in regard to India has not followed any recognisable pattern, though there has been a method in it. With the advent of communism on the Chinese mainland, India was looked upon as an imperialist lackey and Nehru was dubbed as a “running dog of imperialism.” Communist Chinese newspapers followed this line in reporting or commenting on India—until about 1954 when Chou En-lai visited India and enunciated with Nehru the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Subsequently, and until the revolt in Tibet in 1959, India was largely ignored by the Chinese communist press and radio. Only items on the theme of Sino-Indian friendship, such as visits by Indian invitees to China or of Chinese friendship or cultural delegations to India, were reported on. Praise showered on China by handpicked Indian visitors was publicised.

But not a word in appreciation of India was ever printed in Chinese journals or broadcast by Radio Peking.

The first Indian openly to speak disparagingly of China was Dr. S. Chandrasekhar, the Indian demographer, who after visiting China late in 1958, said: "China is one vast zoo. I can foresee the day when China's millions will be marching up and down and, like Hitler's hordes, will be demanding *lebensraum*."

With the revolt in Tibet and the border wrangle, China trained her propaganda batteries full blast on India. This phase lasted until Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi in April 1960. Subsequently, the attempt was to bracket India with the "imperialist" countries and to suggest that the Indian Government is suppressing and oppressing the workers. Even minor strikes in India involving no more than 1,000 or 2,000 workers were magnified in the Chinese communist press, by NCNA and by Radio Peking. The Indian budget and taxation system were represented as hitting the poorer sections of society and India's development plans as helping the rich to become richer.

Nehru's utterances, whether they be on disarmament or the situation in the Congo or Laos, were shorn out of their context and broadcast derisively by Radio Peking in an attempt to show that Nehru was moving into the "imperialist" camp. A typical example was the article in *Ta Kung Pao*, "exposing the true aim of U.S. 'aid' to India:"

"Under the cover of rendering 'aid' to India, the United States has seized the Indian market, dumping there its 'surplus' agricultural and manufactured products... Export of huge quantities of surplus agricultural products to India will make that country ever more dependent on the United States for foodgrains..."

"The United States is also ferociously plundering India's strategic materials. Taking advantage of India's famine in 1951 (there was no famine in India in 1951) the United States has grabbed the country's mica, manganese and other atomic and strategic materials. The 1951 U.S.—Indian food and loans agreement was signed in accordance with India's 1951 emergency food act. The second part of the act provides that India

must pay back the greater part of the loans with its strategic materials. In an article entitled 'American-Indian trade' in *The New York Times* of January 25, 1961, former U.S. ambassador to India, Ellsworth Bunker, revealed that two-thirds of the mica used in the U.S. missile and electrical industries and one-half of the manganese used in the steel industry and one-half of the castor oil used in the aircraft industry came from India."¹³

The *Ta Kung Pao* article was published at a time when China herself was going through one of the worst famines ever to grip that country, with about 20 per cent of the people suffering from nutritional oedema and other diseases caused by malnutrition.

A Chinese communist publication entitled *Victory for the Five Principles*, consisting of a collection of speeches delivered by Chou En-lai during his visit to India, Nepal and Burma in the spring of 1960, had a centre-spread map of South-East Asia, dividing the countries in the region into four categories, each of which was distinctly shaded. The key to the map classified India, Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines and Japan as being "under imperialist domination." Bhutan, Nepal, Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia were described as "aligned with the socialist countries." South Korea, Formosa and South Viet Nam were described as "occupied by U.S. imperialist forces," while China, North Korea and North Viet Nam constituted the "socialist countries."¹⁴

Even the world table tennis championships in Peking were not spared as a vehicle for associating India with "imperialist" countries. A despatch from NCNA on April 4, 1961, said:

"Indian and Portuguese table tennis teams withdrew from the world table tennis championships."¹⁵

The implication was that India is like Portugal, a reactionary country.

The signing by China of treaties of friendship and mutual non-aggression with some of her neighbours and the settlement of the common frontier with Burma and Nepal were part of Peking's campaign to "isolate" India. The campaign came to a head during

the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries in September 1961.

Prior to the conference, the Chinese Government invited President Sukarno of Indonesia and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to China and treated them to the usual round of banquets and slogans against imperialism and colonialism and neo-colonialism. While Sukarno and Liu Shao-chi, then chairman of the People's Republic of China, signed a joint communique calling for a second Bandung-type conference of Asian and African countries, irrespective of their alignments, the joint communique signed by Dr Nkrumah and Liu showed that, while they expressed an identity of views on various topics, they did not quite agree about the neutralist summit conference at Belgrade. On this subject they merely exchanged their respective views.¹⁶

Immediately after the Belgrade conference, Peking's official newspapers launched their broadsides against Nehru, *The China Youth Daily* carried a report by Peng Ti, in which it was stated that the conference "reflected the general aspirations of the Asian, African and Latin American countries for independence and freedom, for the complete eradication of colonialism, in order to consolidate world peace." *The China Youth Daily* added :

"But it was precisely such typical Asian-African aspirations that had become the subject of scorn by the prime minister of an old Asian country. This was evident at the preparatory meeting in Cairo. It was even more evident at the conference now (in Belgrade). The speech made by the Indian prime minister, Nehru, at the conference showed that he was at loggerheads with the majority opinion . . . The attempt of Nehru to divert the attention of the conference from the struggle against imperialism and colonialism did not seem to go off well. What was isolated was not the colonial question, but Mr. Nehru himself and his Indian delegation."¹⁷

The People's Daily of Peking went a step further and branded Nehru as "a spokesman of the imperialists" who "by means of a general and vague discussion on the so-called questions of war and peace attempted to divert the objective of the conference and direct its main spearhead not against imperialism

and colonialism but against the Soviet Union, China and the socialist camp.”

The People's Daily did not name Nehru, but made it amply clear to whom it was referring when it said :

“The outcome of the conference means a defeat also for certain spokesmen of U.S. imperialism who have put on the cloak of non-alignment. They were unable to divert the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist main current of the conference and, in the attempt, have only laid bare their true features.”¹⁸

Ta Kung Pao, the foreign affairs journal of Peking, also attacked Nehru, but again without naming him.

Having bracketed India with western “imperialists,” Peking was somewhat nonplussed when India marched troops into Goa and liquidated Portuguese colonialism in the Indian subcontinent. Three days after the event, the Chinese Government issued a statement supporting the Indian Government in “recovering Goa.”¹⁹

The big question that remains to be answered is: “Why did China throw away India’s friendship ?” Nehru himself provided the answer in a historical perspective. He said in New Delhi on July 20, 1961 :

“China’s long-term policies almost throughout her history had been to expand, to spread out whenever she was strong, carrying not only her political control but also her culture and civilisation, thinking that she was conferring a benefit on others. It was like British imperialism in the past . . . I do not think that China’s long-term policies have changed because of communism. Her national tendency is to expand, and communism must be added to that . . .”²⁰

Earlier, Nehru had said in the Indian Parliament on May 8, 1959 :

“The Chinese rather look down upon every country other than their own. They consider themselves as the middle kingdom, as the celestial race, a great country.”²¹

In May 1961, the Indian Parliament enacted legislation to punish those who question the territorial integrity of India "in a manner prejudicial to the safety and security of India."

Under the new law, which amended the existing criminal procedure code, persons questioning India's integrity could be imprisoned up to three years and-/or fined. The amending act also empowered the government to forfeit publications containing prejudicial matter.

In moving the amending bill in the Lok Sabha, the Indian minister of state for home affairs, B.N. Datar, said it was intended to combat what he termed "highly treacherous and antinational-propaganda" especially in the vital border areas. The then home minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, said that the Communist Party of India (CPI) had become more active in the strategic region bordering on China during the few months preceding the enactment.

The CPI's propaganda line in the border area followed these lines: 1) It is India which does not want a settlement of the boundary question with China because the ruling Congress party wants to "exploit" the boundary issue "in order to deceive the broad masses of the Indian people and strengthen its own position;" 2) China is desirous of a settlement of the boundary question, and China's stand on the issue is correct; China is not aggressive because her socialist system predetermines her peaceful foreign policy.²²

Only communist members of the Indian Parliament opposed the measure. But it received overwhelming support not only from the Congress Party members, but also from the socialists and independents. For instance, the late Dr. H. N. Kunzru, an independent member, read extracts from various resolutions of the CPI and said the CPI was trying by all means in its power to serve the interests of China. The communist view that a socialist China could never have warlike designs on India implied that India might be the guilty party.

*

*

*

*

Indian communists derive their inspiration either from Moscow or Peking. There is even a joke that the Kerala communist leader, A.K. Gopalan, shaved off his moustache in 1953 because the hirsute Stalin died and the glabrous and depilated Malenkov took over—briefly though.

The extreme leftwing section of the Indian communists, led by B. T. Ranadive, has been openly pro-China in so far as the Sino-Indian question is concerned. The rightwing of the CPI, led by S. A. Dange, has not been anti-China over the border question, but has sought to demonstrate its support to the Indian case mainly for tactical reasons. The so-called rightist deviation in the CPI occurred primarily in the states of Maharashtra and Kerala, and at a time when the CPI was intent on gaining support in these states for local causes. In Maharashtra, a state which came into being by the division of the larger Bombay state, the CPI was in league with other parties in an organisation called the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad. The non-communist parties in the Parishad backed India's stand on the border question; and understandably enough, the CPI which was in league with them on the specific question of bringing about a linguistic Maharashtra state, could not pursue a pro-China policy on the boundary issue.

In Kerala, the CPI was pitted against Nehru's Congress Party in the general election following the overthrow of E.M.S. Namboodiripad's communist government. The CPI wanted the electoral support of those who were inclined to the left but were pro-India so far as the Sino-Indian problem was concerned. Hence, the communist leadership of Kerala appeared to side with New Delhi on the border question.

However, the third general election in India held early in 1962 showed that local and domestic issues rather than the Sino-Indian question swayed the electorate. The Indian National Congress party lost some ground in its popular standing. In 1957 it had polled 47.78 per cent of the total votes cast; in 1962 the figure declined to 45.06 per cent. The CPI, on the other hand, registered a slight gain from 8.92 to about ten per cent—which was surprising in the context of the general expectation that its popularity had waned on account of its ambivalent stand on the issue of Chinese aggression.

Again, the Praja-Socialist Party, which was most vociferously anti-China and vehemently critical of Nehru's handling of the Sino-Indian problem got fewer popular votes in 1962 than in 1957; the decline was from 10.41 per cent to 8.88 per cent. At the same time, the Jan Sangh, which was even more anti-China than the PSP, secured a gain from 5.93 per cent to 6.38 per cent.

It is noteworthy that the sixth congress of the CPI, held in Vijayawada, Andhra, in April 1961, totally sidetracked the Sino-Indian problem. The CPI congress, which was attended by a strong Soviet fraternal delegation led by Khrushchev's right-hand man, Mikhail Suslov, first secretary of the CPSU, received a message from Khrushchev requesting the CPI "not to say or do anything that would further estrange Sino-Indian relations and generate more bitterness in China."²³ This behest from the Soviet leader was faithfully carried out by the CPI. As a matter of fact, Suslov took a leading part in the proceedings and guided the CPI along non-controversial lines.

The only passing reference to the border problem was made by the late Ajoy Ghosh, general secretary of the CPI, in a *Pravda* article regarding the Vijayawada congress of the CPI. He said :

"... There has been another big factor exercising a negative influence (on the CPI). That is the regrettable disputes between India and China, especially the border dispute. For nearly 18 months this dispute has dominated the Indian political scene. It has supplied a powerful weapon to pro-imperialists to assail our foreign policy. It has helped the ruling classes to divert popular attention from important issues and sow confusion among large sections of the democratic masses. This dispute has been a big blow to our democratic movement. The interests of India's democracy demand an early solution of this dispute and the restoration of friendly relations between India and China, the two greatest countries of Asia. Our party has been stressing the need for such a solution."²⁴

Although he did not blame China, Ghosh conceded that because of "a consistent foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru, India has made an outstanding contribution to the cause of disarmament and world peace, a contribution which has earned India the respect of all peace-loving peoples."

Ghosh went on to say that while defending India's foreign policy from all attacks by the right, the CPI would have simultaneously to take measures to see that this policy became "more consistent." Ghosh said :

“It is indisputable that as a result of two five-year plans, which the Government of India undertook, the industrial base of India’s economy has become broader and stronger. Not only has the overall general index of industrial ‘production gone up from 100 in 1951 to 167.5 in 1960. but a number of industries which are of decided significance for our economy have been and are being developed.”²⁵

*

*

*

*

With the approach of India’s third general election, which was held in February 1962, spokesmen of the CPI became openly critical of China. Z. A. Ahmed, a member of the CPI’s five-man secretariat and a respected leader of the party, for instance, said that the “Chinese have made incursions into Indian territory, and the Communist Party of India, which fully endorses the position taken by the Government of India, will defend every inch of Indian territory occupied by China.”²⁶

Apart from reaffirming the official Indian communist stand that the McMahon line constitutes India’s eastern frontier, Dr. Ahmed said that in the western sector “Indian territory is demarcated by the traditional borders which have now been amply clarified by the report of the team of Indian officials.”

In its manifesto for the Indian general election of February 1962, the CPI declared that it stands for the territorial integrity of India. The manifesto said :

“We have made it clear that in our opinion the frontier of India in the eastern sector lies along what is known as the McMahon line, that in the western sector it is the traditional frontier between the two countries that should be recognised and that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, including the part occupied by Pakistan, forms part of India.”²⁷

Subsequently, the CPI was completely split, with the pro-Moscow right wing supporting India on the border issue.

NOTES

- 1 White Paper No. II, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, p. 58.
- 2 Ibid., p. 65.
- 3 NCNA, New Delhi, July 5, '60.
- 4 *The Times of India*, Bombay, July 7, '60.
- 5 NCNA, New Delhi, Aug. 2, '60.
- 6 Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) No. 2446, U.S. consulate-general, Hong Kong.
- 7 NCNA, Peking, Dec. 6, '60.
- 8 *The Times of India*, Bombay, March 28, '65.
- 9 NCNA, Peking, March 8, '61.
- 10 Ibid., April 1, '61.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 *The Times of India*, Bombay, March 28, '61.
- 13 NCNA, Peking, April 1, '61.
- 14 *The Times of India*, Bombay, March 11, '61.
- 15 NCNA, Peking, April 6, '61.
- 16 SCMP No. 2566, U.S. consulate-general, Hong Kong.
- 17 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 11, '61.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid., Dec. 20, '61.
- 20 *The Mail*, Madras, July 22, '61.
- 21 *The Times of India*, Bombay, May 9, '59.
- 22 An Indian Member of Parliament commented: "A burglar does not become a saint because he professes to be a socialist."
- 23 *The Times of India*, Bombay, April 12, '61.
- 24 & 25 Radio Moscow (English to South & Southeast Asia) 1500 GMT, April 5, '61.
- 26 *The Times of India*, Bombay, July 28, '61.
- 27 *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, Oct. 13, '61.

THE HIMALAYAN WAR

THE fighting along the India-China border, the unilateral ceasefire by China, the withdrawal of her forces, and the subsequent diplomatic moves provide an example not only of the clash of arms but the clash of wills also.

It is also a case of deliberate, calculated escalation—by China.

Peking's determination is to impose by any means—invasion, withdrawal, threats and appeals—the “line of actual control” of November 7, 1959, as unilaterally defined by the Chinese Government.

In his letter to Nehru, dated November 7, 1959, Chou En-lai said:

“As the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, and it is very long and very far, or comparatively far, from the political centres of the two countries, I am afraid that if no fully appropriate solution is worked out by the two governments, border clashes which both sides do not want to see may again occur in the future. And once such a clash takes place, even though a minor one, it will be made use of by people who are hostile to the friendship of our two countries to attain their ulterior objectives . . .

“In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of India and China each withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called McMahon line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in

and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order . . .”

In reply, Nehru, on November 16, suggested that “in the Ladakh area, both our governments should agree on the following as an interim measure. The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware, are their latest maps. Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier notes and correspondence and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines in the east and the west.”¹

This proposal of Nehru was made again in an Indian note dated May 14, 1962.

*

*

*

*

India's contention is that as a prerequisite to negotiations, the pre-September 8, 1962, line must be restored. Although India does not accept this line as the boundary, she has not seriously thought of dislodging the Chinese from the Aksaichin plateau.

China's unilaterally-determined November 7, 1959, “line of actual control” conforms, in the eastern sector, more or less to the McMahon line except for Longju and Thagla ridge; in the middle sector it also conforms largely to the boundary as defined by India except for Bara Hoti; and in the western sector (Ladakh) it stretches up to the positions to which Indian forces were pushed by the Chinese army during the fighting in October-November 1962.

The pre-September 8, 1962, line also conforms in the eastern sector to the McMahon line. India claims Longju and Thagla ridge in this sector, though she may not make an issue of them. In

the middle sector, the November 7, 1959, and the pre-September 8, 1962, lines are identical except for Bara Hoti.

The important difference between the two lines is in the western sector—a vital 2,500 square miles of barren territory which is of no use to either side except for its strategic value. China has built a road through this area, while India had established 43 posts there, mostly for the purpose of flying the Indian flag rather than as defensive points.

India insists on a restoration of the status quo as existing immediately before September 8, 1962, as a precondition for negotiations, because on that date the Chinese for the first time crossed the Thagla ridge at the western extremity of the McMahon line. Thagla ridge is the highest watershed at this point. Therefore, India regards September 8, 1962, as a crucial date.

*

*

*

*

The prelude to the large-scale fighting began in the Galwan valley early in July 1962. On the tenth of that month an Indian patrol consisting of some 30 soldiers commanded by a junior commissioned officer was encircled by a Chinese force about 500 strong. And as in earlier border encounters, the Chinese were the first to lodge a protest.

The previous day, *The People's Daily* of Peking editorially said, "The Indian Government should rein in on the brink of the precipice," and warned that "conflicts causing bloodshed on the Sino-Indian border areas may happen any time." Peking also quoted the then Indian defence minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, as having said (in a report in *The Amrita Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta of July 5) that "military means would be used if diplomacy failed."

The encirclement of the Indian patrol began at 9-30 a.m. Although outnumbered to the extent of one to 15 and totally out off from the rear, the Indians were ordered to hold their ground. They were reportedly well stocked with food and ammunition.

The Chinese came to within 15 yards of the Indians, with their guns at the ready, when the Indian commander said he would order his troops to open fire if the Chinese came any closer.² Early on the

morning of July 14, the Chinese withdrew to a distance of about 200 yards, and the following day retreated further.

A Chinese foreign ministry note on the incident, dated July 13, said the Chinese, encircled by Indians, had lost all contact with their rear for as long as eight days.³ Simultaneously, a spokesman of the information department of the Chinese foreign ministry made a statement in Peking, asserting :

“What the Indian troops are doing now is actually to compel China to accept their challenge. Should the Indian side insist on provoking a clash, the consequences arising therefrom will be very serious. We must warn the Indian Government that it should give serious consideration to the danger of the situation and not play with fire. One who plays with fire will burn himself.”⁴

After this incident in the Galwan valley, the Chinese resorted to a systematic campaign of building up tension by allegations of force being used by the Indian side, while they themselves resorted to it—first stray shots at the Indians, then probing moves in some strength, and finally the largescale invasion south of the McMahon line in NEFA, and of Ladakh.

On July 21, in the Chip Chap river valley, the Chinese opened fire in two places, using light machineguns, mortars and rifles. They attacked on Indian patrol without warning, wounding two men. This was the first instance of resort to firearms since the Longju and Kongka Pass attacks in 1959.⁵

Then on July 27 and 29, the Chinese again fired at Indians, but no casualties were reported. On August 4, the Chinese fired a shot near Karakoram pass close to India's post at Dauletbeg Oldi which is at an altitude of nearly 17,000 feet.

Chinese allegations of the use of force by India were frequent and of a serious nature.⁶

On September 8, 1962, the Chinese crossed the Thagla ridge at the western extremity of the McMahon line at the trijunction of NEFA, Bhutan and Tibet. India regards this move—and the date—as a crucial one. The crossing of the Thagla ridge violated not only what India regards as Indian territory, but it also constituted a viola-

tion of a principle—the principle underlying the McMahon line and the entire Sino-Indian boundary, namely that the highest watershed ridge marks the frontier between India and Tibet.

* * * *

Peking has made much of the fact that near the trijunction of NEFA, Bhutan and Tibet, India has occupied territory north of the McMahon line as drawn on the original McMahon map. The occupation by India of Khinzemane and the Dhola post, therefore, constitutes an intrusion, according to Peking.

This was emphasised in the Chinese foreign ministry note to the Indian embassy of October 6, 1962. It pointed out that “according to the original 1914 map of the McMahon line, this line extends eastwards from approximately 27 degrees 44 minutes six seconds north latitude and 91 degrees 39 minutes seven seconds east longitude, while Che Dong (the Chinese name for Dhola, where India had a post) is situated at 27 degrees 46 minutes five seconds north and 91 degrees 42 minutes east, and so obviously north of the line.”⁷

The note added that during the meeting of the officials of the two sides, Indian officials had given the western extremity of the McMahon line as 27 degrees 48 minutes north and 91 degrees 40 minutes east. But this assertion was untenable, and India’s Dhola post encroached upon Chinese territory.

Writing in *The People’s Daily* of October 20, 1962, “Observer” said that computing one minute of latitude to be equal to 1.8 kilometres in actual distance, the “northward thrust” by India of 3.4 minutes in latitude is equal to seven to eight kilometres.

This apparent “discrepancy” was explained by Nehru in an annexure to his letter to Chou En-lai dated November 14. It said that if the original McMahon map were strictly adhered to, Migyitun and Tulung La in the eastern sector (NEFA) which are under Chinese occupation should strictly be south of the McMahon line.

The Simla agreement of 1914 merely formalised what was the traditional and customary boundary in the area which lies along the highest Himalayan watershed ridges. The maps attached to the agreement were of a small scale of one inch to eight miles. They were sketch maps intended to be only illustrative. All that they made

clear was that the boundary ran along the main watershed ridges of the area. The parallels and meridians were shown only approximately in accordance with the progress achieved at that time in the sphere of scientific surveys.

This is a common cartographic feature. If the maps and the co-ordinates were taken literally, it is impossible to explain the discrepancy between the existing distances and those given in the map between various villages in the area. A glance at the sketch map would show how inaccurately places like Tawang, Jang, Leh, Tashiyangsi, Dzong, etc. are indicated on it.

Sir Henry McMahon himself said in his memorandum:

“It will be seen that the boundary line agreed to by the Tibet Government, as shown by the red line on the map, follows, except where it crosses the valleys of the Taron, Lohit, Tsangpa, Subansiri and Njanjang rivers and for a short distance near Tsari, the northern watershed of the Irrawaddy and the Brahma-putra.

“The boundary line on the west follows the crest of the mountain range which runs from Peak 21431 through Tu Lung La and Menlakathong La to the Bhutan border. This is the highest mountain range in this tract of the country. To the north of it are people of Tibetan descent; to the south, the inhabitants are of Bhutanese and Aka extraction. It is unquestionably the correct boundary . . . The map showing the boundaries of Tibet as a whole, which it is proposed to attach to the Tibet convention, is on far too small a scale to show such boundaries in the detail which is desirable in the case of this hitherto undefined portion of the frontier between India and Tibet.”⁸

As a matter of fact, the Chinese have accepted this position in regard to the Burma-China boundary treaty. Article 48 of that treaty says: “In the maps of the Burmese-English version, while the latitudes generally coincide with the results obtained on the spot, the longitudes do not coincide, there being variations ranging from 19 seconds to one minute 22 seconds to the east.”

It was on the pretext that the Indian side had gone north of the

McMahon line and had actually encroached upon Chinese (Tibetan) territory that China launched its massive offensive.

* * * *

On September 20, 1962, a serious clash between Chinese and Indian forces occurred at India's auxiliary post near Dhola. About 9-30 p.m. two Chinese soldiers crept up near the post and lobbed hand-grenades at it. The Indians threw flares and saw a "fairly substantial number of Chinese soldiers within a few hundred yards" of the Indian auxiliary post.⁹ The Chinese thereupon opened fire, which was returned. Intermittent firing by the Chinese continued until the morning of September 21. In the skirmish a Chinese officer was killed and a Chinese soldier was wounded, while three Indian jawans were also wounded.

The skirmish continued on the following three days on a more intensified scale. More than 1,000 rounds of ammunition and five artillery shells were fired and several hand-grenades were thrown, according to the Chinese. The casualties were a Chinese soldier wounded on September 22-23, three Chinese soldiers killed and two officers wounded on September 24 and another Chinese soldier killed and another wounded on September 25, as reported by New China News Agency.

Early in October, India appointed Lieut-General B.M. Kaul, chief of the Indian army general staff, as corps commander of NEFA.

On October 10, there was severe fighting on the southern side of Thagla ridge. The engagement started after a Chinese sentry threw a hand-grenade at the Indian post on the night of October 9. On the following evening the Chinese resorted to heavy firing, and Indian troops returned the fire. The Indians suffered six dead, five missing and 11 wounded, while 33 Chinese were killed their total casualties being more than 100.

The Chinese made the allegation that India had set up a post at Le village in Tibet at 91.48 degrees east longitude and 27.49 degrees north latitude. some distance north of the McMahon line, and had advanced along the Namkhachu river (which the Chinese call Kechilang river). The Government of India categorically denied this,

stating that while there is a village known as Le at the co-ordinates mentioned, India has not set up a post there, nor have her personnel gone there.¹⁰

On October 12, Nehru said instructions had been issued to the Indian forces "to throw the Chinese out of our territory."¹¹ The Chinese used this statement, duly publicised in the Indian press, to good propaganda effect.

Two days later, *The People's Daily* published an editorial entitled, "Mr Nehru, it is high time for you to pull back from the brink of the precipice." It said:

"It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with their glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory. History has furnished repeated proof that not the Chinese troops but the Japanese imperial army and the Yankees were cleared out of Chinese territory. This has been the fate of all foreign aggressors on Chinese soil and this will be so in the future ! If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict.

"All comrades, commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army guarding the Sino-Indian border, heighten your vigilance a hundred-fold ! The Indian troops might carry out at any time Nehru's instructions to get rid of you. You must be well prepared. Your sacred task now is to defend our territory and be ever ready to deal resolute counter-blows at any invader.

"At this most critical moment in the development of the Sino-Indian border situation, we still want to appeal once more to Mr Nehru: Better rein in at the edge of the precipice and don't use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble."¹²

Of passing interest is the use in this editorial of the term, "Commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army," while later Peking throughout used the expression "Chinese border guards."

On October 16, the Chinese again fired on an Indian post in the

Dhola area. Indian troops retaliated, and the Chinese withdrew, leaving one dead. He was buried by the Indians.

* * * *

Early on the morning of October 20, the Chinese launched their massive onslaught both in the eastern and western sectors; the middle sector was quiet.

China's threat to invade NEFA had been held out as early as November 30, 1961. A note from Peking of that date had said:

“The Chinese Government would have every reason to send troops across the so-called McMahon line and enter the vast territory between the crest of the Himalayas and their southern foot.”¹⁸

A few hours before the large-scale attack, the Chinese shouted, “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers). On October 19, some Chinese activity had been observed across a deep chasm, but appeared to peter out. On a number of occasions the Chinese patrols had come within speaking distance of the Indian posts. Invariably they spoke in Hindi to the Indians, shouted “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” assured the Indians that China had no expansionist designs and asked the Indians to vacate the posts claimed by China.¹⁴

At 5 a.m. on October 20, 1962, a young Indian second lieutenant of the corps of signals was rudely awakened by the din of mortar-fire. The place was a bridge on the Namkhachu river a short distance below Thagla ridge on which the Chinese had earlier entrenched themselves. More than two Chinese battalions armed with automatic rifles, heavy mortars and nine-millimetre guns attacked the Indians who numbered about two companies.

The Chinese took the Indian garrison at Khinzemane by complete surprise. The Indian posts at Dhola and Kalung also fell on October 20. The Dhola post had been established by India in August to forestall a suspected Chinese move to drive a wedge between NEFA and Bhutan.

The following day, the Chinese went about occupying minor positions such as Jungputiu, Chekuopu, Keningnai, Jitingpu, Tang,

Niangpa and Drokung bridge. Longju—which had been unoccupied by both India and China since 1959—was entered by the Chinese on October 22, and on the same day an assault was launched on the Indian defence post at Kibitoo at the extreme eastern end of NEFA near its junction with Burma, and on Bumla, posing a threat to the district headquarters of Tawang.

On October 23, a spokesman of the Chinese ministry of national defence said that since Indian troops had crossed the McMahon line (the allegation refers to China's contention that the western extremity of the McMahon line starts at 27.44.6 degrees north latitude and not at 27.48 degrees as claimed by India)¹⁵ Chinese forces too would be free to cross that line "to prevent Indian aggressive troops from again crossing the illegal McMahon line which China has never recognised."¹⁶

So saying, the Chinese launched a three-pronged drive on Tawang, where the Dalai Lama, while escaping from Tibet, had rested. On October 25 Tawang fell in the face of repeated assaults by superior Chinese forces.


The following day, a state of emergency was declared in India, and three days later the decision of the United States to give infantry arms to India was announced. The U.S. Government also went on record as recognising the McMahon line as the boundary between India and Tibet in the eastern sector.

Two Royal Air Force Britannias brought arms from Britain, while Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Malaya expressed support for India. Canada sent arms.

The decision of the U.S. and other countries to send arms to India was in response to a circular letter from Nehru to the governments of all countries except China, Portugal and South Africa. India has no diplomatic relations with the latter two.

Lincoln White, spokesman of the U.S. state department, said that the decision to give defence assistance to India was in response to Nehru's request and was prompted by a specific situation. That situation was created by the massive Chinese communist attacks on the Indian frontier. White said :

"This premeditated Chinese communist aggression is a serious development and is so regarded by the American Govern-



UNDER THE COLOMBO PROPOSALS THAGLA RIDGE AND LONGJU, AS ALSO BARAHOTI IN THE MIDDLE SECTOR, ARE REGARDED AS THE "REMAINING AREAS."

MAP No. 5

ment. In extending assistance to India, we are responding to an urgent need arising from a situation which is of concern not only to the United States, but to our allies as well."¹⁷

On November 3, less than a fortnight after the Chinese invasion began, the first planeloads of American light infantry weapons began arriving in India.

The then British deputy foreign secretary, Edward Heath, said on October 31 that he felt sure that Pakistan "will not wish to take any advantage of" the border conflict "to the detriment of India." Heath also said that Britain most earnestly urged China "to show a proper understanding of the situation before events have moved too far." The British and Indian high commissioners in Pakistan, on behalf of their governments, approached the Pakistani Government.

Pakistan objected to the giving of arms by the U.S. to India; Pakistan's foreign minister, the late Mohammad Ali, said whatever arms were given to India must be given also to Pakistan so that the India-Pakistan balance of power would be undisturbed. Pakistan also asked for guarantees that the U.S. arms given to India would not be used against Pakistan.

Turkey which, together with Pakistan, is a member of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), refrained from aiding India because of Pakistani objections.

The Government of India, on November 15, gave an assurance that American arms would not be used for any purpose other than repelling the Chinese.¹⁸ This was preceded by the disclosure that until November 7, some 40 countries had expressed sympathy and support to India.

*

*

*

*

In the face of Indian reverses, the clamour for the resignation of V.K. Krishna Menon, India's controversial defence minister, became irresistible, and he was relieved of the defence portfolio on October 31, though he continued as minister of defence production.¹⁹ Nehru himself became defence minister. On November 7, Krishna Menon quit the government altogether, and a week later Y.B. Chavan, until

then chief minister of Maharashtra state, took charge of the defence portfolio; B. Raghuramiah was appointed minister for defence production; and T.T. Krishnamachari became minister for economic and defence co-ordination.

On November 14, the Lok Sabha passed two resolutions moved by Nehru, one approving the proclamation of an emergency and the other reaffirming "the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard the struggle may be." The latter resolution was passed, all members standing—a solemn gesture unprecedented in India's parliamentary history.

In Pakistan, November 16 was observed as a day of protest against the delivery of American arms to India. Students marched to the U.S. embassy in Karachi. There were anti-U.S. demonstrations in Pakistan subsequently too.

*

*

*

*

The lull in the fighting which had set in since the beginning of November 1962 was broken with a minor offensive launched by the Indian side on the 14th on Chinese positions north of Walong at the eastern end of NEFA. Fighting in difficult terrain and against heavy odds, the Indians captured the lower slopes of a Chinese strongpoint.

The Chinese responded by attacking massively. As each assault was beaten back, the Chinese launched another. On November 18, the Government of India announced the fall of Walong.

On the same day, by a wide outflanking movement, the Chinese by-passed Se La where India had considerable fortifications. Later investigations revealed that the Chinese had infiltrated in large numbers in the disguise of Tibetan refugees. It was a commentary on the poor nature of the intelligence service of India. Indian correspondents covering the fighting in NEFA disclosed that the Indians could not distinguish between the Chinese, Tibetans and the local inhabitants of the Himalayan foothills.

Se La is on the way from Tawang to the administrative headquarters of Bomdi La. The Indian army had anticipated an outflanking move through Bhutan. But the Chinese did not enter Bhutan.

These developments were described by Nehru as total war. He said:

“It is no longer a border war between India and China. It is an invasion of India. I do not know how other countries will be affected by it. We are preparing to meet this total war . . . Each one of us is a soldier today.”²⁰

Earlier, Nehru had embarked on a campaign to rouse the nation. He likened India’s reverses to Dunkirk. Describing the Chinese attack as “the greatest menace that has come to us since we became independent,” Nehru said:

“I have no doubt in my mind that we shall succeed. Everything else is secondary to the freedom of our people and of our motherland and, if necessary, everything else has to be sacrificed in this great crisis.

“Perhaps there are not many instances in history where one country, that is India, had gone out of her way to be friendly and co-operative with the Chinese Government and people and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and then for the Chinese Government to return evil for good and even go to the extent of committing aggression and invading our sacred land. No self-respecting country, and certainly not India with her love of freedom, can submit to this, whatever the consequences may be . . . There may be some more reverses. But one thing is certain—the final result of this conflict will be in our favour. It cannot be otherwise when a nation like India fights for her freedom and the integrity of the country.”²¹

Earlier, Nehru had said:

“What are they (the Chinese) doing today? In the other house I said it is aggression and invasion which reminds me of the activities of the western powers in the 19th and 18th centuries. Perhaps I was wrong. It is more comparable to the activities of Hitler in the modern age, because one thought that this kind of thing cannot happen nowadays. Of course, some

aggression may take place here and there, but this well-thought-out, premeditated and well-organised invasion is what one thought was rather out-of-date and not feasible.”²²

On November 19, Nehru in a broadcast to the nation announced the fall of Bomdi La and said that the Chinese were heading for the Assam plains. There was speculation in India whether the Chinese objective was the Digboi oil fields of Assam or to establish a link with the Naga rebels.

Meanwhile, the Government of India set up a national defence council consisting of the emergency committee of the cabinet, the chiefs of staff of the three services, leaders of public opinion, and General K. S. Thimayya, a retired chief-of-staff of the Indian Army who died in Cyprus in December 1965.

While the support which India received from various countries was heartening from New Delhi’s point of view, Ghana, an “uncommitted” nation, adopted a puzzling attitude. Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the deposed Ghanaian president, protested to Britain, stating that he was “gravely distressed and saddened” by Britain’s decision to help India. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, retorted:

“I find it difficult to understand your objection . . . It is only right and natural that Britain should express its sympathy and support for India’s anxiety and danger.”²³

On November 11, Nehru said that the Soviet Union had promised to stand by her commitments to India—the supply of MIG-21 planes and the setting up of a factory for their manufacture in India. On the same day, the United States completed the airlift of small arms and light infantry weapons to India, while Royal Air Force transport planes evacuated Europeans residing north of the Brahmaputra river. Brigadier-General John E. Kelly also arrived in New Delhi from Washington to head a 12-man team to supervise the delivery and use of American arms.

* * * *

Simultaneously with the thrusts into NEFA, the Chinese

launched large-scale onslaughts in the western sector of the boundary in Ladakh. Beginning at 5 a.m. on October 20, all the 13 forward Indian posts from the Galwan valley up to Dauletbeg Oldi were attacked and overrun. The following day, two more Indian defence posts in the Sirijap area were captured. Three more Indian posts fell during the following three days of fighting.

On October 29, Chinese forces launched further attacks on Indian defence posts at Changla, Jarala and Demchok and occupied more territory.

In the first week of November, Chinese concentrations were observed in the Spanggur area, opposite India's defensive position at Chushul which has a tortuous and tenuous road link with Srinagar via Leh and has the world's highest airstrip at an altitude of 14,250 feet. Chinese forces were observed digging in and bringing up gun reinforcements.

These were preparations for an assault on Rezangla and Chushul, both of which were heavily shelled. Rezangla was taken by the Chinese after wiping out the small Indian garrison to the last man. But the Indians held on to Chushul, though the post was thoroughly battered by concentrated Chinese shelling and its airstrip rendered unusable.

The Chinese later conceded that both Rezangla and Chushul are on the Indian side of the "line of actual control." However, the Chinese have remained in occupation of Rezangla.

Chinese forces thus knocked out the 43 Indian posts in Ladakh east of the "line of actual control."

NOTES

- 1 White Paper III, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 45-51.
- 2 *The Times of India*, Bombay, July 15, '62.
- 3 NCNA, Peking, July 14, '62.
- 4 NCNA, Peking, July 13, '62. (Before the Galwan valley incident, the Indian Government had protested against 29 Chinese intrusions—in 1. Barahoti, protested against on June 28, '55; 2. Damzan on Nov. 6, '55; 3. Nilang on April 28, '56; 4 & 5. Shipki pass on Sept. 8 and 24, '56; 6. Walong on Jan. 17, '58; 7. Khurnak fort on July 2, '58; 8. Aksaichin area on Oct. 18, '58; 9. Lohit frontier division on Jan. 17, '59; 10. Sangcha Malla on Dec. 10, '58; 11. Laphthal on Dec. 10, '58; 12. Western Pangong Lake on July 30, '59; 13. Khinzemane on Aug. 11, '59; 14. Longju on Aug. 28, '59;

15. Kongka pass on Oct. 23, '59; 16. Taktsang Gompa on July 29, '60; 17. Jelep La on Sept. 27, '60; 18. Hot Springs on Oct. 31, '60; 19. Chushul on Oct. 31, '61; 20. Chemokarpola on Oct. 31, '61; 21. Nyagzu on Oct. 31, '61; 22. Dambu Guru on Oct. 31, '61; 23. Point 78.12 E., 35.19 N. on Oct. 31, '61; 24. Roi village on April 18, '62; 25. Chip Chap valley on May 14, '62; 26. Sumdo on April 15, '62; 27. Spanggur on May 21, '62; 28. Road from point 78.35 E. and 35.33 N to 79.8 E and 34.33 N (date of protest not known); and 29. point 78.15 E and 35.15'30 N on June 28, '62.
- 5 NCNA, Peking, July 22, '62.
- 6 A list of Chinese allegations of the use of force by India before the large-scale fighting began. (Source: NCNA, Peking):
 July 19, '62, in the Galwan valley, number of shots fired and casualties not given.
 July 27, near Nyagzu, 16 shots fired, but casualties not given.
 July 27, in the Chip Chap valley, two shots fired, but casualties not given.
 July 31, in the Galwan valley, number of shots and casualties not given.
 Aug. 1, in the Galwan valley, seven shots fired but casualties not given.
 Aug. 13, in the Galwan valley, four bullets struck Chinese positions, but casualties not given.
 Aug. 21, in the Galwan valley, two shots fired but casualties not given.
 Aug. 22, in the Galwan valley, two shots fired but casualties not given.
 Aug. 23, in the Pangong lake area, nine shots fired but casualties not given.
 Aug. 25, in the Galwan valley, four shots fired but casualties not given.
 Aug. 26, near Karakash river, number of shots and casualties not given.
 Aug. 29, near Karakash river, 17 shots fired but casualties not given.
 Sept. 2, south of Chip Chap river, nearly 200 shots fired on transport group which was ambushed, but no casualties given.
 Sept. 15, near source of Karakash river, 50 bullets and two mortar shells fired; Chinese fired eight rounds.
- 7 NCNA, Peking, Oct. 8, '62.
- 8 White Paper No. VIII, pp. 10-17.
- 9 *The Hindu*, Madras, Sept' 22, '62.
- 10 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Oct. 13, '62.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 NCNA, Peking, Oct. 15, '62.
- 13 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Oct. 21, '62.
- 14 Ibid., Nov. 5, '62.
- 15 Of passing interest is the statement in *The China Quarterly* (London) of July-Sept. '62, p. 222, by "S. G." (Dr S. Gopal, director, historical division, Govt. of India) that the trijunction of India, Bhutan and China (Tibet) is at 91.40 E and 27.46 N. Dr. Gopal has explained this to the author as a misprint.
- 16 NCNA, Peking.
- 17 USIS press release.

- 18 The texts of the notes exchanged between the U.S. and Indian Governments, released in Washington, D.C. on Nov. 17, '62, said: "It is the understanding of the U.S. Govt. that with regard to defence articles made available to the Govt. of India under special arrangements to be concluded between representatives of our two governments, and including defence articles provided between November 3 and 14, '62, the Govt. of India is prepared to offer 1. necessary facilities to representatives of the Govt. of the U.S. attached to the U.S. embassy in India for the purpose of observing and reviewing the use of such articles furnished by the Govt. of the U.S. and to provide them with such information as may be necessary for the purpose; and 2. to return to the Govt. of the U.S. such articles furnished by the Govt. of the U.S. which are no longer needed for the purpose for which they were originally made available."

In reply, the Indian ambassador, B. K. Nehru, said: "I have the honour to confirm that the understanding set forth in the above quoted note is correct. I agree that your note together with this reply shall constitute an agreement between our two governments which comes into force on the day of this reply."

- 19 M. R. Masani, the opposition Swatantra Party member of the Lok Sabha, told this writer that the question of Menon's resignation came up before the executive committee of the (Indian National) Congress parliamentary party. When members demanded Menon's exit, Nehru said that the China policy was his, and if Menon should quit he too should go with him. Members then said that if that was the prime minister's attitude, Menon would not receive any support in the Lok Sabha from the Congress benches. Nehru was thus left with no alternative but to get rid of Menon. But Menon, according to Masani, continued to occupy the defence minister's official residence opposite Nehru's in New Delhi, and met Nehru frequently in private.
- 20 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Nov. 19, '62.
- 21 *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, '62
- 22 Speech in Rajya Sabha, Nov. 9, '62, quoted in *Foreign Affairs Reports*, special issue, vol. XIII, number six, June '64, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
- 23 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Nov. 2, '62.

TWELVE

CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL

WHILE India had not fully recovered from the shock of China's sudden and massive onslaught and was still making frantic military preparations, the Chinese Government issued a statement at midnight on November 20-21, 1962, the purport of which was that Peking would unilaterally implement Chou En-lai's November 7, 1959, proposals which he had offered again on October 24, 1962.¹ (The October 24 proposals have been discussed in the chapter on The Move for Negotiations).

The Chinese Government statement declared that :

1. beginning from the day following that of the issuance of the statement, that is at midnight on November 21-22, the Chinese frontier guards would cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian boundary.

2. Beginning from December 1, the Chinese frontier guards would withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959.

(a) In the eastern sector, the Chinese "are prepared to withdraw" from the positions then held by them south of the McMahon line to positions 20 kilometres to its north.

(b) In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese would withdraw 20 kilometres towards Chinese territory from the "line of actual control," that is the positions held by them at the time of the issuance of the ceasefire declaration.

3. In order to ensure the normal movement of the inhabitants of the border area, forestall the activities of saboteurs and maintain order there, China would set up check-posts at a number of places on "its side of the line of actual control with a certain number of civil police assigned to each check-post."

The Chinese left 26 "civil posts"—seven in the western sector,

three in the middle sector, and 16 in the eastern sector, all of them on the Chinese side of the "line of actual control" of November 7, 1959. The seven posts in Ladakh (western sector) were all on the Chinese side of even the pre-September 8, 1962, line—that is, none of them was located in the area where India had set up 43 posts which the Chinese removed by force.

The location of the seven civil posts in the western sector was exactly the same as that of the seven posts which Peking claimed it had on November 7, 1959. The objective of the Chinese was thus very obvious and clear—to recreate the so-called line of actual control of November 7, 1959.

In his letter of November 14, 1962, to Chou En-lai, Nehru had categorically repudiated the existence on November 7, 1959, of a "line of actual control" as defined by the Chinese. On that day, Nehru asserted, the Chinese line of control consisted of positions which they held from Spanggur Lake, Khurnak Fort, Kongka Pass and then northwards to join the main Aksaichin road in Ladakh.

In refutation, a Chinese Government memorandum presented to the Indian charge d'affaires in Peking, Dr P. K. Bannerji, on December 9, 1962, said:

"In point of fact, China had, long before November 7, 1959, set up not only the three posts at Spanggur, Khurnak Fort and Kongka Pass, but also four other posts in the western sector. The specific locations of these posts were Shenshienwan (approximately 35.34° north, 77.49° east) near Karakoram pass; Tienwentien (approximately 35.19° north and 78.12° east) in the Chip Chap valley; Hot Springs (approximately 34.25° north and 78.55° east) northwest of Kongka pass; and Nyagzu (approximately 33.58° north and 78.53° east) north of Panggong lake.

"These seven posts, with the northernmost in the vicinity of the Karakoram pass and the southernmost in the vicinity of Spanggur lake, are all in close proximity to the line of actual control."¹

(The Chinese "civil posts" in the middle sector are at Shikpi, Poling and Silangta; in the eastern sector at Le, Hsiao, Chuna,

Gongna, Lung, Migyitun, Tamadem, Laigo bridge, Nanyi, Lusha, Titung, Dergong, Budzong, Hsiachiang, Tsayul and Sama. All of them are north of the McMahon line and do not include what the Chinese regard as the disputed points of Longju and Thagla ridge.)

The Chinese Government's ceasefire and withdrawal statement of November 20-21, 1962, pointed out that "after withdrawing, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962." This partly fulfilled New Delhi's stipulation for talks with China—that the pre-September 8, 1962, situation along the border must be restored.

The statement further said that if the Indian Government agreed to take corresponding measures—that is, withdraw 20 kilometres from the "line of actual control" further into Indian territory—the Chinese and Indian Governments could immediately appoint officials to meet at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the Sino-Indian border to discuss matters relating to the 20-kilometre withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to form a demilitarised zone, the establishment of checkpoints by each party on its side of the line of actual control as well as the return of captured personnel."

When the talks between the officials of the two parties have yielded results, and the results have been put into effect, talks could be held by the prime ministers of the two countries for further seeking an amicable settlement of the boundary question. The Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

It was clear from the Chinese Government statement that it was not only unilaterally implementing Chou En-lai's November 7, 1959, and October 24, 1962, proposals, but was expecting India to undertake reciprocal withdrawals—under the threat that "China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence, and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom."

The statement said categorically that in the eastern sector (NEFA) Indian forces should not advance from the positions to which they had been pushed by the Chinese; in the middle and western sectors, Indian forces should withdraw 20 kilometres.

Actually, the position was worse from India's point of view than what was proposed by China under the November 7, 1959, plan; for, in the eastern sector Indian forces had virtually withdrawn from the whole of NEFA. China, in fact, made it clear that Indian personnel should not advance northwards in NEFA.

China's ceasefire statement was not bereft of the usual sentiments:

“The Sino-Indian boundary question is an issue between two Asian countries. China and India should settle this issue peacefully; they should not cross swords on account of this issue and even less allow U.S. imperialism to poke in its hand and develop the present unfortunate border conflict into a war in which Asians are made to fight Asians. It is from its consistent stand of protecting the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples, strengthening Asian-African solidarity and preserving world peace that the Chinese Government has, after considering the matter over and over, decided to take these important measures.

“The Chinese Government calls upon all Asian and African countries and all peace-loving countries and people to exert efforts to urge the Indian Government to take corresponding measures so as to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question.”²

An effective ceasefire came into force at midnight on November 21-22, 1962, and the Chinese, as they had announced, carried out their planned withdrawal as from December 1.

*

*

*

*

Having invaded practically the whole of NEFA, why did the Chinese withdraw? It would have been logical for them to hold on to NEFA while they compelled India to concede to them the Aksaichin plateau, the linchpin of the dispute. The answer is that as the Chinese came down to the foothills and plains, they were faced with the same kind of supply problems which the Indians had laboured under while they were on the crest of the Himalayas—of

having to use helicopters and transport planes—although the problem of the Chinese was one of descent.

The Chinese “frontier guards” came equipped with supplies to last them a few weeks; they retreated when these supplies got exhausted. They obviously did not want to waste their limited supplies of oil and transport aircraft to hold on to NEFA, although this was the logical thing to do if they wanted to negotiate from a position of strength. Mao Tse-tung says:

“We must hold or seize territory wherever the relative strength of the enemy and our own forces makes this possible, or wherever such territory is significant for our campaigns or battles; to do otherwise would be a mistake.”⁸

The withdrawal by China from NEFA was not a “magnanimous gesture,” as Peking put it. If it were so, the Chinese have to make just another less magnanimous gesture and pull out of the seven “civil posts” in Ladakh so that negotiations with India can begin.

* * * *

India, obviously, was not inclined to be lulled into inaction by the ceasefire and withdrawal; New Delhi’s military preparations went ahead. On the very day that the Chinese ceased fire, a British team led by John Tilney, under-secretary for Commonwealth relations, and General Sir Richard Hull, chief of the imperial general staff, arrived in New Delhi. Simultaneously, an American team headed by Averell Harriman, assistant secretary of state, and Paul Nitze, assistant secretary for defence, also arrived in the Indian capital. The British Government arranged to fly military equipment from its base in Singapore, and American jet transport aircraft arrived with American crew.

As Nehru put it, India received “military supplies without inhibitions.” General Paul D. Adams, chief of the U.S. strike command, came to India; Australia and Canada responded with warm clothing and food gifts; so did West Germany.

Four days after the ceasefire, American C-130 Hercules transport planes started ferrying Indian troops and equipment to Assam.

Three days later, Britain signed an agreement to provide India with arms and military equipment without payment "for the purpose of defending India against Communist Chinese aggression." The agreement which came into force on the day of its signing (November 27) was entered into on behalf of their respective countries by the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, and India's defence minister, Y. B. Chavan. It provided for British supervision of the use of the arms and equipment supplied.

Meanwhile, the Indian army chief-of-staff, General P. N. Thapar, went on long leave "for reasons of health," and he was succeeded by General J. N. Chaudhuri. In NEFA, Lieut.-General S. Maneckshaw succeeded Lieut.-General B. M. Kaul as corps commander.

Moscow's attitude, which apparently had not until then crystallised (see chapter on "India, China and the Soviet Union") became critical of the supply of western arms to India. In a broadcast on December 2, 1962, Moscow Radio attacked British and American plans to give military aid to India, and said that the "senseless fighting along the Sino-Indian border has stopped, but imperialist dealings have in no way ended." The radio said that Britain and the United States had "even sent envoys to Pakistan to persuade that country not to raise the question, at least for the moment, of Kashmir." This was to enable India to withdraw her troops from the Indo-Pakistani border "and throw them on to the Sino-Indian frontier."

In view of this critical statement, misgivings were expressed in India about Soviet sincerity in supplying India with MIG-21 planes and in setting up a factory for their manufacture. Nehru told the Lok Sabha, two days after the Moscow broadcast, that the Russians would fulfil their promise to establish the factory and that MIG-21 planes due for delivery that month would arrive, although there might be some delay. More than two months later, the Russian freighter, *Dobrush*, arrived in Bombay with four MIG-21 planes in crates, comprising the first instalment of 12 promised by the Soviet Union. Two Soviet technicians also arrived in connection with the MIG factory.

In giving military aid to India, the western countries appeared to be very much concerned about the reaction in Pakistan. While India asked for all sorts of military equipment, short of nuclear

weapons, the western countries were reluctant to supply supersonic planes.

* * * *

There were minor accusations of the violation of the ceasefire by both India and China. Just a week after the ceasefire, Peking accused India of "advancing towards the ceasefire line" and engaging in "armed provocation." Peking also accused India of the violation of Chinese airspace. On December 30, the Chinese shelled Chushul for about five minutes but caused no damage.

The mention of a "ceasefire line" implied the existence of a certain line beyond which the Chinese did not want Indian military personnel to advance. Thus, Peking was seeking to impose by force Chou En-lai's November 7, 1959, proposals—that both sides withdraw to a distance of 20 kilometres from "the line of actual control."

While a 20-kilometre withdrawal by both sides had the appearance of being equitable, it is to the disadvantage of India. Chinese bases are on the plateau within five to ten miles from the border at elevations of 14,000 to 15,000 feet, and it is a relatively easy matter for them to move men and supplies up to the Thagla ridge and other points on the McMahon line for deployment on the Indian side of the line. For India, a 20-kilometre withdrawal means an actual pull back by the Indian armed forces of 50 to 80 road miles through difficult terrain. This, in many places, would be a five to ten days' march. On the other hand, a 20-kilometre pull back for the Chinese would take them to their main bases and supply centres and lines of lateral communications from where they could drive up in motorised columns in a matter of hours.

The Indian Government, meanwhile, decided to close down its consulates-general in Shanghai and Lhasa because restrictions placed on them by the Chinese had made it impossible for them to perform their functions. New Delhi asked Peking to take reciprocal measures and close down the Chinese consulates-general in Bombay and Calcutta. On December 15, 1962, the four consular offices were shut down.

By the middle of December, Indian administrative teams moved up to Bomdi La, which had been left by the Chinese in a state of

utter devastation, and by the end of January 1963, Indian civil administration had been restored in the frontier posts of Khinze-mane at the western end of the McMahon line and at Kibitoo at the eastern end.

The Chinese ministry of national defence announced on March 2 that China completed the planned withdrawal of her "frontier guards" to positions 20 kilometres on the Chinese side of the "line of actual control" on February 28.

Meanwhile, a joint United States-British-Canadian-Australian military mission arrived in India to examine the question of the air defence of India in the event of an aerial attack by China. The mission completed its work in a fortnight. To allay misgivings about the possible establishment of foreign military bases in India, Nehru said in the Lok Sabha:

"There is no question of stationing foreign air forces or the establishment of foreign air bases in India. None of the friendly countries has made any such suggestion. India has to be defended by her own forces. We welcome the help of friendly countries in procuring the necessary equipment and material. But the air defence of the country is too vital a matter to be left to improvisation and delays inherent in any project like that of an 'air umbrella' suggested in press reports. . .

"The preliminary action that is considered necessary is the extension of the existing air-strips, improvement in ground control and communications systems, etc. to be taken in connection with the air defence arrangements. . . In the event of a sudden emergency, the government will have to deal with it in the light of developments with support from friendly countries which may become suddenly necessary and be available."⁴

In July 1963, the United States offered to provide a set of radar installations and related communications equipment to cover the entire northern border of India. Since it would have taken 12 to 18 months for permanent radar units to be ready and installed in India, the U.S. offered to send some mobile radar sets and initiate the training of Indian Air Force personnel in their use.

It was also agreed by the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom that high performance fighter aircraft from their air forces may visit India temporarily and participate in joint training exercises with the IAF under the overall aegis of the IAF. But the exercises in themselves did not mean any commitment by these governments to assist India in her defence, though the U.S. and British Governments would consult the Government of India in the event of such a contingency.

About the same time, a massive military buildup by China all along India's northern frontiers was reported. The Chinese massed 13 divisions and their troops occupied assault positions by the end of July. The Indian Army chief-of-staff, General Chaudhuri, who had been to the United States, cut short his visit and returned to India. The defence minister who was touring South India also abruptly hurried back to New Delhi. Peking however described Indian reports of the Chinese build-up as a myth to cover up India's arms deal with the United States and other western countries.

In November 1963, U.S., Australian and British military planes arrived in India to take part in the joint air training exercises. The exercise, known as Shiksha or Training, reportedly proved that Indian cities and strategic points cannot be protected from surprise Chinese air attacks without supersonic aircraft.

Commenting on the exercises, the Peking *People's Daily* commentator, "Observer," who is a high-ranking party official, said:

"To seek more 'aid' from the U.S., the Indian Government has even yielded India to the 'global strategy' of the U.S. at the expense of its own sovereignty and national interests... The joint air exercises mark a new stage in the U.S.-Indian collusion against China, and also in the development of the Indian Government's treacherous line of selling itself out to U.S. imperialism. Through the joint exercises, the Indian Government has actually proclaimed from the house-tops its military alliance with U.S. imperialism, casting aside all pretenses of non-alignment."⁵

Criticism in a different tone was voiced in the Lok Sabha by opposition members, According to *The Times of India* of April 7,

1963, Nath Pai, a Praja Socialist member, read out extracts from the speech of V. K. Krishna Menon in the U.N. on October 10, 1958. Menon was quoted as saying: "So far as I am aware, China does not represent any menace to the internal stability of any country more than any of the 81 nations represented in the (General) Assembly." Again, long after the Chinese incursions into India were known, Menon replied to a query from a student in the United States about India's military position: "Don't worry, my boy. I will not drop a postcard to the Pentagon."

Earlier, Earl Mountbatten, chief of the British defence staff, the U.S. secretary of state, Dean Rusk, and the British Commonwealth secretary, Duncan Sandys, arrived in India. The latter two also visited Pakistan to assure its leaders that western military aid to India would not be used against Pakistan; they at the same time told India that British and U.S. military aid to India was unrelated to the settlement of the Kashmir question, though they would very much like to see a settlement.

T. T. Krishnamachari, India's minister for defence and economic co-ordination, visited the United States with a list of India's defence requirements, which included missiles such as Bomarcs, Nike-Hercules or Nike-Ajax, supersonic jet fighters, fighter-bombers and transport planes. The United States promised to equip six Indian mountain divisions, supply 24 C-119 transport planes, lend-lease a squadron of C-130's and supply road-building, railway and communications equipment. The C-130's were withdrawn after they were no longer required by the Indian Government. The United States also decided to ship an entire ammunition factory to India from Louisville, Kentucky.

Air-Marshal S. M. Engineer of the IAF went to Moscow on a "goodwill visit" at the invitation of the Soviet Air Force chief. S. Bhoothalingam, secretary to the Indian ministry of defence, also went to the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia offered to assist the setting up of a factory for making mountain artillery.

Britain had earlier signed an agreement to provide India with arms and military equipment without prepayment "for the purpose of defending India against Communist Chinese aggression." The agreement which came into force on November 27, 1962, specified an agreed but undisclosed financial limit and also provided for

British supervision of the use of the arms and equipment that were supplied.

* * * *

While accusations of intrusions or minor ceasefire violations were exchanged by New Delhi and Peking, a more serious incident was protested against by India on June 17, 1963. This involved the alleged setting up by China of an "aggressive military post" on Indian territory south-south-east of Dauletbeg Oldi near the Karakoram pass at approximately $77.59.30^{\circ}$ east longitude and $35.14.30^{\circ}$ north latitude, clearly west of the so-called "line of actual control of November 7, 1959." The post had been noticed by an Indian patrol on June 12, 1963.

The Indian protest note said that the Chinese, by establishing the post, had deliberately infringed the boundary alignment claimed by them in their 1960 map, the "line of actual control of November 7, 1959," Peking's own unilateral declaration of ceasefire and withdrawal, and the Colombo proposals which the Chinese Government professes to have accepted in principle.

Indian press reports suggested that by setting up the post the Chinese were attempting to link up the Aksaichin area with the territory ceded to them by Pakistan west of the Karakoram pass. The Indian garrison at Dauletbeg Oldi, which controls the eastern approaches to the pass, had withdrawn to Sultan Chusku during the Chinese invasion. By setting up the new post about 1,200 metres northeast of Depsang La, the Chinese were seeking to block India's return to Dauletbeg Oldi by the winter Shyok river route. The traditional Indian routes to the Karakoram pass are across the Saser pass in summer and over the frozen Shyok river in winter. While Saser pass is 30 to 40 miles (approximately 50 to 65 kilometres) west of the Chinese claim line, the Shyok river route is only a few miles from the so-called "line of actual control" but well inside Indian territory.

Peking categorically denied the existence of this post, which was obviously set up for military observation purposes, but admitted that the co-ordinates mentioned by India indicated a point inside Indian territory. The Chinese apparently removed the post later, though this was not stated by either side.

During the border fighting, both the sides refrained from using their air forces for offensive operations. But on October 17, 1962, three days before the massive Chinese onslaught, a Chinese Government note to the Indian embassy in Peking recalled that during the Chinese premier's visit to New Delhi in April 1960, he had told Nehru that unidentified aircraft detected over the Sino-Indian border area were U.S., planes.

Chou En-lai had informed Nehru that the Chinese Government had told the Burmese Government that should Burma discover any unidentified planes over its air space, it would be fully entitled to deal with them on its own, either forcing them to land or shooting them down. The Chinese Premier expressed the belief that India would do likewise.

Thereafter, the note said, the same point had been reiterated many times by the Chinese Government in its notes to India. The Burmese side "believed in the Chinese Premier" and did shoot down a U.S.-made aircraft belonging to Chiang Kai-shek within Burma's borders. This fact had been referred to by Nehru in the Indian parliament on December 11, 1961.

The Chinese note asserted that while Chinese aircraft had never entered India's airspace, India had continually been sending its planes "to intrude into China's airspace and at the same time kept prevaricating and making false charges against China." The note added:

"In order to make the truth known to the whole world, the Chinese Government hereby formally declares that, henceforth the Indian side, upon discovering any intruding alien aircraft in India's airspace, may immediately force them to land or shoot them down; likewise, the Chinese side, upon discovering any alien aircraft in China's airspace, will immediately force them to land or shoot them down. Let us down them and find out whose aircraft after all are making frequent illegal flights above the Sino-Indian border, who after all is engaged in mischievous invention while sending out aircraft to violate the airspace of the other party and who is trying to mislead the public."⁶

So saying, the Chinese shot down an Indian helicopter evacuat-

ing the wounded near the western end of the McMahon line on October 20. The same day, an Indian plane was shot at in NEFA, but it managed to return to its base. The following day, another Indian helicopter was shot down by the Chinese, also in the NEFA area.

Also on October 17, 1962, a Chinese protest note alleged that between April and September, "intrusions" by Indian aircraft over China's airspace numbered 431 sorties. The note alleged that the Indian planes airdropped to the Indian posts military personnel and more than 1,400 packages of various military materials. Indian helicopters even landed "on Chinese territory on a number of times and transported military personnel."

New Delhi perceived a sinister motive in Peking's allegation that India had "airdropped military personnel"—the motive being the possible use by China of paratroops under the guise that Indian soldiers had been dropped from the air.

Apart from shooting down these two helicopters, the Chinese did not extend the fighting to the air, though they alleged that from October 1962 to January 1964, India committed 88 "violations of China's airspace." Indian allegations of air intrusions by China during the same period numbered only three.

*

*

*

*

Throughout the border fighting, the middle sector of the boundary remained quiet, although it was there that the first Chinese accusation of an intrusion by India was made less than three months of the conclusion of the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet and India, embodying the famous five principles of peaceful co-existence.

At the conference on Bara Hoti held in New Delhi between Indian and Chinese officials it was apparent that the Chinese officials did not even know the precise location of Bara Hoti. When pressed for details, the Chinese side vaguely stated that Wuje (the Chinese name for Bara Hoti) was an area south of Tunjun La and covered 15 kilometres north to south and 10 kilometres east to west, but no co-ordinates were made available. On the other hand, the Indian side made it clear that by Bara Hoti or Wuje was meant a small

pasture ground covering two miles in length and three-quarters of a mile in breadth, south of Tunjun La. The relevant co-ordinates were also supplied.

In 1958, India had proposed that, pending a settlement of the differences over Bara Hoti both sides should refrain from sending armed personnel there and neither side should exercise civil jurisdiction over it, or send civilian personnel. The Chinese, while being agreeable to the suggestion of not sending armed parties to the disputed area, had turned down the proposal that neither side should exercise civil jurisdiction over the area.

* * * *

During the fighting, the Chinese took 3,942 Indian military personnel prisoner; 2,300 Indians were killed and 770 reported missing, making a total of 3,070 men lost in the month-long clashes.

The 3,942 Indians taken prisoner, including Brigadier J. P. Dalvi, 26 colonels and majors, were released by the Chinese in ten batches from April 10 to May 25, 1963.

The Indian authorities had detained several hundred Chinese residents of India. Of these 2,394 chose to go to China; they were repatriated in three Chinese ships, *Chung Hua*, *Kaung Hua* and *Gah Hua*. A further batch of 263 Chinese who initially decided to be repatriated to China later changed their mind and stayed on in India.

The Chinese demanded that members of the staff of their embassy in New Delhi be permitted to visit the camp in Deoli, Rajasthan, where the Chinese were detained.

New Delhi, on the other hand, pointed out that Peking has ratified the Geneva conventions on the treatment of prisoners and, therefore, should permit the international committee of the Red Cross, through its delegate in the Far East, Andre Durand, to visit Indian prisoners in China. This was not allowed by Peking.


Durand subsequently visited the Chinese internment camp in India and testified that conditions in the camp were quite satisfactory from all points of view.

Of passing interest during these exchanges between New Delhi and Peking over prisoners and internees was the use of the term

“Mainland China” by New Delhi in the context of the disinclination of some Chinese residents of India to go back to China; evidently, there were some who wanted to go to Taiwan. This was protested against by Peking and cited as an instance of New Delhi countenancing the “Two Chinas” idea.

NOTES

- 1 NCNA, Peking, Dec. 10, '62.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Fourth volume of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, p. 106.
- 4 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Feb. 24, '63.
- 5 NCNA, Peking, Nov. 12, '63.
- 6 White Paper No. VII, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 151-152. When the plane over Burma was shot down, Nationalist Chinese sources in Taipei denied that any of their 'planes was missing over Burma; it was speculated whether the Chinese Communists themselves might have sent an aircraft over Burma to be shot down for propaganda purposes and to prove their point.



SOURCE: "INDIA'S FIGHT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY," PUBLICATIONS DIVISION, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION & BROADCASTING, NEW DELHI, 1963.

MAP No. 6

THIRTEEN

THE MOVE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

BEFORE the large-scale border fighting, India's efforts were directed towards getting China to agree to Nehru's November 16, 1959, proposal that in the western sector of the boundary, India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line, which the Chinese Government has shown as the international boundary in its 1956 map, while China should withdraw all her personnel to the east of the international boundary, which has been described by the Government of India in its official map.

This meant the withdrawal of all Chinese personnel from the Aksaichin area where China has built strategic highways. Such a mutual withdrawal—in the case of India the withdrawal would have been slight if not negligible—was regarded by India as an essential prerequisite to ease tensions and create the appropriate climate for peaceful negotiations.

China on the other hand wanted discussions straightway on the substantive question of the entire Sino-Indian boundary “without preconditions” while she steadily applied military pressure. Peking's attempt throughout was to impose a solution—an unequal treaty from New Delhi's point of view—on the basis of Chou En-lai's November 7, 1959, “line of actual control.”

While incidents of firing were taking place along the border, especially in Ladakh, the Government of India on July 26, 1962, said in a note that it is “prepared, as soon as the current tensions have eased and the appropriate climate is created, to enter into further discussions on the India-China boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials as contemplated during the meeting of Chou En-lai and Nehru (in 1960).”

On August 4, 1962, the Chinese Government “approved” of the suggestion for talks on the basis of the officials' report and proposed

that "such discussions be held as soon as possible and the level, date, place and other procedural matters for these discussions be immediately decided upon by consultations through diplomatic channels."

Meanwhile, China's vice-premier and foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, made a statement on the Italian-Swiss radio and television network that no force on earth could make the Chinese withdraw.¹ This assertion was regarded by India, in a note to China dated August 22, as China's summary rejection of Nehru's November 16, 1959, proposal for a mutual withdrawal in the western sector, and that the statement in itself constituted an "impossible precondition" tantamount to asking for the acceptance of the Chinese claim in the western sector even before discussions have taken place.

New Delhi, at the same time, said it would be glad to receive a representative of the Government of China to discuss preliminary matters such as "a definition of the measures that should be taken to restore the status quo of the boundary in this (western) region which has been altered by force during the last five years and to remove the current tensions in this area so as to create the appropriate climate for purposeful discussions."²

Commentaries by official spokesmen in New Delhi and over All India Radio at the time stated that a refusal to withdraw would be tantamount to retaining the gains of aggression and negotiating for more.

Peking turned down New Delhi's invitation to a representative of the Government of China, although the Chinese Government's note of September 13, 1962, did not specifically say so. The note totally ignored India's invitation, made allegations against New Delhi of maintaining tension by creating border incidents, and made the counter proposal that the two governments appoint representatives to start discussions on the basis of the officials' report beginning on October 15 in Peking and then in New Delhi, alternately.

Peking did not want to go on record as having rejected India's invitation. At the same time it was building up military pressure.

The Government of India accepted China's invitation to its representative or representatives to go to Peking and start discussions on October 15, as proposed by the Chinese, on "measures to remove tensions in the western sector and restore the status quo" and not straightway on the boundary dispute itself. New Delhi's note said :

“The Government of India are prepared to hold further discussions at the appropriate level to define measures to restore the status quo in the western sector which has been altered by force in the last few years and to remove the current tensions in that area. The implementation of such measures will create a climate of confidence between the two governments which alone can make possible constructive discussions to resolve the differences between the two governments on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials.”^a

Peking responded by saying that it is prepared to receive the representatives of the Government of India in Peking on October 15, but only to discuss the entire boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials of the two sides, and not to deal with matters for the restoration of the status quo in the western sector and of a climate of confidence. The Chinese note of October 3 asked why only the western sector should be discussed and not the middle and eastern sectors. It proposed that neither side should refuse to discuss any question regarding the boundary raised by the other.

The Government of India countered, on October 6, by saying that it is “prepared to make the necessary arrangements for starting discussions in Peking or in Delhi from a mutually convenient date as soon as the latest intrusion (the crossing of the Thagla ridge) by Chinese forces in Indian territory south of the McMahon line has been terminated.”

New Delhi’s note said that the Government of India’s approach in this matter of talks and discussions is clear and straightforward: preliminary talks to ease tensions and to create the appropriate climate of confidence, to be followed by further purposeful talks, and, after the implementation of measures to ease tensions and restore confidence have been taken, to resolve differences between the two governments on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials.

The Government of India said that it would not enter into any talks and discussions under duress or continuing threat of force. Therefore, the latest Chinese intrusion in the eastern sector (across Thagla ridge) must be undone. The deliberate creation of tension in

the eastern sector could not be made the basis or excuse for discussing that particular sector.

The Chinese objective was two-fold: to bring India to the negotiating table under the threat of military force and compel New Delhi to agree to a boundary settlement that would legalise China's occupation of Aksaichin. It was not clear then whether China's objective was also to annex NEFA, or merely apply military pressure there to obtain concessions in Aksaichin.

* * * *

On October 24, 1962, the Chinese had captured not only Khinzemane and Dhola, but had also occupied Longju, and had mounted offensives at the extreme eastern end of the McMahon line and at Bumla, and their capture of Tawang, the administrative headquarters, was expected within a matter of hours. The Chinese entered Tawang the following day.

Chou En-lai's October 24 proposals were timed to coincide with this military gain and the psychological impact it would have on India. The proposals were :

1. Both India and China affirm that the Sino-Indian question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

2. Provided the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultations between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, that is the traditional, customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.

3. The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

These proposals were accompanied by an appeal to the Indian Government for a "positive response." The Chinese Government also appealed to the governments of Asian and African countries for an effort to bring about the materialisation of these three proposals. It also appealed to all peace-loving countries and people to do their part in promoting Sino-Indian friendship, Asian-African solidarity and world peace.

The fact was that the October 24, 1962, proposals were the same as the November 7, 1959, proposal for a mutual withdrawal of 20 kilometres from Chou-En-lai's "line of actual control"—with the difference that the October 24, 1962, proposal was being made under armed duress and with snags in it.

The first condition that China laid down was that India should agree, first of all, to a mutual withdrawal of 20 kilometres from the "line of actual control," in other words commit itself to Chou's November 7, 1959, proposal. If India agreed to this, the Chinese Government would be willing, through consultation between the two parties, to withdraw its forces in the eastern sector to the north of the "line of actual control."

It was not indicated what the consultation was to be about or how long it would last, and why the Chinese Government was only "willing to withdraw" and not actually do so.

One reason for China to advance the October 24 proposal on the very day that they were about to push the Indian defenders out of Tawang was the fact that Tawang is some 20 kilometres south of the McMahon line, and the Chinese were implementing by force their November 7, 1959, proposal for a 20-kilometre mutual pull-back from the "line of actual control," and were wanting India to accede to it under duress.

On October 24 itself, a spokesman of the Indian ministry of external affairs described the proposals as a "deceptive device that can

fool nobody,” and that the Government of India would welcome the Chinese Premier or any other suitable Chinese representative to New Delhi to discuss the border question if the Chinese forces withdraw to the positions they had occupied before September 8, 1962, that is before they had crossed the Thagla ridge.

Three days later, Nehru himself wrote to Chou, saying :

“We are of the considered view that a clear, straightforward way of reversing the deteriorating trend in India-China relations would be for your excellency to accept the suggestion to revert to the position as it prevailed all along the India-China boundary prior to September 8, 1962.”⁴

The People's Daily of October 27 confirmed that the October 24 proposal was a renewed offer of Chou's November 7, 1959, proposal. The paper said that a withdrawal by China to her September 8, 1962, positions was not acceptable.

Chou, in his letter to Nehru of November 4, explained why a return to the September 8 positions was “unfair.” He said:

“Since the state of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to September 8, 1962, has been referred to, I cannot but point out that that state was unfair and pregnant with danger of border conflict and hence should not be restored.

“The three proposals (of October 24) are reciprocal and not onesided; they are equitable and not asking for the submission of one side; they are based on mutual accommodation and not imposed on others; they are based on mutual respect and not bullying one side; they are in the spirit of friendly negotiation and not arbitrary or dogmatic.”⁵

On November 14, Nehru in a letter to his Chinese opposite number, rejected the October 24, 1962, proposals, saying :

“Your present proposal in brief amounts in broad terms to this: because India had been pressing China to remedy the forcible alteration of the status quo since 1957 in the western sector, China has undertaken since 8th September, deliberately and in

cold blood, a further massive aggression and occupied larger areas of Indian territory and is now making the magnanimous offer of retaining the gains of the earlier aggression plus such other gains as it can secure by negotiations from the latest aggression on the basis of the Chinese three-point proposals. If this is not the assumption of the attitude of a victor, I do not know what else it can be. This is a demand to which India will never submit whatever the consequences and however long and hard the struggle may be. We cannot do less than this if we are going to maintain the principles we cherish, namely peace, good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence with all our neighbours including China. To do otherwise would mean mere existence at the mercy of an aggressive, arrogant and expansionist neighbour.”⁶

Nehru said that the basic fact was that till September 8, 1962, no Chinese forces had crossed the frontier between India and China in the eastern sector as defined by the Simla treaty of 1914, that is the highest watershed ridge. It was on September 8 that Chinese forces crossed the frontier and threatened the Dhola post of India. Nehru added :

“We took limited defensive measures to reinforce this post and at the same time made repeated approaches to the Chinese Government to withdraw their forces beyond the Thagla ridge which is the frontier in this region. Your forces not only did not withdraw to the position they occupied before 8th September, 1962, but, after probing attacks, mounted a massive attack and are now in occupation of large areas of Indian territory in this region and also in various other frontier areas of NEFA. That the attack was premeditated and carefully planned is clear from the fact that this attack at the Thagla ridge frontier which commenced on the morning of 20th October, 1962, was not an isolated move; similar attacks against Indian defence posts started simultaneously along other parts not only of the eastern sector of the frontier, but also of the western sector of the frontier. . .

“This invasion, coming after 12 years of constant and

consistent endeavour on our part to maintain and develop friendly relations with China can only point to one and only one conclusion, namely, that the Government of China, have taken a deliberate, cold-blooded decision, in total disregard of all principles which govern normal neighbourly relations between sovereign governments, to enforce their alleged boundray claims by the military invasion of India. It is this crisis of confidence which has to be dealt with. I must state frankly that we find no attempt, either in the three proposals as elaborated now or in the other parts of your letter, to deal with this main problem created by the massive Chinese aggression on India which began on 8th September, 1962, namely the complete loss of confidence in the bonafides of the professions for a peaceful settlement repeatedly made in public statements of the Government of China. On the other hand, your letter proceeds on the unilateral assumption that the line of actual control created by the latest Chinese invasion of India should be accepted as a part of the ceasefire arrangements and implemented on the ground, the boundary differences being negotiated thereafter between the two prime ministers. In brief, China will keep what it has secured by this further invasion and is prepared to negotiate on the rest. India can never agree to this position.”

Three days after this letter was written, the fall of Walong to the Chinese was announced in New Delhi. The Chinese also attacked and took forward Indian positions near Chushul in Ladakh. Chushul was subjected to saturated shelling, but the Indian defenders held it.

Fears were expressed in New Delhi that China's peace proposals and offer of negotiations, whatever their intrinsic merit, were only a tactic: fight, advance, negotiate—only to break down the will of the enemy to fight—and fight again. Negotiations were only another form of “struggle” for the Chinese.

*

*

*

*

Meanwhile, interested countries of Asia and Africa came forth with proposals and formulae for negotiations. On October 31,

1962, the authoritative Cairo newspaper, *Al Ahram*, published what it described as the proposals made by President Nasser to Nehru and Chou En-lai. They were :

1. Immediate cessation of hostilities.
2. Withdrawal of all fighting forces to the positions they occupied before the outbreak of the fighting on October 20, 1962, that is, behind the line where their forces stood on September 8 last.
3. The establishment of a no-man's land between the forces to prevent further fighting.
4. Peaceful negotiations to arrive at a permanent settlement of the border dispute.⁸

On November 2, China summarily rejected the UAR proposals, stating that a return to the September 8 position was unacceptable.⁹ India accepted them.

On November 11, the Government of India revealed that Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, then President of Ghana, had submitted certain proposals similar to those made by President Nasser. India again accepted them, but China turned them down.

On November 14, New China News Agency circulated from Peking the proposals made by the Government of Guinea a week earlier. They were: 1. Immediate ceasefire; 2. withdrawal of the forces 20 kilometres on either side of the "natural frontiers;" 3. an immediate meeting of the two governments with a view to settling their dispute by peaceful negotiations; and 4. outright condemnation of all foreign intervention. It was not explained what was meant by "natural frontiers."

The Guinea Government made a "pressing appeal to the Afro-Asian group and to all peace-loving countries to make an effective contribution to the solution of a crisis the development of which could dangerously affect the international situation."

New China News Agency circulated on November 18 the summary of the correspondence that had taken place until then between Chou En-lai and the heads of state or Government of Guinea, Tanganyika and the United Arab Republic.

In his letter to Sekou Toure of Guinea, Chou En-lai said that the Chinese Government considered the Guinea proposals "reasonable, constructive and conducive to a peaceful settlement" and expressed the hope that the "proposal of the Guinea Government would receive

a wide, positive response among Asian and African countries." He also complained about U.S. military assistance to India.

Tanganyika's proposals were:

1. China's troops move behind the line which India claims to be the McMahon line in the eastern sector and the customary line in other sectors of the border.

2. Indian troops move behind the line which China claims to be the traditional customary line.

3. A commission agreeable to both sides, to keep a watch over the entire border with on-the-spot inspections, if necessary, be appointed to make sure that the terms of the agreement are observed.

4. A commission of three countries, one named by India, another by China, and a third agreed upon by both sides, to study and report on the historical facts relating to the traditional, customary and McMahon lines.

5. India and China, and a third party if they both so desire, to use the report as a basis for negotiations to settle the dispute.

Chou En-lai, in his letter to the Tanganyikan President, Rashidi Kavava, said that the first two points, though basically fair, would not be acceptable to India because in 1959 Nehru had proposed that Chinese and Indian personnel withdraw from the disputed territory in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border; but India refused to apply the same principle to the eastern sector.

The third, fourth and fifth points, Chou said, were "undoubtedly well-intentioned," but the Sino-Indian boundary question should be, and could only be, settled through direct negotiations between China and India. The positive role of a third party friendly to both sides did not lie in getting directly involved in the dispute between the two sides, but in promoting direct negotiations between them.

About President Nasser's proposals, Chou said, if the United Arab Republic head of state had "fully understood the course of events leading to the present Sino-Indian border conflict, he would certainly discover that neither restoration of the state of the boundary as before September 8, 1962, nor restoration of the state of the boundary as before October 20, 1962, when the clashes began, constitute a reasonable basis for a peaceful settlement."

Thus, Chou expressed himself against the compromise formulae suggested by Ghana, Guinea, Tanganyika and the UAR. At the

same time, Chou addressed on November 16 an eloquent appeal to the heads of state or Government of North Korea, Mongolian People's Republic, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, UAR, Syria, Yemen, Ceylon, Cambodia, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, Laos, Tanganyika and Uganda "to uphold justice and use their influence to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question on a fair and reasonable basis." The appeal also comprehensively reviewed the border dispute from Peking's point of view.

Ten months later, on September 19, 1963, after Peking had expressed reservations about the Colombo proposals, the Soviet Communist Party organ, *Pravda*, commented :

"In the Afro-Asian countries the fact is noted that the People's Republic of China Government itself twice in October and November 1962 called on these countries to 'show initiative' and 'facilitate' the commencement of direct Sino-Indian negotiations. But when this was done, the People's Republic of China Government did not avail itself of the kind services of these countries."

*

*

*

*

While thus rejecting or sidetracking the proposals of friendly African countries, Chou En-lai, on November 28, 1962, wrote to Nehru, stating that Chinese forces would withdraw all the way 20 kilometres beyond "the line of actual control" of November 7, 1959, and in doing so they would be "far behind the positions held on September 8, 1962."

Chou's letter contained a warning. It urged India also to withdraw 20 kilometres from the "line of actual control." (This could have applied only to the middle and western sectors, for in the eastern sector Indian personnel had already withdrawn more than 20 kilometres in the face of the Chinese advance). Chou said "in case the Indian side should refuse to co-operate, even the ceasefire which has been effected is liable to be upset." If India agreed, the two governments could appoint officials to meet at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the border to discuss matters relating to the 20-kilometre withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to form a demilitarised zone, the establishment of checkpoints of each

party on its own side of the line of actual control, and the return of captured personnel.

“The meeting of the officials of the two countries will itself be of great positive significance because it will signify the return of our two sides from the battlefield to the conference table. If the meeting of the officials of the two countries achieves results and the results are put into effect, the prime ministers of our two countries can then hold talks and proceed further to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.”¹⁰

Chou undoubtedly wanted to negotiate from a position of strength and was expecting India to accede to his suggestion because of what Chinese propaganda organs called the “heavy blow” inflicted on India by China’s People’s Liberation Army.

In an editorial greeting the six-nation Colombo conference convened by the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike, on December 11, 1962, *The People’s Daily* of Peking observed :

“One cannot understand what justification can India have to pose as the victor and not take a proper measure of itself after it suffered such a heavy blow from China’s armed counter-attack.”¹¹

In his reply, Nehru pointed out that from the Chinese Prime Minister’s letters of November 4 and 28, the following principles had emerged :

1. A proper atmosphere should be created for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian differences regarding the border.
2. The differences should be settled in a friendly way through peaceful talks and discussions.
3. There should be no attempt to force any unilateral demand by either side on account of the advances gained in the recent fighting.
4. The necessary preliminaries for talks and discussions should be consistent with the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides.
5. The implementation of these proposed arrangements should not in any way prejudice either side’s position in regard to the correct boundary alignment.

Nehru said what the Chinese Prime Minister called "the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959" in the western sector was a series of isolated Chinese military posts (which were at Spanggur, Khurnak Fort, Kongka Pass and along the main Aksaichin road), while the "line of actual control" now claimed by China "is along a line of control established by your forces after the massive attacks mounted since 20th October, 1962."

Nehru said :

"This is a definite attempt to retain under cover of preliminary ceasefire arrangements physical possession over the area which China claims and to secure which the massive attack since 20th October, 1962, was mounted by your forces. This we cannot agree to. This also violates principles 1, 3, 4 and 5."¹²

Nehru categorically stated that the October 24, 1962, proposals of Chou En-lai as well as the ceasefire and withdrawal statement "aim at securing physical control of areas which were never under Chinese administrative control either on 7th November, 1959, or at any time prior to 8th September, 1962."

Both the prime ministers were aware of the fact that the ceasefire line or the line up to which each side conceded the other's jurisdiction would inevitably become the defacto boundary. Hence the preliminary wrangle over the ceasefire line. And this partly explains China's objection to the total and unreserved acceptance of the Colombo proposals.

*

*

*

*

On the eve of the convening by the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandarnaike, of the six-nation Colombo conference, Peking sought to create an atmosphere of crisis. Through a memorandum handed to the Indian charge d'affaires, Dr. P. K. Bannerji, the Chinese Government demanded in peremptory tones that India give clear and positive answers to the following questions :

What is the Indian Government's attitude to 1. ceasefire; 2. withdrawal of 20 kilometres by both sides from the "line of actual control as existing on November 7, 1959;" and 3. a meeting of

officials to deal with matters pertaining to the demilitarized zone and establishment of checkposts.

The memorandum said that India had been vague and evasive about these matters and had been repeatedly demanding clarifications and explanations about matters which were very clear. The memorandum asserted :

“The line of actual control of November 7, 1959, is fair and reasonable, and it is absolutely unacceptable to restore the state of the boundary to what it was on September 8, 1962.”¹³

The memorandum also claimed that on November 7, 1959, China not only had just three posts in the western sector as stated by India (at Spanggur lake, Khurnak fort and Kongka pass) but four other posts at Shenshienwan (approximately 35.34° N., 77.49° E) near Karakoram pass, Tienwentien (approximately 35.19° N., 78.12° E) in the Chip Chap valley, Hot Springs (approximately 34.25° N, 78.55° E) northwest of Kongka pass, and Nyagzu (approximately 33.58 N, 78.53 E) north of Pangong lake. These seven posts, the Chinese memorandum emphasised, are all in close proximity to the “line of actual control.”

After their ceasefire and withdrawal, the Chinese set up posts at these very positions, thus creating or recreating the “line of actual control” of November 7, 1959.

*

*

*

*

On the day the leaders of Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, United Arab Republic, Indonesia and Ghana met in Colombo, Nehru answered in the Lok Sabha the three questions asked by Peking :

Ceasefire—The declaration of the Government of China is a unilateral one. But in so far as the ceasefire is concerned, India accepts it, and nothing has been done by or on behalf of India to impede the implementation of the ceasefire declaration.

Disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides—India is in favour of a disengagement on the basis of a commonly agreed arrangement. But such an arrangement can only be on the basis of undoing the further aggression committed by the Government of

China on Indian territory since September 8, 1962. The Government of China could not expect India to agree to the so-called line of actual control of November 7, 1959. What India suggested is a simple and straightforward proposal: that of restoration of the status quo prior to September 8, 1962.

Meeting of officials—If the officials of the two sides are to meet, they must have clear and precise instructions as to the ceasefire and withdrawal arrangements which they are supposed to implement. Unless they receive these instructions, which must be the result of an agreement between the Governments of India and China, they will be unable to function.

The question, in short, was the quite simple one whether the Chinese November 7, 1959, "line of actual control" or the pre-September 8, 1962, line as insisted on by India should be the ceasefire line. The vital difference between the two was the 2,500 square miles of barren territory in Ladakh where India had set up 43 flag-flying posts which were removed by force by the Chinese during their October-November 1962 offensive. By demanding a meeting of the officials of the two sides, Peking was seeking to freeze the situation along the so-called "line of actual control" of November 7, 1959.

In the Lok Sabha, Nehru offered to refer the border dispute to the International Court or any other international judicial body provided the pre-September 8, 1962, status quo was restored. The offer was formally made in an Indian diplomatic note on January 4, 1963, which called for a positive response from the Chinese Government to India's proposal that the border dispute be referred to the World Court at The Hague for its opinion. The note said :

"Evidently, the Chinese believe in the principle of taking what they can by force and asking for negotiations for the rest. This imperialist demand is reminiscent of the old days of gun-boat diplomacy."¹⁴

The proposal for a reference to the World Court was repeated on April 3, and was summarily rejected by the Chinese on October 9 after New Delhi had sent a reminder to Peking.

Even while the Colombo powers were meeting and the leaders of Ceylon were trying to persuade New Delhi and Peking to accept

their proposals as a basis for negotiations, Peking was seeking to impose its own terms on New Delhi. On December 30, 1962, when Madame Bandaranaike left Hong Kong for Peking by a special train sent by the Chinese to submit the Colombo proposals for Peking's consideration, the Chinese Government handed a memorandum dated December 29 to the Indian Government which said that "mere non-impediment by India of China's unilateral ceasefire is not enough and that the ceasefire might be upset."

The memorandum made it clear that while Chinese forces would withdraw beyond the September 8, 1962, line, that line was unacceptable to China as a ceasefire line or as a line for the disengagement of the forces of the two sides or as a line up to which Indian forces could advance.

The memorandum set forth the Chinese position regarding various points at dispute along the boundary. About Longju, it said that China had accepted the suggestion made in 1959 that the personnel of neither side be stationed there on condition that this principle should apply also to Parigas, Shipki pass, Sang, Tsungha, Puling-Sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Lapthal in the western sector.¹⁵

About Thagla ridge and Dhola, in relation to Migyitun and Tulung La, it said that China accepted neither the co-ordinates of the McMahon map nor the principle followed by Sir Arthur Henry McMahon that the highest watershed ridge forms the boundary. China followed only "the line of actual control of November 7, 1959."

Further evidence of Peking's determination to negotiate from a position of strength, following its invasion and withdrawal, was contained in Chou's letter to Nehru of December 30, 1962, which proposed that "in order to stabilise the ceasefire and seek a rapprochement of the view of the two sides, the Chinese Government proposes that in the course of the withdrawal of the Chinese frontier guards on China's own initiative according to set plans, the Indian troops should stay in their present positions along the entire Sino-Indian border, and that in the meantime, officials of the two sides should meet immediately to discuss such matters as withdrawal arrangements for the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides, establishment of checkpoints and return of captured personnel."

This was rejected by Nehru on January 1, 1963. He said :

“This proposal of yours is worse than your three-point proposal (of October 24, 1962) inasmuch as it seeks to exclude Indian armed forces from the entire area of Indian territory subjected to this latest aggression since September 8, 1962, that is, from Indian territory of over 30,000 square kilometres in the eastern sector and over 6,000 square kilometres in the western sector...

“No amount of wordy argument can hide the position of advantage that the Chinese Government seeks to retain as the spoils of its latest aggression.”¹⁶

This letter was followed by a diplomatic note three days later. It said :

“Such limited action as India took before and was compelled to take later to resist the latest Chinese aggression which began on September 8, 1962, requires no apology or explanation. It is absurd to distort this as ‘armed provocations against the Chinese side.’ Surely, an aggressor committing the violation of a friendly neighbouring country’s territory does not expect to be welcomed by the victim of this aggression...It is China and not India that is making a wrong appraisal of the events of the last three months. The forbearance and tolerance shown by India were misconstrued as a sign of weakness and it is China that has adopted bullying tactics by mounting massive attacks. When this plan of aggression began to be condemned by all peace-loving countries of the world, the Chinese Government hurriedly adopted a plan of unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal in the hope that they would be able to confuse world opinion under the guise of peaceful intentions and, at the same time, succeed in compelling India to come to terms in accordance with the military dictates of China.”¹⁷

NOTES

- 1, 2 & 3 White Paper No. VII, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 36-37 & 77-78.
- 4 White Paper No. VIII, pp. 4-5.
- 5, 6 & 7 Ibid.

- 8 The text of the UAR presidential council statement was released in Hong Kong by the UAR consulate-general.
- 9 China's rejection was announced in New Delhi by a spokesman of the external affairs ministry. He also announced the rejection by China of Dr Kwame Nkrumah's compromise proposals.
- 10 White Paper No. VIII, pp. 24-26.
- 11 NCNA, Peking, Dec. 11, '62.
- 12 White Paper No. VIII, pp. 28-31.
- 13 NCNA, Peking, Dec. 10, '62 and White Paper No. VIII, pp. 31-35.
- 14 White Paper No. VIII, pp. 74-78.
- 15 White Paper No. III, pp. 39-46.
- 16 White Paper No. VIII, pp. 48-51.
- 17 White Paper No. VIII, pp. 74-78.

FOURTEEN

THE COLOMBO PROPOSALS AND AFTER

THE conference of the six non-aligned Asian and African countries, convened by Ceylon, began in Colombo on December 10, 1962. It was participated in by Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike (Prime Minister of Ceylon), General Ne Win of Burma, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, Dr Raden Subandrio (Foreign Minister of Indonesia), Ali Sabri (Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic) and Kofi Ashante Ofori-Atta (Justice Minister of Ghana). They were assisted by officials.

The formula they evolved to bring India and China to the negotiating table, known as the Colombo proposals, was:

1. The conference considers that the existing de facto ceasefire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict.

2. (A) With regard to the western sector, the conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20-kilometre withdrawal of their military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru of November 21, 1962.

(B) The conference would appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position.

(C) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarised zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.

3. With regard to the eastern sector, the conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both the governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective

Eastern Sector: The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo conference proposals move right up to the south of the line of actual control, that is the McMahon line, except for two areas on which there is a difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right up to the north of the McMahon line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo conference proposals, the arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China according to the Colombo conference proposals, are the Chedong or Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two governments.

Middle Sector: The Colombo conference desired that the status quo in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the status quo.

* * * *

An important point was: What would happen if there was no agreement between India and China on the establishment of an equal number of civil posts of the two sides in the 20-kilometre demilitarised zone in the western sector between the "line of actual control of November 7, 1959" and the position of the Chinese forces after their unilateral 20-kilometre eastward withdrawal.

This point was further clarified by Mrs Bandaranaike in a letter dated March 7, 1963, to Chou En-lai. She said:

"The Colombo conference proposals are silent on the question as to what happens if China and India fail to agree in regard to the establishment of civilian posts (in the western sector). On that question, while in China, my colleagues and I expressed the view that it would not be contrary to the Colombo conference proposals if the area remained unoccupied."³

Thus, the Colombo proposals would be implemented on the ground if China were to remove the seven civil posts which it established in the western sector in the 20-kilometre strip of no-man's

land east of the "November 7, 1959, line of actual control" and leaves this strip entirely unoccupied. These seven posts are on the Chinese side of the pre-September 8, 1962, line and at the same locations where, according to Peking, China had its posts on November 7, 1959.

* * * *

India accepted the Colombo proposals on January 25, 1963, by an indirect vote in the Lok Sabha which defeated, by 349 to 59, an opposition motion which said that the proposals "are not in keeping with the honour, sovereignty and integrity of India."

Nehru argued at considerable length in favour of the proposals. He said that the object behind India's demand for the restoration of the pre-September 8, 1962, line would be fully attained if the Colombo proposals as clarified were implemented. As a matter of fact, Nehru said, the restoration of the statusquo-ante September 8, 1962, would not be a happy position for India, since that would mean an interlocking of military posts where the Chinese had the advantage.

Describing the problem facing China as a dilemma, Nehru said:

"If the Chinese refuse to accept (the Colombo proposals) they are in the wrong. If they accept, it is to their disadvantage and our advantage . . . If we do not accept them, then their refusal would be covered and our refusal will be played up. That is their game—to make us do something of which they can take advantage."⁴

* * * *

India's total and unreserved acceptance of the Colombo proposals was a diplomatic setback for China. Statements by Chinese leaders indicated that Peking had anticipated a rejection of the Colombo proposals by India, or at best, their acceptance with reservations.

Four days before the proposals were approved by the Indian

parliament, China's vice-premier and foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, speaking at a farewell banquet given by him to Nepal's foreign minister, Dr Tulsī Giri, said that China accepted the Colombo proposals in principle. But the Chinese Government, Chen Yi said, maintained certain points of its own interpretation of the proposals, and the Indian Government might have its own interpretation too.⁵

The Chinese "interpretation" as stated in Chou En-lai's letter of January 19, 1963, to the Ceylonese Prime Minister, revealed that it was nothing else but Chou's earlier proposal to Nehru that while Chinese forces withdrew, Indian forces should not advance in the eastern sector of the boundary.⁶

China's so-called "positive response" to the proposals amounted to not occupying what Peking has called the "disputed areas"—Thagla ridge and Longju in the eastern sector; Barahoti or Wuje in the middle sector; and the 20-kilometre demilitarised zone east of Chou En-lai's "line of actual control of November 7, 1959" in the western sector. According to the Chinese Premier, "it is a matter of course for China to set up civilian checkpoints" in these so-called disputed areas; but China would not do so as a "positive response" to the Colombo proposals. But later China did set up seven civil posts in the western sector and informed the Colombo powers about it.

The actual wording of the Colombo proposals in their application to the eastern sector of the boundary, and their clarification, is of more than passing interest because of the "interpretation" by China.

The Colombo proposals say: "With regard to the eastern sector, the conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both the governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective positions. . ."

Its clarification, as given by the Colombo powers themselves, says: "The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo conference proposals, move right up to the south of the line of actual control, that is the McMahon line. . ."

The fact that the text of the Colombo proposals (and not their clarification) does not specifically say that Indian troops can move right up to the McMahon line has been seized by Peking to place its

own "interpretation" that Indian forces should not move right up to the south of the McMahon line.

The intention of the Chinese was clearly not to let go the logistical advantage of their invasion and to negotiate from a posture of strength and impose on India a border treaty—an unequal treaty—on the basis of the so-called "line of actual control of November 7, 1959."

Did Nehru actually agree not to advance Indian forces right up to the south of the McMahon line? The controversial letter of the Ceylonese Prime Minister to her Chinese opposite number dated March 7, 1963, says:

"In the course of an informal discussion, at which officials were not present, Prime Minister Nehru informed my colleagues, Mr Ali Sabri, Mr Ofori-Atta and myself that in regard to the question or point of interpretation on the eastern sector, while he was not prepared to accept any condition restricting his government from deploying its forces in that area, it was not his intention to advance its forces up to the McMahon line, and that I could give you this assurance."⁷

In effect, Nehru agreed that he would not ask the Indian forces to reoccupy the area south of the McMahon line from where they had been dislodged by the Chinese invasion, though should he so decide, he could not be precluded from doing so.

The second point of interpretation which China made was that in the western sector India should not set up civil posts in the 20-kilometre demilitarised zone east of the so-called "line of actual control of November 7, 1959."

*

*

*

*

Having lost the diplomatic initiative, an assortment of statements emanated from Peking intended to create the impression that India's acceptance of the Colombo proposals is not unreserved, that the clarifications of the proposals as given by the Colombo powers are "India's own interpretations."

On this point, Mrs Bandaranaike's letter to Chou dated March 7, 1963, says:

“I can assure you that neither my colleagues nor I made any statement in New Delhi that was different from what had already been stated in Peking on the Colombo conference proposals. For purposes of presenting the Colombo conference proposals to the Indian parliament, the Indian Government summarised what had been stated at the discussions in New Delhi in a document, a copy of which you will have already received. This document was prepared by the Government of India as a summary of the discussions in New Delhi. This document is expressed in the language of the Indian Government, but its content is no different in substance from the thoughts conveyed in my document entitled ‘The principles underlying the proposals of the Six.’ For instance, in the Indian document, the meaning of paragraph 2(C) of the Colombo proposals is expressed in sub-paragraph 3 under the heading ‘Western sector’ in the following way: ‘The demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres created by the Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo conference proposals. It is only as to the location of the number of posts and their composition that there has to be agreement between the Governments of India and China.’

“If you were to compare this text with paragraph 2(C) of the proposals themselves and paragraphs 9(D) and (E) of my document entitled ‘The principles underlying the proposals of the Six’, you will appreciate that there is no difference between them except in regard to modes of expression. The basic idea in all these statements is that although neither India nor China should have military posts in the proposed demilitarised zone, neither the presence of India nor China was to be excluded and that the proposed demilitarised zone should be administered by civilian posts to be agreed upon by both sides. The Indian comment that administration by civilian posts of both sides is a substantive part of the Colombo conference proposals—although it is not my comment—does not, in my view, add anything to or alter in any way the content or the substance of the proposals as already set out.

“I should like to disabuse your mind of any incorrect

impression that you may have formed that the Colombo conference proposals were not clearly and consistently explained in India is the same way that they were explained in China.”⁸

While maintaining its reservations and “interpretations” of the Colombo proposals, China’s leaders gave the world to understand that they had no objection to Indian forces moving right up to the south of the McMahon line. This was a significant retreat, though Peking did not concede this right to India in any diplomatic note.

On February 12, 1963, at a banquet he gave in honour of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, Chairman Liu Shao-chi categorically said:

“Provided that India does not conduct provocations and does not enter the areas where there is a dispute about the cease-fire arrangement, the already relaxed situation on the Sino-Indian border would not become tense again.”⁹

According to Peking the disputed areas regarding ceasefire arrangements are only Longju and Thagla ridge in the eastern sector, Barahoti in the middle sector and the area east of the so-called line of actual control of November 7, 1959, in the western sector where India had set up 43 flag-flying posts until they were forcibly removed by the Chinese by their massive onslaught of October-November 1962.

*

*

*

*

Peking’s attempt to wriggle out of the Colombo proposals can best be seen from the various statements regarding the proposals that emanated from the Chinese capital:

On January 28, 1963, *The People’s Daily* said that the Colombo proposals “contain ambiguities and inconsistencies.” The “ambiguity” apparently was in regard to the movement of Indian forces right up to the south of the McMahon line and the “inconsistencies” were the stipulation that the 20-kilometre strip created by China’s withdrawal east of the “line of actual control” should be administered by the civilian posts of both India and China,

On February 17, 1963, China's vice-premier and foreign minister Marshal Chen Yi, in a television interview which he gave to a Swedish journalist said:

"The Colombo proposals contain contradictions and fallacies in logic. Moreover, they are ambiguous in some matters of detail."¹⁰

Chen Yi also said that the clarifications given to India by Ceylon, Ghana and the UAR are different from those given to China by Ceylon and Indonesia. This was spiritedly denied by Mrs Bandaranaike and also by Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, Ceylon's minister without portfolio, who said in the House of Representatives in Colombo on April 5:

"There is no difference in the explanations of the Colombo proposals given to the Prime Ministers of China and India."¹¹

On March 3, 1963, Chou, in a letter to Nehru, said that "in order to promote direct Sino-Indian negotiations, the Chinese Government has done all that is possible for it to do. . . The Chinese Government's stand for direct Sino-Indian negotiations will not change."

Nehru retorted on March 5:

"I regret I cannot understand your claim that 'in order to promote direct Sino-Indian negotiations the Chinese Government has done all that is possible for it do.' The obvious thing, if the Government of China is sincere in its professions regarding a peaceful settlement, is to accept the Colombo proposals without reservations just as the Government of India has done. We can go to the second stage of talks and discussions only thereafter."¹²

China's vice-premier and vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, Marshal Ho Lung, speaking at the April 18 Bandung conference anniversary in Peking, said:

"It is our firm and unshakable stand to settle the Sino-Indian

boundary question peacefully . . . Having taken all major measures conceivable on our own initiative, we hope that India will agree to hold direct talks speedily. At the same time if India is unwilling to enter into negotiations for the time being, we will wait with patience."¹³

China's decision to wait patiently has been repeated often and is intended to freeze the boundary situation which after China's invasion and withdrawal conforms to the November 7, 1959, "line of actual control" as unilaterally determined by China.

Addressing a press conference in Cairo on December 20, 1963, Chou En-lai said:

"There is no question of renouncing reservations in regard to the Colombo proposals."¹⁴

China's reservations concerning the Colombo proposals are confined to the western sector. An editorial in *The People's Daily* of Peking of October 13, 1963, said:

"What the Chinese Government has done greatly exceeds the requirements of the Colombo proposals. It only reserves its own interpretation of a portion of one of the six articles of the proposals, namely article 2(C) which says in regard to the western sector of the Sino-Indian border: 'Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarised zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.'

"This provision is vague, and it would be hard to avoid different interpretations."¹⁶

The People's Daily did not refer to the clarification given by the Colombo powers which makes it clear that the 20-kilometre demilitarised zone east of the so-called "line of actual control" in the western sector is to be administered by the civil posts of India and China.

It is of interest to note how Chou En-lai went about signing joint communiques with Asian leaders calling for Sino-Indian negotiations "on the basis of the Colombo proposals" while still maintaining his reservations.

The joint communique signed by Chou and General Ne Win of Burma in Rangoon said: "The two sides were glad to note that the situation along the Sino-Indian border has eased. They expressed the hope that China and India would find it possible to enter into direct negotiations on the basis of the Colombo proposals so as to remove progressively the differences between them and finally achieve a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question."

Again, the joint communique signed in Colombo by Chou and Sirimavo Bandaranaike said: "The Chinese Premier expressed thanks to Ceylon and other Colombo conference nations for their efforts of mediation between China and India and expressed readiness to continue to seek direct negotiations with India on the basis of the Colombo proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Ceylon Prime Minister indicated that together with the other Colombo conference nations, Ceylon would continue its efforts to promote Sino-Indian reconciliation."

Earlier, in an interview which he gave in Dacca to the Associated Press of Pakistan, Chou said: "Conditions are ready for the opening of direct negotiations between China and India on the basis of the Colombo conference proposals. A further relaxation of the Sino-Indian boundary question is entirely possible, provided India agrees to return to the conference table without any pre-conditions."

An indication that all these statements about negotiations on the basis of the Colombo proposals did not mean that China would accept the Colombo proposals fully and unreservedly as India has done, was given by Chou in an interview to some Japanese journalists in Colombo. Chou said: "The Chinese Government has always stood for the immediate opening of direct negotiations between China and India on the basis of the Colombo proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question; it sticks to the same stand today."

The purport of all the statements was that the Colombo proposals themselves must be the subject of Sino-Indian negotiations.

* * * *

That Peking's intention was clearly to freeze the border situation while talking about a negotiated settlement was shown by its response to a five-point proposal which New Delhi made on April 3, 1963. In a note the Government of India said:

1. The Government of China should accept, without reservations, the Colombo proposals just as the Government of India has done.

2. The acceptance by both sides of the Colombo proposals can be followed up by a meeting of the officials of the two sides to arrive at a settlement of various matters left by the Colombo powers for direct agreement between the parties and to decide the details regarding implementation of the Colombo proposals on the ground.

3. The officials of both sides concerned can then take action to implement these proposals on the ground so that agreed ceasefire arrangements are established on the ground.

4. Thereafter, in the improved atmosphere, India and China can take up the question of their differences on the boundary question and try to reach a mutually acceptable settlement in one or more than one stage. If a settlement is reached, this can be implemented in detail on the ground.

5. If a settlement is not reached in these direct talks and discussions between the two parties, both sides can consider the adoption of further measures to settle the differences peacefully in accordance with international practice followed in such cases. Both India and China can agree to make a reference on the differences regarding the boundary to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and to agree to abide by the Court's decision. If this method of peaceful settlement is, for any reason, not acceptable to the Government of China, both parties can agree to some sort of international arbitration by a person or group of persons, nominated in a manner agreed to by both governments, who can go into the question objectively and impartially and give their award, the award being binding on both governments.

For almost six months Peking did not respond to this proposal, until the Government of India sent a reminder. Then, on October 9, the Chinese Government said that it "might as well use some ink and paper" to reply.

Peking categorically rejected the April 3, 1963, proposal of the Government of India, saying "it can be foreseen that no results will be obtained even though boundary negotiations are held." It also turned down the suggestion that the dispute be referred to international arbitration stating that China was not a member of the United Nations whose organ the International Court is. And international arbitration was not acceptable to China.

To make it very clear that Peking had finally slammed the door on negotiations, *The People's Daily* editorially said on October 13, 1963:

"There is no longer any room for negotiations between the two sides."¹⁶

India responded to this stand of the Chinese Government by a trenchant note dated October 16. It said:

"It is becoming increasingly clear that the Chinese Government has adopted the philosophy of 'might is right' and will not consider any other methods of settlement of its differences with its friends and neighbours, except submission to its dictates and failing that settlement by war.

"Why does China still talk at the same time of settling questions peacefully on the basis of friendship and the five principles? Is this an adaptation of the principle, 'Strategically we should slight all enemies and practically we should take full account of them' in its relations with friends and neighbours?

"The history of India-China relations since the inauguration of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 illustrates this Chinese strategy of duplicity and equivocation. It appears that the boundary question or any other that the Chinese may want to raise will not be brought up by them till the necessary military preparations are completed against an unsuspecting

friend or neighbour when in Chinese parlance conditions become 'ripe for settlement'."17

The Indian note pointed out significantly that Peking's reservations and "interpretations" of the Colombo proposals preceded and not followed the clarification of the proposals by the Colombo powers. Therefore, the clarifications, which are quite consistent with the principles underlying the proposals, have in no case any relationship with the reservations made by China so many days before the clarifications were even thought of. The note said:

"China's acceptance of the Colombo proposals 'in principle' is merely a cunning device to distort these proposals to suit its own position. Otherwise, there can be no ground for denouncing the proposals as illogical, inequitable, ambiguous, etc., while maintaining a facade of acceptance 'in principle'.

"The Chinese Government should know that the crisis of confidence created by its massive attack on India in which 3,942 persons were taken prisoner, 2,300 were killed, 770 are still missing, and which has enabled China to continue to be in forcible occupation of 15,000 square miles of Indian territory, cannot be wished away by mere words. This crisis has to be resolved as recommended by the Colombo conference countries by a bilateral ceasefire arrangement arrived at on the basis of these proposals, before the substantive question of India-China differences regarding the border can be discussed."18

Regarding China's rejection of arbitration by the International Court or a body of persons acceptable to both sides, the Indian note said:

"The rejection by China in advance in absolute terms of the internationally accepted practice of settling by arbitration differences between nations which cannot be resolved bilaterally, leaves only one of two alternatives: acceptance of Chinese dictates backed by military force or continuance of conflict. . .

"China's arrogant and facetious rejection of the constructive proposals (of April 3, 1963) made by the Government of

India for a settlement of the differences by peaceful means makes it absolutely clear that China believes in no principles, Panch Sheel or any others, which govern international relations. It only acts on the jungle law of might is right."¹⁹

There was no rejoinder to this from Peking whose intention by then was to say as little as possible about the border conflict and let the situation freeze.

* * * *

During the non-aligned nations' conference in Cairo in October 1964, China circulated among the attending delegates a memorandum stating that the Sino-Indian border question should not be discussed because China was not represented at the conference.

The Chinese Government issued a statement, on October 9, 1964, while the non-aligned conference was still in session in Cairo and the representatives of the six Colombo conference countries were holding consultations among themselves. The statement said:

“Such consultations will place more obstacles in their way, making it more difficult for the six Colombo conference nations to conduct mediation in the future.”²⁰

The Government of India described this statement as a “warning to dissuade the Colombo powers from undertaking any mediatory efforts to bring India and China to the conference table.”²¹

Meanwhile, China set up a number of stone cairns along the so-called “line of actual control of November 7, 1959,” in Ladakh, the intention being to bring about some sort of demarcation of that line on the ground.²²

NOTES

- 1 According to statements made by spokesmen of the Govt. of India, the clarifications were given by Ceylon, Ghana and UAR and were concurred with by the other Colombo conference participants.
- 2 Maps 3 & 5 show the “line of actual control” in the western sector as claimed by China

- 3 This unpublished letter, the existence of which was first revealed by this writer in a despatch to *The Times of India* dated November 11, '63, from Hong Kong created a stir in India because it contained an assurance given by Nehru that, "while he was not prepared to accept any condition restricting his government from deploying its forces in that area (NEFA), it was not his intention to advance his forces up to the McMahon line, and that I (Mrs Bandaranaike) could give you (Chou En-lai) this assurance." The text of the 4,000-word letter was released to the press by M. R. Masani, Swatantra party member of the Lok Sabha, at the third national convention of his party in Bangalore on Feb. 1, '64.
- 4 *The Times of India* Bombay, Jan. 26, '63.
- 5 NCNA, Peking, Jan. 22, '63.
- 6 Ibid., Jan. 26, '63.
- 7 & 8 See 3 above.
- 9 NCNA, Peking, Feb. 13, '63.
- 10 NCNA, Peking, released the text of the interview on March 14, '63.
- 11 *The Times of India* Bombay, April 6, '63.
- 12 White Paper No. IX, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 5-7.
- 13 NCNA, Peking, April 19, '63.
- 14 Ibid., Dec. 21, '63.
- 15 Ibid., Oct. 14, '63.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17, 18 & 19 White Paper No. X.
- 20 NCNA, Peking, Oct. 10, '64.
- 21 Statement dated Feb. 12, '65 (Indiagram, Cairo, IG/65/41, Feb. 16, '65).
- 22 Ibid.

SIKKIM, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

THROUGHTOUT the border crisis, China did not seriously violate the territorial limits of Sikkim, although a few stray intrusions did occur. But Peking massively built up its military position across the Sikkim boundary in Tibet and accused India of violations of the frontier.

China's objective was to call into question the treaty relations between India and Sikkim under which the defence and foreign relations of the latter are the responsibility of New Delhi.

Peking was particularly punctilious in stressing that at his press conference in New Delhi in 1960, Chou En-lai had stated that China respected India's "proper" relations with Sikkim, while according to New Delhi, he had not used the adjective "proper." The use of "proper" to qualify "relations" implied that from Peking's point of view there was something "improper" in Indo-Sikkimese relations.

*

*

*

*

The boundary between Sikkim and Tibet is defined by the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890; it was jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.¹ This was acknowledged by a Chinese foreign ministry note to the Indian Government dated December 26, 1959, which said:

"The boundary between China and Sikkim has long been delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any dispute in practice."²

The Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890 says:

“1. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim-Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet.

“It is admitted that the British Government, whose protectorate over the Sikkim state is hereby recognised, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that state, and, except through and with the permission of the British Government neither the ruler of the state nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any country.”³

However, Chinese soldiers on at least one occasion attempted to alter the boundary of Sikkim. When Nehru visited the border on September 18, 1958, on his way to Bhutan, a commemorative monument was erected a few hundred yards inside Sikkim territory to mark the occasion. Chinese soldiers then tried to claim the right to go as far as this commemorative tablet, claiming that it actually marked the border.⁴

The commemorative stone was later shifted by the Indian side closer to the actual boundary line, as close as approximately 25 yards.

As China's military build-up in the Chumbi valley went on, the young Maharajkumar of Sikkim issued a statement on November 1, 1962, that his state stood solidly behind India, and that if Sikkim was attacked, the Sikkimese would fight to the best of their ability. He said he was fully satisfied with the measures taken by India on the Sikkim border.

On November 13, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Sikkim, and the Government of India appointed Major-General K. P. Candeth in charge of the Indian defence forces there.

Three days earlier, the Chinese Government had lodged a “serious protest” with the Indian embassy in Peking “against the Indian side's serious violations of China's territory and airspace across the China-Sikkim boundary.” Peking alleged that in the past few months, Indian troops had built a total of 39 pillboxes in Chinese territory and set up barbed-wire barricades, dug communication trenches at Nathu La and blocked the pass to hinder the normal movement of border inhabitants,

What China was really objecting to was the fact that Indian defensive measures in Sikkim had resulted in the closure of Nathu La which links Sikkim with Tibet.

The Indian Government denied the Chinese allegation on January 16, 1963, and expressed the hope that by making such a baseless charge China was not creating an excuse for further aggression, just as it had done in NEFA and Ladakh.

That Peking was determined to rake up the whole question of Sikkim's boundary and the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890 was shown by the repeated "serious protests" against the alleged violation of "Chinese territory" by Indian forces and the demand which was later made of a joint investigation.

On March 24, 1963, Peking lodged another "serious protest" against what it termed intensification of repairs and reinforcements of pillboxes and other "defence works illegally set up in Chinese territory" across the Sikkim-Tibet border. Inadvertently, Peking admitted that these were defence works.

The Chinese protest note said that Indian troops had actually built these defence works northeast and north of Nathu La, implying that they had violated Tibetan territory.

The protest note demanded the immediate dismantling of these works and the withdrawal of Indian troops from "Chinese territory." Peking also alleged that Indian aircraft intruded into Chinese airspace across the Sikkim-Tibet border.

India rejected these "preposterous and baseless allegations" which, she said, could have had only one motive, "to fabricate a fictitious justification for the continuing aggressive concentration of Chinese forces on the Indian border."

New Delhi pointed out in this connection that no less a person than the Chinese vice-premier and foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, himself had "indicated this line" in his interview to the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation wherein he said, "Judging from the present attitude of the Indian Government provocative actions on the part of the Indian troops will occur from time to time." This was now being followed up by baseless allegations.

On June 4, the Chinese demanded a joint investigation of "the case of Indian troops crossing the Nathu La and encroaching on

Chinese territory.” The Chinese for the first time mentioned the commemorative tablet as a boundary marker.

The Chinese demand was rejected by New Delhi, although later, during the fighting in September 1965 between India and Pakistan, India agreed to a joint investigation with China so that the Chinese may have no ground for finding a “pretext for aggressive action,” as the Indian Premier, Shastri, put it.

New Delhi said what the Chinese seemed to object was not the fictitious border violations across Nathu La, but the protective defence works which India had necessarily to undertake on her own side of the border “against China’s avowed objective of taking over Indian territory by force.”

New Delhi admitted that such protective defence works had led to the interruption of normal trade and traffic across the border between Sikkim and Tibet. “But for this eventuality the responsibility rests squarely on China and its aggressive objectives and large-scale military preparations along the Sino-Indian border.”

Meanwhile, Peking alleged that 50 Indian troops with picks and spades crossed Nathu La on the Sikkim-Tibet border and, taking advantage of the thick fog, “demolished some of the aggressive military structures illegally built by India in Chinese territory and brought some of the timber back to Sikkim.” This too was protested against by China.

A month and a half later, on July 31, China raked up the issue by again alleging in a note that “the military structures built by India at Nathu La clearly lie beyond the watershed and extend to the slope on the Chinese side of the pass.”

The Sikkim issue was raised by Peking during the non-aligned nations conference in Cairo in October 1964.

*

*

*

*

While fighting was in progress between India and Pakistan in September 1965, the Chinese Government issued a statement on “India’s attack on Pakistan.” It said :

“The Government of India’s armed attack on Pakistan is an act of naked aggression. It is not only a crude violation

of all principles guiding international relations but also constitutes a grave threat to peace in this part of Asia. The Chinese Government sternly condemns India for its criminal aggression and expresses firm support for Pakistan in its just struggle against aggression and solemnly warns the Government of India that it must bear responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression.

“The Indian Government had always been perfidious on the Kashmir question. It once pledged solemnly with Pakistan to grant the Kashmiri people the right of self-determination. But far from honouring its pledge, it has brazenly declared Kashmir an integral part of India and subjected the Kashmiri people to brutal, naked aggression.

“India’s aimed aggression against Pakistan is another exposure of the chauvinistic and expansionist features of its ruling circles. The Indian Government glibly says that it pursues a policy of so-called peaceful co-existence. But actually it has never ceased for a single day its bullying and activities of encroaching upon its neighbours wherever possible. Almost every neighbour of India has known this from its own experience. The Indian ruling circles are the greatest hypocrisies in contemporary international life. The Chinese people have had deep experience of this...

“The Indian Government probably believes that, since it has the backing of the U.S. imperialists and modern revisionists, it can bully its neighbours, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes. This will not do. Aggression is aggression. India’s aggression against anyone of its neighbours concerns all of its neighbours. Since the Indian Government has taken the first step in committing aggression against Pakistan, it cannot evade responsibility for the consequences arising therefrom.”⁵

On September 8, Peking accused India of intruding into China’s territory in the western sector and carrying out reconnaissance and provocations close to the Chinese civil checkpoints in August. The Chinese note said :

“The Indian provocations in August in the western sector

of the Sino-Indian border cannot be regarded as isolated cases. They are by no means accidental occurrences at a time when the Indian Government was carrying out armed suppression of the people in Kashmir and unleashing and expanding its armed aggression against Pakistan. Facts have proved once again that India has not the slightest respect for its neighbours but makes incursions, harassment and encroaches upon them whenever there is a chance. China cannot but pay serious attention to the Indian Government's expansionist actions against its neighbours and strengthen China's defences and heighten her alertness along her borders."⁶

In its note of May 31, 1962, Peking had stated that the attitude of the Chinese Government is one of "never getting involved in the dispute over Kashmir." The Government of India drew the attention of Peking to this in reply to the Chinese allegations. The Indian note of September 12, 1965, said :

"The Chinese Government's attempt to connect events in Kashmir with fictitious intrusions by Indian troops across the 'line of actual control' in the western sector is mischievous. The Kashmir question and India's unfortunate relations with Pakistan are a separate problem and have nothing to do with the Sino-Indian border question."⁷

China at the same time accused India again of intruding into Tibet across the Sikkim frontier and building "aggressive military structures" there. In refutation, India proposed that an independent and neutral observer go to the Sikkim-Tibet border "to see for himself the actual state of affairs." Nothing could be fairer than this, New Delhi said.

At 1 a.m. Peking Time on September 17, 1965, the Chinese foreign ministry summoned the Indian charge d'affaires, Jagat S. Metha and delivered to him an ultimatum which said:

"The Chinese Government now demands that India dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself

within three days of the delivery of the present note, and immediately stop all its intrusions along the Sino-Indian boundary and the China-Sikkim boundary, return the kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and the seized livestock and pledge to refrain from any more harassing raids across the boundary. Otherwise, the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.”⁸

The ultimatum demanded the return of “kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and seized livestock.” The livestock was enumerated as 59 yaks and 800 sheep, and the border inhabitants were listed as four.

The same day, the late Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, told the Lok Sabha that the Chinese had rejected the Indian proposal for an independent and neutral observer to inspect the Sikkim-Tibet border, and that “as an earnest of our desire to give no ground to the Chinese for making this a pretext for aggressive action,” India had informed Peking that she would have no objection to a joint inspection of those points of the Sikkim-Tibet border where Indian personnel were alleged to have set up military structures in Tibetan territory.

Shastri also hoped that China would not take advantage of the present situation (the India-Pakistan armed conflict) and attack India, adding :

“The house may rest assured that we are fully vigilant and if attacked we shall fight for our freedom with grim determination. The might of China will not deter us from defending our territorial integrity.”⁹

The Chinese ultimatum had referred to Kashmir and said :

“The Chinese Government has consistently held that the Kashmir question should be settled on the basis of respect for the Kashmiri people’s right of self-determination, as pledged to them by India and Pakistan . This is what is meant by China’s non-involvement in the dispute between India and Pakistan. But non-involvement absolutely does not mean failure to distinguish

between right and wrong; it absolutely does not mean that China can approve of depriving the Kashmiri people of their right to self-determination or that she can approve of Indian aggression against Pakistan on the pretext of the Kashmir issue. Such was China's stand in the past and it remains so at present. Yet some countries (a reference to the USSR) have acknowledged Kashmir as belonging to India. In that case, how can one speak of their non-involvement in the dispute? The question now is that India has not only refused to recognise the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination but openly launched an all-out armed attack against Pakistan. This cannot but arouse the grave concern of the Chinese Government. Reason and justice must prevail in the world. So long as the Indian Government oppresses the Kashmiri people, China will not cease supporting the Kashmiri people in their struggle for self-determination. So long as the Indian Government persists in its unbridled aggression against Pakistan, China will not cease supporting Pakistan in her just struggle against aggression. This stand of ours will never change, however many helpers you may have, such as the United States, the modern revisionists and the U.S.-controlled United Nations."¹⁰

It was very obvious that Peking was creating tension along the Sikkim-Tibet border as a diversion to help Pakistan while fighting was going on between her and India. Later President Ayub Khan thanked China for her "moral support," as he put it.

*

*

*

*

Immediately after delivering the ultimatum, Peking embarked on a tirade against the Soviet Union—that the "Khrushchev-revisionists" of Moscow in collusion with U.S. imperialism were encouraging the Indian reactionaries and expansionists to attack peace-loving Pakistan and threaten and malign China. The Chinese also said that the Kashmir question must be settled by a plebiscite.

An editorial in *The People's Daily* of Peking of September 18, 1965, made it clear that China had raked up the Sikkim-Tibet border to render assistance to Pakistan. The editorial again lumped the

“U.S. imperialists and Khrushchev-revisionists of the Soviet Union” together in “helping Indian reactionaries.” The editorial said :

“The Soviet leaders have for the last ten years sided with the Indian reactionaries and have spared no effort to support their policy to annex Kashmir.

“When the Indian reactionaries in their war of aggression met with resolute counter-attacks from the Pakistan army and people and found the situation increasingly unfavourable to them, the Soviet leaders have come out to offer their good offices. Clearly, their purpose is to aid the Indian aggressors to force Pakistan to accept India’s annexation of Kashmir as legitimate. It is not surprising that U.S. imperialism and the Indian reactionaries have expressed their deep appreciation for the zeal displayed by the Soviet leaders in this matter.

“The Soviet leaders and U.S. imperialism treat the Indian reactionaries as their darling child. Kennedy, Khrushchev and Nehru long ago became partners in a company. Two of the three founders of ‘Kennedy, Khrushchev, Nehru & Co.’ are dead, and the third has fallen from power; yet their successors are trying hard to keep the failing concern going.”¹¹

Surprisingly on September 19, the Chinese extended the deadline of their ultimatum by three days—until 9-30 p.m. Indian standard time on September 22, 1965.

Meanwhile, the U.N. security council called upon India and Pakistan to cease fire before 12-30 p.m. on September 22—a few hours before the Chinese ultimatum also was to have expired.

Shastri announced in the Lok Sabha on September 20 that the Chinese had moved up their forces in considerable strength all along the border and had provocatively fired at Indian forces both in Sikkim and in Ladakh. Indian forces did not return the fire. Shastri was again cheered when he said India would resist Chinese aggression.

On September 20, Chinese troops fired a few provocative shots at a number of places in Ladakh and Sikkim, but the Indians did not return the fire. The Chinese had moved up their forces forward towards Dauletbeg Oldi, Hot Springs, Dumchele and Demchok

(in Ladakh) and quite close to all the mountain passes along the Sikkim-Tibet border.¹²

Announcing this in the Lok Sabha, Shastri told a questioner : “We shall resist them. We will fight them.” The Indian Prime-Minister took exception to China’s presumptuousness to tell India, as he put it, “what we should or should not do about Kashmir,” adding:

“It is clear from the kind of response which China has sent that what China is looking for is not a redress of grievances, real or imaginary, but some excuse to start her aggressive activities again, this time in collusion with Pakistan . . .

“If there are any structures on Chinese territory in areas where the border is delimited and not in dispute even according to the Chinese, surely there is nothing to prevent the Chinese Government from having them removed—which would otherwise be possible only by our men going into their territory.

“Similarly, no one can imagine that any government would threaten another on the ground that their cattle have been lifted or on the ground that out of the thousands of Tibetans who have sought asylum in this country two or four are being detained here against their wishes . . .

“To justify her aggressive attitude, China was pretending to be a guardian of Asian countries who, according to China, are being bullied by India. The basic objective of China is therefore to claim for herself a position of dominance in Asia which no self-respecting nation in Asia is prepared to recognise. Large or small, strong or weak, every country in Asia has the fullest right to preserve its independence and sovereignty on terms of equality. The dominance of the Chinese cannot be accepted by any of them.”¹³

At 2 a.m. IST on September 21, Indian and Chinese forces exchanged fire across Nathu La on the Sikkim-Tibet border—the first instance of fire being exchanged since the massive Chinese attacks of October-November 1962.

Meanwhile, 60 Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory at Lipu pass in the middle sector of the boundary across the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border. But they later withdrew.

Along the Sikkim-Tibet border, the Chinese built a wall across Jelep La in Tibet, presumably to block Tibetan refugees from escaping to Sikkim and to prevent observation from the Indian side.

On September 24, without waiting for the return of the "captured yaks and goats," the Chinese pulled back to their side of the border notably from a position 800 yards inside Indian territory across Dongchui La which they had earlier seized.

In New Delhi, 801 sheep were paraded in front of the Chinese embassy. "Shepherds" representing the various Indian political parties led the sheep bearing placards which said : "Eat us and spare the world," "Are you going to plunge the world into a horrible war, for the sake of a few sheep ?"

Western newspapers and periodicals, notably *Time* magazine, commented that in this encounter the Chinese lost the most precious commodity in Asia—face.

They were bound to come back to it to regain lost face. And they did. On October 2, 20 Chinese troops crossed Yak La on the Sikkim-Tibet border, surrounded a three-man Indian observation post well within Indian territory and opened fire on it. The fire was returned, and the Chinese withdrew.

On November 13, 1965, 70 to 100 Chinese troops fired intensively on two Indian observation posts in the Dongchui La area well inside Indian territory on the Sikkim-Tibet border. Two Chinese and an Indian were killed. Earlier, on September 26, the Chinese had crossed the border at the same spot and had kidnapped three Indian soldiers.

As the Chinese withdrew, they took away with them the body of the Indian. But it was later reported to have been recovered from the spot where the Chinese had dumped it.

The note of October 1, 1965, delivered by the Government of India to the Chinese embassy in New Delhi summed up the situation in telling language. Describing the Chinese "ultimatum" as impertinent, the note said :

"Both the 'construction' and 'demolition' of military structures by Indian troops were a Chinese myth—a myth which has now exploded in the face of its own authors . . .

"The Chinese Government appears to have been embarrassed that there are not four but thousands of Tibetans who have

left their homeland and taken refuge in India. But that is a fact, though not a creditable one for the Chinese regime in Tibet. The Chinese note has stated that these thousands of Tibetan refugees are a debt which India owes to China. On the contrary, it is a debt which China owes to the people of Tibet for making it impossible for them to live in freedom and dignity in their own motherland.

“It is interesting that a mention has been made in the Chinese note to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In March 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa, following the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and took asylum in India, the Chinese Government had stated that His Holiness was ‘abducted to India by Tibetan rebels’ and kept under duress by the Indian authorities. However, on December 17, 1964, the state council of China, while dismissing the Dalai Lama from his posts as chairman and member of the preparatory committee for the autonomous region of Tibet, described His Holiness as having ‘staged a traitorous, armed, counter-revolutionary rebellion against the country in 1959’ and to have fled abroad. Now the Chinese Government has changed its tune once again and has alleged that the Dalai Lama and others were ‘enticed and coerced to go to India’. The falsehoods propagated by the Chinese Government do not even possess the virtue of consistency. The Chinese Government ought to be aware that rebellions do not take place under enticement or coercion. Where there is oppression, there is rebellion. It is futile to blame India for the troubles in Tibet and for the large number of Tibetans being forced to leave their hearths and homes for refuge in other countries.

“The Chinese Government has taken exception to our statement that China wants to assume the role of hegemony and guardianship over Asian countries. India is aware that China’s hegemonistic ambitions are not confined to Asia alone. While professing Asian-African solidarity China is, in fact, doing everything possible to split the Asian-African community and to widen and exacerbate the cleavages between Asian and African countries. It is in tune with its policy of divide and rule that the Chinese Government has openly taken sides with Pakistan in the current unfortunate Indo-Pakistan conflict and sought to

fan the flames of war and threatened to open a second front against India, when almost every country in the world has been trying to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The Government of India would like to tell China that it is doing the greatest possible disservice to Asia and to Asian-African solidarity by its doctrine of intervention and its assumption of guardianship over others under the pretext of defence against aggression. This behaviour of the Chinese Government cannot go unnoticed by the peoples of the world and particularly the nations of Africa and Asia.”¹⁴

Subsequently, India and China accused each other of a series of border violations. In one encounter India claimed to have killed 30 Chinese near Sese La in northern Sikkim, while losing two of her own men. The incident took place on December 12, 1965.

About this time, the Chinese linked the Sikkim-Tibet border at Nathu La with a road to Lhasa, enabling them to bring heavier guns right up to Nathu La.

*

*

*

*

The partnership or alliance between Pakistan and China was based on three factors: 1. the absence of a common ideological or long-term political bond; 2. its tactical and transient nature, each country trying to gain some advantage over India through the other or together; and 3. the belief entertained by both that India was disintegrating because of internal conditions and external pressures. The basis for all the three factors was the assumption that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’

In 1959, during the minor skirmishes between India and China, Pakistan was critical of India’s “soft approach and flabbiness’ in dealing with China. After the Longju incident, *The Pakistan Times* editorially said on August 30 (two days after Nehru’s disclosure in the Lok Sabha that China had fully occupied Aksaichin in Ladakh) :

“A confirmation of persistent reports of Chinese intrusions into the Ladakh and NEFA areas directly involved the repudiation of one of the most vital bases of India’s external policy—

Indo-Chinese partnership in determining the destiny of Asia... Policy-makers in New Delhi were nevertheless still hopeful that once the Tibetan tragedy faded from popular memory and the Chinese returned to their affable ways so familiar to Indians, all would be well once again. This prognosis might well have come true if it were not for the fact that the Chinese discovered some imperial maps showing all the areas which once formed part of China.

“The majestic Himalayas which countless generations of Indians have regarded as presenting an insuperable obstacle to would-be conquerors from the north and the north-east have suddenly lost their value as a natural means of defence. And the northern neighbour whom Indians were taught to trust as a faithful friend has betrayed designs of which it was never suspected before.”¹⁵

Behind this seeming concern for India was the fear that it might be Pakistan's turn tomorrow to face Chinese expansionist claims. As *Dawn* of Karachi plainly put it, on October 3 :

“The main portion of the 2,000-mile-long McMahon line is Bharat's (India's) concern. But since the Chinese maps, one of which is reported to have come in the possession of our government, have shown a part of the extreme northern region of our country as Chinese territory, we feel it our duty to tell the comrades in Peking that, as far as Pakistan is concerned, there will be no yielding of any kind at any time. The sanctity of the McMahon line must be preserved, and maps or no maps, we will not countenance the loss of even a single inch of our territory.”¹⁶

On October 6, *The Pakistan Times* (then managed by a state official) appreciated Nehru's “uncompromising” stand regarding NEFA which the paper said “China would like to gobble up almost whole.” It said :

“Apparently, Mr. Nehru has at last begun to understand the true nature of the leviathan across the Himalayas. The hovering giant across the Himalayas has cast his baleful shadow not

only on India but also on our fair land. A map recently released by New Delhi shows that China lays claim to big chunks of the Gilgit agency in the northern areas of Pakistan, as also to a slice of Ladakh in Azad (Pakistan-occupied) Kashmir. So far as this country is concerned, Peking may be sure that there will be no Nehru-like flabbiness in our attitude."¹⁷

Yet, in 1962, when India resisted China's large-scale incursions across the international frontier into NEFA and Ladakh, Pakistani papers accused India of being the "aggressor." On the very day that China launched its massive offensive, October 20, *Dawn* said editorially :

"The first and most ominous development to be seriously noted is the fact that India's mask of neutralism and peacefulness now lies candidly discarded and our big and hostile neighbour has emerged at last as, and seems to glory in the role of, a naked military aggressor. One need not endorse the political ideology of the Chinese People's Republic, but must it on that account be denied the right to pursue its peaceful goals in peace ? This is precisely what the white imperialists seem bent on doing. After the failure of their attempt to keep the Chinese people divided and subjugated, they have been dreading and seeking to thwart China's resurgence...The growing rift between the USSR and China is largely Mr. Khrushchev's work...Mr. Khrushchev dreads the rise of this immensely populous coloured nation as much as do the leaders of Europe and America... Be it said, therefore to the eternal shame of India's present leadership that they should seem too willing to play the role of the white man's stooge and act as *agent provocateur* against a fellow Asian nation...All this talk of the Chinese being the aggressors is Washington-brewed tommy rot...What is happening in the NEFA region now is the result of India's deliberate military provocations and aggression at the instigation of India's white patrons in Washington, London—as well as Moscow."¹⁸

Pakistan's President, Field-Marshal Ayub Khan, was no less vehement in 1960 in pointing to the danger posed by China to the

Indian subcontinent. In an article contributed to the *Foreign Affairs Quarterly* of June, he cautioned against "the inexorable push from the north." He said :

"As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. If on the other hand, we resolve our problem and disengage our armed forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards, I feel we shall have a chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past which was that whenever this subcontinent was divided someone or the other invited an outsider to step in."¹⁹

Pakistan's concern in 1959 and 1960 for the safety of the Indian subcontinent apparently was one of Rawalpindi's reactions to an attack by Peking on Pakistan's attitude towards Nationalist China. In July 1959, a "Chinese Muslim Haji Mission" from Taiwan visited Pakistan and this was promptly dubbed by Peking as the activity of the "Chiang Kai-shek clique to poison and disrupt Sino-Pakistani relations." The Peking *People's Daily* columnist, 'Observer,' said the presence of the mission in Pakistan was a "very unfrineldy act and a serious provocation against the Chinese people and Government." *The People's Daily* said :

"Particularly, in the past two years, the Pakistani Government increased its contacts and intercourse with the Chiang Kai-shek clique in order to pursue the U.S.-sponsored 'Two Chinas' scheme. At the same time, responsible personnel of the Pakistani Government on many occasions openly denied China's territorial sovereignty over Taiwan by calling Taiwan a 'country' or by placing Taiwan and 'Mainland China' on the same footing."²⁰

The article alleged that during the Taiwan straits crisis in September 1958 (precipitated by China's massive bombardment of the offshore islands and abortive attempt to seize them) Pakistan in a note to Peking had "gone so far as to allege that the legal status

with respect to the question of sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores) was unclear.”

The People's Daily also referred to Pakistan's "very unfriendly attitude towards China on the question of Tibet." stating that "the foreign minister and other responsible officials of Pakistan have come out with utterances at home and abroad slandering the Chinese people, interfering in China's domestic affairs, sowing discord in the relations between China and India and agitating for cold war."

*

*

*

*

The boundary agreement reached by Pakistan and China might have been the result of Pakistan's genuine concern to avoid a situation similar to the one in which India found herself on her long frontier with China. But there was no doubt that Pakistan was seeking to utilise India's predicament during and following the border clash with China to her and China's advantage.

On December 28, 1962, a joint communique was released in Peking announcing "an agreement in principle on the location and alignment of the boundary actually existing between the two countries." The communique said talks had been held in Peking since October 12 between the diplomatic representatives of the two countries "in pursuance of the decision of the two governments on conducting negotiations through diplomatic channels on the question of the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan"—that is, the Pakistan-held part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.²¹

On March 2, 1963, the full text of the boundary agreement was released. India lodged a protest with Pakistan against the signing of the agreement.

In a statement in the Lok Sabha on March 5, Nehru said Pakistan had claimed to have got 1,350 square miles of territory including 700 square miles of area which was in China's possession. The Chinese had been given 2,050 square miles under the agreement.

According to the Survey of Pakistan maps, even those published in 1962, about 11,000 square miles of Sinkiang territory formed part of Kashmir. If one followed these maps, Pakistan obviously had surrendered over 13,000 square miles of territory to China, Nehru said.

The Indian protest to China of March 2 said :

“If Pakistan has no common border with China, and China and Pakistan nevertheless agree to locate and align a boundary in Kashmir, no further proof is needed to show that the Chinese objective is to come to terms with Pakistan on the question of the ownership of Kashmir and involve itself in its neighbours’ dispute in the interests of its expansionist and chauvinistic policies.”²²

The Indo-Pakistani ceasefire line in Kashmir ends at a place called Khor, 40 miles southwest of the Karakoram pass. It is supposed to extend northwards to the glaciers which lie at the lower reaches of the Karakoram range. A northward extension of the ceasefire line would touch the Karakoram range 50 or 60 miles west of the pass. Pakistan has never claimed this strip of territory between the ceasefire line and the Karakoram pass.

But the Sino-Pakistani border agreement covers the entire stretch of the international boundary from the Pakistan-Afghan border to the Karakoram pass to which neither Pakistan nor China has had access. Pakistan’s jurisdiction extends only up to the ceasefire line, and China’s authority was only over the northern approaches to the pass. The pass itself has been patrolled regularly by Indian troops stationed in Ladakh.

By giving China this vital stretch of territory east of the Kashmir ceasefire line immediately to the south of the Karakoram pass, Pakistan buttressed China’s contention that “the traditional, customary boundary line” between Sinkiang and the Indian subcontinent runs along the Karakoram watershed and not along the crest of the Aghil mountains and the Kunlun range. An extension of this principle on the other side of the Karakoram gives to China the territory in Ladakh (Aksaichin) which she has always wanted.

The then Pakistani foreign minister, Zulficar Ali Bhutto, told a press conference in Karachi that Pakistan had made the following gains by its boundary pact with China :

1. The area of 750 square miles (Nehru had given the figure as 700 square miles) which Pakistan had gained from China was “salt and grazing ground” which was of “considerable economic value.”

2. Pakistan had acquired access to all the passes along the Karakoram range.

3. Control of two-thirds of K-2 mountain peak.

Bhutto called the border between Pakistan and China as a "line of peace" and the agreement itself as "an example for other countries."²³

Pakistan's intention of arriving at a border agreement with China was made known much before the large-scale fighting between India and China started in 1962. On January 15, 1961, Manzur Qadir, then Pakistan's foreign minister, had revealed in a statement in Peshawar that Peking had acceded in principle to the Pakistani request that their border be delimited and demarcated.²⁴

A boundary protocol between the two countries was signed in Rawalpindi on March 26, 1965.

In January 1963, China and Pakistan concluded a trade agreement, the first ever between them. It provided for the granting of most-favoured-nation treatment by each other in matters of trade and commerce, including shipping.²⁵ In August, the two countries signed an air transport agreement providing for the airlines of the two countries to operate over each other's territory.

The subsequent relations between Pakistan and China were marked by warm cordiality and mutual appreciation. In September 1963, Bhutto welcomed and supported the Chinese proposal for calling a conference of the heads of government of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the total prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. If a conference of heads of all governments could not be convened, Bhutto suggested on behalf of the Pakistani Government that a second Asian-African conference be called which could consider the Chinese proposal and "undertake all preliminary steps that may be necessary to convene a world conference at the heads of government level for the purpose not only of prohibiting and destroying nuclear weapons but also for promoting comprehensive and universal disarmament under effective international control so that mankind may be rid of the dread of another world war."²⁶

But neither China nor Pakistan turned up for the Afro-Asian foreign ministers' meeting in Algiers in October-November 1965.

On July 17, 1963, Bhutto told Pakistan's National Assembly

that "armed aggression by India on Pakistan would bring in the largest state in Asia whose territorial integrity would be involved with that of Pakistan." He did not say whether there was a secret defence pact between Pakistan and China or whether there existed an "attack on Pakistan is an attack on China" sort of understanding, but added : "This is the new element to be considered when assuming that Pakistan might have to face armed attack from its Indian neighbour."²⁷

Chou En-lai visited Pakistan in February 1964, and at a press conference in Dacca, explained why and how China and Pakistan could be close friends despite the latter's membership of the anti-communist CENTO and SEATO military pacts. In reply to the correspondent of an American magazine, Chou said :

"The U.S. Government initiated and organised the South-East Asian military alliance; its aims are out and out aggressive and it has sabotaged the peace in this region. But President Ayub Khan has indicated that Pakistan's aim in joining this treaty organisation was defence and not aggression against others. The Government of Pakistan has, on several occasions, explained its position to the Chinese Government. Particularly, after President Ayub Khan took office, many of the international moves as well as its friendship with China have confirmed this position of the Pakistan Government. And, therefore, we are convinced by the (Pakistan) Government's explanations."²⁸

During the India-Pakistan skirmish in the Rann of Kutch in May 1965, Peking came out in support of Pakistan, alleging that India was "carrying out the U.S. scheme of making Asians fight Asians and disrupting Afro-Asian solidarity." An Indian external affairs ministry spokesman said : "This is a mantle which falls fittingly on China and Pakistan who are fellow-aggressors against India."

Subsequently, there was active collaboration between Pakistan and China in military matters. The two countries struck a secret deal, making the defence of East Pakistan a joint responsibility of China and Pakistan.²⁹ A Chinese supply mission came to Dacca in May 1966 to study the type of defence equipment suitable for East Pakistan, taking into account the nature of the terrain and the large number of waterways there. Some Chinese military officers were

attached to the staff of Major-General Maqem Khan, GOC, 14th infantry division, East Pakitna, to advise him on guerilla warfare.³⁰

China gifted 50 MIG-19 planes and 50 medium T-59 tanks to Pakistan.³¹ These were displayed at the Pakistan national day military parade in Rawalpindi on March 23, 1966. The government-owned Radio Pakistan said :

“Air-Marshal Nur Khan led a diamond formation of MIG’s over a reviewing stand packed with western and Indian observers.”³²

American Patton tanks and Sabre-jets were displayed alongside Chinese tanks and planes.

India made several representations to Washington about “the ominous arrival of Chinese military officials in East Pakistan.”³³ The India-Pakistan fighting in September 1965 demonstrated that Rawalpindi has based the defence of East Pakistan not so much on its own intrinsic local military strength as on the threat of China intruding into sensitive Sikkim.³⁴ From the Chumbi valley, China could make a thrust into East Pakistan, thus cutting off the narrow neck by which Assam is joined to the rest of India.³⁵

The chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Liu Shao-chi, visited Pakistan in March 1966 and was given a tumultuous welcome. The joint communique which he signed with President Ayub Khan was described by the Indian foreign minister, Swaran Singh, as amounting to a defence alliance between the two countries.

Liu’s visit was followed by that of the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, in June-July.

*

*

*

*

The Pakistan-China boundary settlement, embracing as it does that part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the effective control of Pakistan, would petrify and perpetuate the partitioning of Kashmir along the present Indo-Pakistan ceasefire line. Pakistan—and China—have accepted the fact that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is divided, one part being under the effective control of Pakistan and the other under the effective control of India.

NOTES

- 1 White Paper No. IX, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, pp. 49-51.
- 2 White Paper No. III, p. 79.
- 3 White Paper No. IX, pp. 49-51.
- 4 *The Chinese Aggression* by Dr Satyanarayan Sinha, MP (Ramakrishna & Sons, New Delhi), pp. 100-111. Also see White Paper No. IX, p. 45.
- 5 Documents on China's Ultimatum to India, ministry of external affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 *The Times of India*, Sept. 18, '65.
- 10 Documents on China's Ultimatum to India.
- 11 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 19, '65.
- 12 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Sept. 21, '65.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Documents on China's Ultimatum to India.
- 15 Quoted by Sitanshu Das in *The Times of India*, Bombay, Feb. 5, '63.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Feb. 6, '63.
- 20 NCNA, Peking, July 23, '59.
- 21 Ibid., Dec. 28, '62.
- 22 White Paper, No. IX, p. 2.
- 23 *The Times of India*, Bombay, March 27, '65.
- 24 Ibid., Jan. 17, '61.
- 25 NCNA, Peking, Jan. 6, '63.
- 26 Ibid., Sept. 21, '63.
- 27 *China Mail*, Hong Kong, July 18, '63.
- 28 NCNA, Peking, Feb. 28, '64.
- 29 *The Times of India*, Bombay, May 25, '66.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 *The Times of India*, Bombay, March 30, '66.
- 32 *The Times of India*, Bombay, March 24, '66.
- 33 *The Times of India*, Bombay, May, 30, '66.
- 34 Ibid.

INDIA, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

WHAT are the motivations behind China's confrontation of India, armed as well as at the diplomatic level—and why has Peking maintained a posture of hostility towards New Delhi ?

They are many. >But the basic one is the larger question of China's relations with the Soviet Union—which for the sake of convenience is called the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute.

Essentially, and without going into details, the dispute is this : China wants the Soviet Union to devote its resources for the promotion and spread of “revolutionary wars” and “wars of liberation.” Should this policy take the Soviet Union along a collision course and end in a thermonuclear war, the Soviet Union should plunge headlong into it.) For, as Chairman Mao Tse-tung says, a nuclear war is the ultimate form of revolution, and the Chinese people will survive one and build on the nuclear shambles a civilisation more beautiful than anything so far evolved by man. Mao says :

“Let us imagine how many people will die if war should break out. Out of the world's population of 2,700 million, one-third—or, if more, half—may be lost. It is they and not we who want to fight; when a fight starts, atomic and hydrogen bombs may be dropped.

“I debated this question with a foreign statesman. He believed that if an atomic war was fought, the whole of mankind would be annihilated. I said that if the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist; in a number of years there would be again 2,700 million people and definitely more... The victorious people would very swiftly create on the ruins of imperialism

a civilisation thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves.”¹

This passage has often been quoted. A Chinese Government spokesman again quoted it in a statement issued in Peking on September 1, 1963, on the partial nuclear test-ban treaty. He said :

“More and more facts bear witness that on the question of war and peace, the Soviet leaders’ theory is one of forbidding revolution and their practice is one of moving from adventurism to capitulationism.”²

The crux of the dispute is, as the Chinese themselves put it: Whether Marxism-Leninism is obsolete in the nuclear age. China’s answer is a negative one, as the Chairman of the People’s Republic, Liu Shao-chi, said at a mass rally in Pyongyang, North Korea, on September 18, 1963:

“We believe that nuclear weapons possess unprecedented destructive power. However, the imperialists have not dared and do not dare use nuclear weapons wherever they please. This is because it would be most unpopular to use them; it is difficult for the imperialists to use such weapons to deal with wars of national liberation or civil wars; if the imperialists use nuclear weapons to start a world war, they will court their own ruin.”³

What has this got to do with the Sino-Indian question ? Plenty, as we shall presently see.

On October 15, 1957, the Soviet Union and China signed an agreement on new technology for national defence under which, according to Peking, the Soviet Union was to have provided China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was stated by a Chinese Government spokesman in Peking on August 15, 1963. His statement was circulated by NCNA the following day.

The Soviet Government, however, “unilaterally tore up this document on June 20, 1959”—as Peking put it—and Khrushchev went

to the United States for talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David. After these talks, "the heads of certain comrades turned," and Khrushchev, while on his way back to Moscow from the United States, stopped over in Peking and "read China a lecture against testing by force the stability of the capitalist system."

This is what Khrushchev told the Chinese at a banquet in celebration of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic :

"When I spoke with President Eisenhower—and I have just returned from the United States—I got the impression that the President of the U.S.A.—and not a few people support him—understands the need to relax international tension.

"Perhaps not every bourgeois leader can pronounce the words 'peaceful co-existence' well, but they cannot deny that two systems exist in the world, the socialist and capitalist. The recognition of this fact ran like a red thread through all the talks; this was repeatedly spoken about by the President and other leaders. Therefore, we on our part must do all we can to exclude war as a means of settling disputed questions, and settle these questions by negotiations...

"The leaders of many capitalist states are being forced more and more to take account of realities and to recast their international relations because in our century it is impossible to resolve questions of relations between two systems otherwise than on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence. There is no other way... We must think realistically and understand the contemporary situation correctly. This, of course, does not by any means signify that if we are so strong, then we must test by force the stability of the capitalist system. This would be wrong; the peoples would not understand and would never support those who would think of acting in this way..."

It was at that juncture that the Longju incident took place; Chinese troops stormed the thinly manned Indian police outpost in NEFA on August 26, 1959, and killed two Indian frontier policemen. It was the first armed clash between India and China.

On September 9, the official Soviet news agency, *Tass*, issued

a statement deploring the incident. *Tass* said that the Soviet Union viewed the incident from its own efforts to bring about a reduction in international tension and abatement of the cold war.

There were people in the world, *Tass* said, who were opposed to the meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. They were trying to exploit the Sino-Indian border dispute to create tension and build up a climate of crisis. *Tass* said :

“The incident on the Sino-Indian frontier is certainly deplorable. The Soviet Government maintains friendly relations both with the People’s Republic of China and India. The Soviet and Chinese people are linked by the unbreakable bonds of fraternal friendship based on the great principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and India is developing successfully in keeping with the ideal of peaceful co-existence.”⁵

Tass went on to urge a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Two days later, Nehru at a press conference welcomed it. From Peking’s point of view however, the *Tass* statement was, as *The People’s Daily* editorial of February 27, 1963, put it, “the first instance in history in which a socialist country, instead of condemning the armed provocations of the reactionaries of a capitalist country, condemned another fraternal socialist country when it was confronted with such an armed provocation.”

The *Tass* statement, Peking said was “rushed out” despite “repeated objections” from China. In this way the leadership of the CPSU brought the differences between China and the Soviet Union right into the open before the whole world.” *The People’s Daily* said :

“The leadership of the CPSU has become increasingly anxious to collude with the Indian reactionaries and has been bent on forming a reactionary alliance with Nehru against socialist China. The leadership of the CPSU and its press openly sided with Indian reaction, condemned China for its just stand on the Sino-Indian border conflict and defended the Nehru Government. Two thirds of Soviet economic aid to India has been

given since the Indian reactionaries provoked the Sino-Indian border conflict. Even after the large-scale armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border began in the autumn of 1962 the leadership of the CPSU has continued to extend military aid to the Indian reactionaries.”⁶

Soon after Khrushchev's return to Moscow after his Camp David talks and after “lecturing” to the Chinese in Peking, the Kongka pass incident took place. A relatively strong Chinese force ambushed and killed ten out of a party of 17 Indian frontier policemen, led by Karam Singh, in Ladakh, on October 21, 1959.

The implication of all this was that, if the Soviet objective was the reduction of international tension, the Chinese was the very opposite of it— of maintaining and increasing international tension and creating violent incidents which could spark off a larger conflict. Obviously, India is the greatest stumbling block in the path of the Chinese in Asia. If only India could be undermined: together, the USSR and China could do it. But Khrushchev was not co-operative enough.

That was the logic behind the Chinese moves on the Sino-Indian border.

On September 19, 1963, the editorial board of *Pravda*, the organ of the Soviet Communist Party, published an article entitled, “A serious hotbed of tension in Asia.” Noting that the conclusion of the partial nuclear test-ban treaty was a “vital step in creating a healthier international atmosphere,” *Pravda* said :

“Unfortunately, there still is inflammable material on our planet which threatens to flare up at any moment and becomes a source of grave danger to peace. One such hotbed of tension is the now chronic Sino-Indian border conflict in the area of the Himalayas which is still just as acute.

“The USSR stand on the Sino-Indian conflict, no matter how the Chinese leaders try to distort it, has been and is in essence directed to helping settle this conflict as soon as possible. It would only be natural to expect that this stand would find understanding and support among the Chinese leaders. However, strange to say, Peking did everything it could to distort it. With

regard to the latest pronouncements of the Chinese leaders on the question of the Soviet Union's position in the Sino-Indian border dispute, it is difficult to understand what predominates here—hostility towards the first socialist country, or the desire to discredit the policy of peaceful co-existence which the Soviet Government is consistently conducting, or disguised attempts to hide their withdrawal from the agreed line of the communist and workers' parties of the world on questions of the socialist countries' policy towards the new independent states.

“It is well known that the neighbouring peoples of India and China lived in peace and friendship for many centuries. There were no wars between them, no disputes on territorial problems.

“After the Indian people won their independence in 1947 and the revolution triumphed in China in 1949, friendly, good-neighbourly relations were established between India and China. The borders between them remained the same as before, and no border conflicts sprang up...

“The first armed clashes on the Indian-Chinese border began in the middle of 1959. The situation became particularly acute in the autumn of 1962. Battles involving large armies flared up between China and India, with thousands of men being wounded and killed and taken prisoner...

“The Soviet Union has proceeded from the fact that this was beneficial only to the forces of imperialism and reaction, which are interested in preserving the hotbeds of international tension.

“However, the Chinese leaders are not satisfied with the USSR's peaceful stand. Perhaps they wanted to settle the border dispute with India by means of arms and hoped to receive the Soviet Union's support in this matter? If this is what the Peking leaders wanted, then, naturally they have reason to be 'indignant' with the USSR's stand.

However, no matter what they say in Peking, the Soviet Government, loyal to the Leninist policy of peace, has always done and will continue to do everything to extinguish, instead of warming up, the hotbeds of international tension and to firmly promote the preservation and consolidation of peace.

We have always considered and still consider that there were no reasons for starting a border conflict between India and China, and especially for bringing this conflict to an armed clash.”⁷

The Tashkent declaration, signed by the late Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Pakistani President, Ayub Khan, in January 1966 under Soviet auspices, was a step towards extinguishing a hotbed of international tension. The Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, played a major role in getting Shastri and Ayub Khan to sign the declaration.

And, true to expectations, while the Tashkent talks were in progress, Peking delivered a note to the Indian embassy in the Chinese capital disavowing its adherence to its own ceasefire terms under which it had vacated the areas seized by its armed forces in 1962 in NEFA and had created a 20-kilometre demilitarised zone in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary (Ladakh) east of the so-called “line of actual control of November 7, 1959.”⁸

Having reoccupied this 20-kilometre demilitarised zone where, until then it had only seven civil posts, Chinese forces moved into Thagla ridge and Longju in the eastern sector (NEFA).

These moves were in contravention of the Colombo proposals which had specified Thagla ridge and Longju in the western sector—as also Barahoti in the middle sector—as the “remaining areas” which should be left unoccupied by both sides.

China’s stand until then was that while it had implemented the Colombo proposals unilaterally on the ground without however accepting them fully by letter, India should not correspondingly implement them on the ground. In other words, while China established seven civil posts in the demilitarised zone in the western sector (all of them east of the pre-September 8, 1962, line) India should not set up an equal number of civil posts in the demilitarised zone. If India too had established the same number of civil posts in Ladakh in the demilitarised zone, the Colombo proposals would automatically have been implemented on the ground without China committing itself to them on paper.

China’s objection to India setting up these posts on territory east of the so-called line of actual control of November 7, 1959, could be explained only in terms of its apprehension that a concession given

to India to move into territory east of the "line of actual control of November 7, 1959" might be taken by India as a right acquired to press its claim to the Aksaichin plateau.

* * * *

The People's Daily of Peking of November 2, 1963, stated the obvious when it editorially commented that "one of the important differences of principle between the Soviet leaders and ourselves turns on the Sino-Indian boundary question."

The editorial revealed that on February 6, 1960, in a verbal notification to the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had stated :

"One cannot possibly seriously think that a state such as India, which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against it."⁹

According to the Chinese, there was just one occasion when the Soviet Union reflected the Chinese stand on the Sino-Indian border question. That was when *Pravda* carried an editorial (October 25, 1962) "pointing out that the notorious McMahon line was imposed on the Chinese and Indian peoples and had never been recognised by China." The editorial pointed out that the three-point proposal of the Chinese Government of October 24, 1962, was "constructive and constituted an acceptable basis for opening negotiations and settling the dispute between China and India peacefully."¹⁰

This view was embodied in a letter from Khrushchev to Nehru, urging acceptance of Chou En-lai's October 24 proposals. Nehru vigorously rejected it in a letter he addressed to Khrushchev, stating that no self-respecting country, least of all India, could be expected to negotiate with China on the basis of Chou En-lai's October 24 proposals while large Chinese armies were on Indian soil. (The Chinese had taken Tawang in NEFA the following day).

The Pravda article which drew a fine distinction between the Soviet Union's "Chinese brothers and Indian friends" contained

not a hint of any disapproval of the methods used by Peking. On the other hand, there was a strongly implied criticism of certain elements in India.¹¹

The *Pravda* editorial said :

“The kindling of a conflict between the two great Asian powers serves the interests not only of imperialism but also of certain reactionary circles in India closely connected with foreign capital and with the imperialistic forces inimical to India.

“A peaceful solution of the conflict requires activation of efforts of the progressive forces in India. We must take into account that in the present atmosphere of strained relations even some progressively-minded people can yield to nationalistic influences and adopt a chauvinistic position. But in questions involving war and peace and involving controversial international problems, such a position serves no useful purpose. What is called for now is an international approach, actions directed not at a kindling of hostilities and sharpening of the conflict, but at settling it by peaceful methods and negotiations.”¹²

A few days later, the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Russian rockets in Cuba took place. It was a turning point in world history when mankind stood precariously near the nuclear brink...Subsequently, according to the Chinese :

“Forgetting everything he had said less than two months earlier, Khrushchev reverted to his original tune and made the following insinuations at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: The areas disputed by China and India are sparsely populated and of little value to human life. The Soviet Union could not possibly entertain the thought that India wanted to start a war with China. The Soviet Union adhered to Lenin’s views on boundary disputes. Her experience over 45 years proved that there was no boundary dispute which could not be solved without resorting to arms. Of course, it was good that China had unilaterally ordered a ceasefire and withdrawn her

troops; but would it not have been better if the Chinese troops had not advanced from their original positions ?”¹⁸

The Chinese retorted by pointing out that the total area of the disputed part of the India-China border is 125,000 square kilometres or larger than the total area of the Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia. “Supposing that a capitalist country were bent on occupying these two Union republics of the Soviet Union, would the Soviet leaders regard that too as an insignificant matter beneath notice ?”

Khrushchev had also asserted, *The People’s Daily* said, that the disputed areas along the Sino-Indian border are sparsely populated and of no great value to human life, and therefore need not be taken seriously.

But whoever advanced the theory that a socialist country may defend only its densely populated areas, Peking asked. Actually the population density of the area in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border is roughly the same as that of the Turkmen republic of the Soviet Union. And the area in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border is not more deserted than the vast frozen north-eastern part of the Soviet Union, facing the USA’s Alaska across the sea. Supposing that a capitalist country wanted to occupy these areas in the Soviet Union, would the Soviet leaders agree that there was no need to worry about them and that they could be surrendered ?

Peking said that between 1955 and April 1963 the Soviet Government gave or promised economic aid to India totalling five billion rupees, the “larger part being offered since the Indian reactionaries began their campaign against China.” Soviet military aid to India was stepped up after the India-China border skirmishes started.

The September 21, 1963, statement of the Soviet Government said:

“Now the Chinese leaders make accusations, stating that India is waging war against China and using Soviet armaments. This, first of all, is essentially not according to fact. Secondly, if one was to follow this kind of logic, the Indian Government has much more reason to declare that the Chinese troops are waging war against India and are using Soviet armaments,

because everyone knows about the tremendous military aid which the Soviet Union renders China.”¹⁴

Peking asked the Soviet leaders :

“What are you ? Munition merchants ? If so, what you say is quite right. This is called cash on delivery, and you can do business with anybody. But if you still consider yourselves communists and leaders of a socialist country to boot, then your words are silly as well as quite wrong. How can a communist mention Socialist China in the same breath with an India ruled by big bourgeoisie and landlords ? How can he put aid to his own class brothers on a par with aid to reactionaries ?”¹⁵

* * * *

The big change in the Soviet stand after October 24, 1962, was, at least partly, due to the nuclear confrontation in Cuba. Peking unleashed one of the most unrestrained verbal attacks on the Soviet leaders for their “capitulationism” over Cuba. In a 6000-word front-page editorial, *The People’s Daily* of December 15, 1962, hit out at Khrushchev, stating :

“No Marxist-Leninists or revolutionary peoples have ever been paralysed with fear by the nuclear weapons in the hands of imperialism and given up their struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. We Marxist-Leninists are not advocates of the theory of the omnipotence of weapons or of nuclear weapons. We never believe that nuclear weapons can decide the destiny of mankind. We are profoundly convinced that the masses of people are the decisive force in the development of history. They alone can decide the course of history. We are resolutely opposed to the imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail.

“We also hold that the Socialist countries have no need whatsoever to use nuclear weapons as a gambling counter or for frightening others. To do this would mean truly to commit the error of adventurism. Having blind faith in nuclear weapons and failing to recognise or have confidence in the

strength of the masses of the people and to be scared out of one's wits by imperialist nuclear blackmail would be likely to lead one to jump from one extreme to another and to commit the error of capitulationism."¹⁶

Addressing the Supreme Soviet in December 1962, Khrushchev asked what the Albanians (meaning Chinese) wanted in Cuba. Answering the question himself, he said they wanted a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. And what sort of conflict would it be when these two great nuclear powers clashed, he asked. And answering the question himself, he said it would be a thermonuclear war. And what would the "Albanians" do when a thermonuclear war broke out between the USSR and USA? "They will sit it out," Khrushchev answered, using a Russian phrase.

Moscow also denounced Peking for its attitude towards the Colombo proposals. The *Pravda* editorial of September 19, 1963, said:

"In the Afro-Asian countries the fact is noted that the Chinese Government itself twice, in October and November 1962, called on the countries to 'show initiative' and facilitate the commencement of direct Sino-Indian negotiations. But when this help was offered, the Chinese Government did not avail itself of the good services of these countries.

"The press in many Afro-Asian countries notes that at the outset the Chinese Government declared it would accept the Colombo conference proposals 'in principle'. Later it claimed that it could not fully accept them because 'not everything was clear' and it called for explanations. When these explanations were provided, the Chinese Government stated that they had been supplied by representatives of only some of the Colombo conference countries and consequently, as *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*The People's Daily*) put it, they 'are not documents of the legal conference'. Other arguments questioning the competence of the Colombo conference appear in the Chinese press.

"In its statement of August 20 the Chinese Government again claimed that it was prepared to accept the Colombo proposals 'in principle'. However it does not go beyond these general declarations,

“No wonder that many are now beginning to say that while praising to the skies the initiative of the non-aligned nations and declaring that it ‘appreciates’ their kind services and ‘gives them their due,’ the Chinese Government is actually ignoring their efforts and showing no desire to avail itself of the Colombo proposals.”¹⁷

* * * *

That the intention of the Chinese in their border war with India was to bring about a collapse of established government in India was clear from the appeal to the Indian communists to rise against the “reactionary” Nehru regime. Peking reminded the Indian communists that during the 1929 fighting between the USSR and Kuomintang China, the Chinese communists, true to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, had sided with the Soviet Union while betraying their own motherland.

“The Chinese people still remember that when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state in the world, it was provoked and attacked by China’s reactionary big bourgeoisie and big landlords represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At that time, despite the fact that the Soviet Government had given vigorous support to the Kuomintang of China, the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after their betrayal of the revolution and their surrender to imperialism, whipped up a frantic anti-Soviet campaign simultaneously with their unbridled anti-communist, anti-popular moves.

“In December 1927, the Kuomintang reactionaries forcibly and outrageously closed down Soviet consulates in various cities of China, arrested and killed Soviet diplomatic officials and broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. A year and more afterwards in July 1929, the Kuomintang reactionaries, in violation of Sino-Soviet agreements of 1924, manufactured the ‘Chinese eastern railway incident’ and arrested more than 300 Soviet nationals... In October of that year the army of the Kuomintang reactionaries attacked the Soviet border, stirring up an armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union.

Thus, the Soviet Union was compelled to act in self-defence and defeated this military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries.

“Did the socialist Soviet Union do the right thing at that time? History has long since rendered its verdict: it was the perfectly right thing to do...

“Sino-Indian relations today bear certain similarities to Sino-Soviet relations of more than 30 years ago...(Then) the Chinese communists and progressives strongly protested against the anti-Soviet crime of the Kuomintang Government... In July 1929, the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued another declaration, resolutely calling on ‘the broad masses to rise against the war on the Soviet Union’. In response to this call, the Chinese communists and the broad masses of the people, despite ruthless repression and persecution by the Kuomintang reactionaries, courageously held mass meetings and demonstrations in resolute opposition to the anti-Soviet military provocation of the reactionary Kuomintang clique. For this, many communists, workers, peasants, students and progressives laid down their lives with glory. Did the Chinese Communist Party do the right thing in resolutely opposing the Kuomintang reactionaries and supporting the socialist Soviet Union? Undoubtedly, it was perfectly right...

“Today, the communists and progressives of India are in a situation somewhat similar to that of the Chinese communists and progressives more than 30 years ago. As a result of the reactionary policy of the Nehru Government, the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces are subjected to persecution. Each time the Nehru Government stirs up an anti-China campaign, he simultaneously mounts an attack on the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces...”¹⁸

*

*

*

*

Looking back, it would be correct to deduce that between the years 1959 and 1962 China might have been willing to settle the boundary question with India on the basis of the so-called “line of actual control of November 7, 1959.”

But settlement of the border, including delimitation and demarcation on the ground, would not have precluded Peking from creating tension. One has only to look at the Sikkim-Tibet border which, Peking admits, has been formally delimited and demarcated on the ground. China has accepted this boundary. But this has not inhibited her from maintaining tension there and using force.

So long as the Sino-Soviet dispute remains a live issue, Peking will regard the Sino-Indian border as a convenient area for creating international tension. No two peoples are more dissimilar than Indians and Chinese, and co-existence between them should either belong to the realm of wishful thinking or be on the basis of a lack of active mutual contact. Friendly cooperation will be impossible.

An important aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is the relations of Peking and Moscow with New Delhi. This has been repeatedly stated by the Chinese themselves. What China would like the Soviet Union to do is to join hands with her in subverting and "liberating" India.

With India "liberated," there will be nothing left in the path of the Chinese in "liberating" the rest of Asia, and then Africa and Latin America which, Peking says, are "ripe for revolution."

China has been creating opportunities along the Sino-Indian border for Moscow to collaborate with her. The two together could set about the task of "liberating" India. If this should lead to a larger conflict, the Soviet Union should plunge into it.

All this may sound odd and neurotic. But China is in a state of national neurosis. Instances of entire nations being in a neurotic state are not rare. Hitler's Germany is an example. It is a dangerous state, the more so in the case of the Chinese whose ethos would not permit them to play second fiddle in the communist world. They would either dominate—historically they have always regarded themselves as the celestial race, middle kingdom and centre of the universe—or recede into a shell and isolate themselves even more than at present.

Since the Chinese cannot possibly dominate the communist world, the probability is that they will gradually withdraw into their shell and remain in splendid isolation for a long time to come.

The trouble with the Chinese is that their communist revolution took place at least a quarter of a century too late. It is too late in the day to speak of the "purity" and applicability in the second half of

the 20th century of a 19th century doctrine—the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.

Today's revolution is the exploration of outer space, the unravelling of the mysteries of the microcosm and macrocosm, the marvels of chemistry and medicine—not terrorism, torture, banditry, brigandage and guerilla warfare in the jungles in the name of socialism and revolution and liberation.

* * * *

Relations between India and China came close to the point of a total diplomatic rupture when, in June 1967, the Chinese authorities charged two junior Indian diplomats in Peking, K. Raghunath and P. Vijay, second and third secretaries, respectively, with espionage, detained them, and finally expelled them, after Chinese mobs had maltreated and humiliated them.

Raghunath is a brilliant member of the Indian Foreign Service, having stood first in the open competitive examination, leagues ahead of the second man. He studied Chinese (Mandarin), besides German, in Hong Kong. His knowledge of Mandarin is extremely good.

Raghunath was stripped of his diplomatic status by the Chinese, while Vijay was declared *persona nongrata*. Peking alleged :

“Since the beginning of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China, thinking that he could make use of this opportunity, K. Raghunath has been collecting everywhere political and military intelligence about China in brazen violation of its laws and decrees and his case is of a most serious nature.”¹⁹

All that he and Vijay had done was to take photographs on the western hills of Peking, an area which is open to tourists and other foreigners. Photography was not forbidden by the Chinese at this scenic spot which is of historical and archaeological interest.

Raghunath was “publicly tried” *in absentia* by a so-called people's court in Peking—a “trial” which India's foreign minister, M. C. Chagla, described as an absolute farce—and ordered to leave China within 72 hours,

Raghunath had been the object of China's anger because he evidently knew too much. Once, while buying Red Guard newspapers in a Peking street, he was taken by some Red Guards to a public security bureau. Red Guard newspapers have been sold in Peking openly, and foreigners had been buying them without any restrictions.

New Delhi retaliated by stripping the Chinese first secretary, Chen Lu-chih, of his diplomatic status and ordering his expulsion. A third secretary, Hsieh Cheng-hoa, was declared *persona nongrata* and ordered to leave India within 72 hours.

These actions were followed by a mammoth Red Guard demonstration outside the Indian embassy in the Chinese capital. Indian diplomats and other members of the staff of the embassy, together with their families, numbering in all about 70, were confined by the Chinese within the precincts of the embassy with limited supplies of food and water.

New Delhi responded by confining the members of the Chinese embassy, numbering in all 22, within its vast compound in which are located, besides the embassy, the chancery, residential and other ancillary buildings. The Chinese had evacuated the families of the embassy personnel sometime in October 1966 as part of an overall recall from all their overseas missions.

News of the assault on Raghunath and Vijay and their humiliation incensed a New Delhi crowd which broke through police cordons and belaboured some members of the Chinese embassy who surrounded the flagstaff. Six Chinese were injured and removed to hospital, while the Chinese communist flag was torn down and trampled underfoot.

The New Delhi demonstrators let loose into the compound of the Chinese embassy a dozen donkeys with placards round their necks bearing the words: "Mao's Thoughts."

On June 20, the siege of the Indian embassy in Peking was lifted, and reciprocally, the police cordon around the Chinese embassy in New Delhi was also removed.

After this episode, New Delhi started evacuating the wives and children of the Indian embassy personnel from the Chinese capital. Peking reduced its staff in New Delhi to about 15 persons.

*

*

*

*

Why did China precipitate these incidents ? A plausible explanation is that Peking wanted to smother all talk of a rapprochement between India and China. There had then been some loose talk in New Delhi about the desirability of making up with China, of the inadvisability of adopting too rigid a stance vis-a-vis the Colombo proposals, and so on. By picking out two junior diplomats and molesting and humiliating them, Peking wanted to make it plain to India that it cares two hoots for a normalisation of relations.

Soon after this episode, the Chinese picked a quarrel with the Burmese with whom their relations until then had been correct if not cordial. The Burmese embassy in the Chinese capital was subjected to a Red Guard siege and General Ne Win was made the target of a concentrated hate campaign. The excuse for this was the feeling against the overseas Chinese in Burma which had led to some unpleasant incidents.

Thus, overnight as it were, the Chinese threw down the gutter the goodwill with Burma which they had taken pains to create over the years. Why ?

The conclusion is inescapable that the ultimate objective of the Chinese is a world war, if need be a nuclear war. They are evidently putting everything that they have into their missile and nuclear arms programme. As Chen Yi once said: "We will have nuclear weapons even if we do not have pants to wear."

It is Peking's calculation that it will be in a position to challenge the other nuclear powers in about seven years. Meanwhile, embassy sieges, expulsions of diplomats and other stunts serve to divert the attention of the people.

The seven-year period is based on documents captured by the Americans in Viet Nam. According to Professor P. J. Honey:

"Among the mass of documents captured when a major Viet Cong headquarters was overrun during the military operation 'Cedar Falls' were three of unparalleled importance for the understanding of what is now taking place in Viet Nam... The first is a 24-page letter from Le Duan, first secretary of North Viet Nam's Lao Dong party, to Nguyen Chi Thanh, a member of North Viet Nam's party politburo and currently overall commander of the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam. The other two

documents are notebooks belonging to senior Viet Cong cadres which contain long and detailed accounts of a lecture given by General Nguyen Van Vinh during his visit to Cosvn, Viet Cong headquarters in South Viet Nam.”²⁰

These documents make China’s position regarding a Viet Nam peace settlement quite clear :

“China’s position on negotiations is intrasigent, and Chinese leaders believe that the time will not be ripe until a few years from now and, even worse, seven years from now. In the meantime we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, allout and rapid offensive using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What we should do in the south today is to try to restrain the enemy and make him bog down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an allout offensive.”²¹

Wars have been a part of human history. The third world war is already being fought in Viet Nam. It may be another seven years before it becomes a nuclear armageddon, unless a fundamental change overtakes China meanwhile.

The so-called great proletarian cultural revolution is basically an effort under Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s direction to prevent revisionist tendencies in China. The idea is that human beings must have no abiding stake in life; they should cherish no values other than those propounded by the chairman; they should be ready to perish, by the million if need be, for the sake of upholding Mao’s thoughts.

NOTES

- 1 & 2 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 1, '63. (Five years erlier, Chairman Mao Tse-tung had subscribed to the principles of peaceful co-existence and had sworn everlasting unity between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties in a joint communique he signed with Khrushchev early in August 1958. The joint communique, *inter alia*, said: “China and the Soviet Union will continue to do their utmost to work for the easing of international tension and prevention of a new war disaster. The two parties reaffirmed that the right

of every people to choose their own social and political system must be respected, that countries with different social systems must practise peaceful co-existence in accordance with the famous five principles which are widely accepted internationally, that all international disputes should be settled through peaceful negotiation, and that the development of economic and cultural relations among nations on the principles of mutual benefit and peaceful competition should be encouraged as it will increase the mutual understanding between peoples and is in full accord with the aim of easing international tension and safeguarding peace.”—NCNA, Peking, August 4, '58).

- 3 NCNA, Peking, Sept. 18, '63.
- 4 Ibid., Oct. 3, '59.
- 5 Quoted by All India Radio, March 1, '63.
- 6 “The origin and development of the differences between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves,” Foreign Languages Press, Peking, '63, p. 48.
- 7 This article was reproduced by the Chinese in the booklet, “The truth about how the leaders of the CPSU have allied themselves with India against China,” which also published *The People's Daily* editorial board's article of November 2, '63 (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, '63).
- 8 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Jan. 10, '66.
- 9 “The truth about how the leaders of the CPSU have allied themselves with India against China,” Foreign Languages Press, Peking, '63, p. 5.
- 10 Ibid., p. 7.
- 11 *The Times of India*, Bombay, Oct. 26, '62.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 “The truth about how the leaders of the CPSU have allied themselves with India against China,” Foreign Languages Press, Peking, '63, p. 7.
- 14 & 15 Ibid., p. 25, pp. 25-26.
- 16 NCNA, Peking, Dec. 16, '62.
- 17 See 7 above, pp. 43-44.
- 18 “More on Nehru's philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian boundary question” by the editorial department of *The Peoples Daily*, Peking, Oct. 27, '62. It is also reproduced in “The Sino-Indian boundary question,” enlarged edition, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, '62, pp. 125-129.
- 19 NCNA, Peking, June 12, '67,
- 20 *The Times of India*, Bombay & New Delhi, May, 23, '67.
- 21 Ibid.

APPENDIX

The hitherto unpublished memoranda and notes exchanged between the Governments of India and China on the question of Tibet in 1950 are reproduced below:

(1) Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet, delivered by the Indian ambassador on October 21, 1950, to the Chinese foreign ministry in Peking.

The Central People's Government are fully aware of the views of the Government of India on the adjustment of Sino-Tibetan relations. It is, therefore, not necessary to repeat that their interest is solely in a peaceful settlement of the issue. My government are also aware that the Central People's Government have been following a policy of negotiations with the Tibetan authorities. It has, however, been reported that some military action has taken place or is about to take place, which may affect the peaceful outcome of these negotiations.

The Government of India would desire to point out that a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs. The Central People's Government must be aware that opinion in the United Nations has been steadily veering round to the admission of China into that organisation before the close of the present session. The Government of India feel that military action on the eve of a decision by the (general) assembly will have serious consequences and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations and the Security Council.

At the present time when the international situation is so delicate, any move that is likely to be interpreted as a disturbance of the

peace may prejudice the position of China in the eyes of the world. The Government of India's firm conviction is that one of the principal conditions for the restoration of a peaceful atmosphere is the recognition of the position of the People's Republic of China, and its association with the work of the UN. They feel that an incautious move at the present time even in a matter which is within its own sphere will be used by those who are unfriendly to China to prejudice China's case in the UN and generally before neutral opinion. The Government of India attach the highest importance to the earliest settlement of the problem of Chinese representation in international organisations and have been doing everything in their power to bring it to a successful conclusion. They are convinced that the position of China will be weakened if through military action in Tibet those who are opposed to China's admission are now given a chance to misrepresent China's peaceful aims.

The Government of India feel that the time factor is extremely important. In Tibet there is not likely to be any serious military opposition and any delay in settling the matter will not therefore affect Chinese interests, or a suitable final solution. The Government of India's interest in this matter is, as we have explained before, only to see that the admission of the People's Government to the UN is not again postponed due to the causes which could be avoided and further that, if possible, a peaceful solution is sought while military action may cause unrest and disturbance on her own borders.

(2) Note of the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet delivered by the Indian ambassador in Peking on October 28, 1950.

Embassy of India in China, Peking. 28 October 1950.

Excellency, I have the honour to convey to your excellency the following communication from the Government of India.

Begins: We have seen with great regret reports in newspapers of official statements made in Peking to the effect that "People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet." We have received no intimation of it from your ambassador here or from our ambassador in Peking. We have been repeatedly assured of the

desire of the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations. In an interview which India's ambassador had recently with the vice-foreign minister, the latter, while reiterating the resolve of the Chinese Government to "liberate" Tibet, had expressed a continued desire to do so by peaceful means. We informed the Chinese Government through our ambassador of the decision of the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking immediately to start negotiations. This delegation actually left Delhi yesterday (25th). In view of these facts, the decision to order an advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable. We realise there has been delay in the Tibetan delegation proceeding to Peking. This delay was caused in the first instance by the inability to obtain visas for Hong Kong, for which the delegation was in no way responsible. Subsequently, the delegation came back to Delhi because of the wishes of the Chinese Government that preliminary negotiations should first be conducted in Delhi with the Chinese ambassador. Owing to lack of knowledge on the part of the Tibetan delegation of dealing with other countries and the necessity of obtaining instructions from their government, who in turn had to consult their assemblies, certain further delay took place. The Government of India do not believe any foreign influence hostile to China has been responsible for the delay in the delegation's departure.

Two. Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there will naturally be fear on the part of the Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and, in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or of peace. The Government of India can only express their deep regret that in spite of the friendly and disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet by force instead by the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach.

Ends:

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

K. M. PANIKKAR

(3) Reply of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on October 30, 1950, to the memorandum and note of the Indian Government on the question of Tibet.

On October 21, 1950, the ministry of foreign affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China received from H.E. Ambassador Panikkar an *aide memoire* of the Government of India on the question of Tibet. On October 28, minister for foreign affairs, Chou En-lai, further received a communication from the Government of India as conveyed by H.E. Ambassador Panikkar.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear: Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's Government. The Central People's Government has repeatedly expressed the hope that the problem of Tibet may be solved by peaceful negotiations, and it welcomes, therefore, the declaration of the local authorities of Tibet to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peaceful negotiations. Yet, the Tibetan delegation, under outside instigation, has intentionally delayed the date of its departure for Peking. The Central People's Government, however, has not abandoned its desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peaceful negotiations, and whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated.

In particular, the problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems. If those countries hostile to China attempt to utilise as an excuse the fact that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is exercising its sovereign rights in its territory of Tibet and threaten to obstruct the participation of the People's Republic of China in the UN Organisation, it is then but another demonstration of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of such countries towards China.

Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of

India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express their deep regret. October 30, 1950.

(4) Note of the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet dated November 1, 1950.

Embassy of India in China, Peking. November 1, 1950.

Excellency, I have the honour to convey to your excellency the following communication from the Government of India.

Begins: The Indian ambassador in Peking has transmitted to the Government of India the note handed to him by the vice-foreign minister of the People's Republic of China on October 30. The Government of India have read with amazement the statement in the last paragraph of the Chinese Government's reply that the Government of India's representation to them was affected by foreign influences hostile to China and categorically repudiate it. At no time has any foreign influence been brought to bear upon India in regard to Tibet. In this, as in other matters, the Government of India's policy has been entirely independent and directed solely towards a peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

Two. The Government of China are really mistaken in thinking that the Tibetan delegation's departure to Peking was delayed by outside instigation. In their previous communications the Government of India have explained at some length the reasons why the Tibetan delegation could not proceed to Peking earlier. They are convinced that there has been no possibility of foreign instigation.

Three. It is with no desire to interfere or to gain any advantage that the Government of India have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations, adjusting legitimate Tibetan claims to autonomy within the framework of Chinese sovereignty. Tibetan autonomy is a fact, which, judging from reports that they have received from the Indian ambassador in China and also from other sources, the Chinese Government were themselves willing to recognise and foster. The Government of India's repeated suggestions that Chinese sovereignty over Tibet

and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiations were not, as the Chinese Government seem to suggest, unwarranted interference in China's internal affairs, but well-meant advice by a friendly government which has a natural interest in the solution of the problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods.

Four. Wedded as they are to ways of peace the Government of India have been gratified to learn that the Chinese Government were also desirous to effect a settlement in Tibet through peaceful negotiations. Because of this, the Government of India advised the Tibetan Government to send their delegation to Peking, and were glad that this advice was accepted. In the interchange of the communications which had taken place between the Government of India and the Government of China, the former received repeated assurances that a peaceful settlement was aimed at. In the circumstances, the surprise of the Government of India was all the greater when they learnt that military operations had been undertaken by the Chinese Government against a peaceful people. There has been no allegation that there has been any provocation or any resort to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence, there is no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step involving an attempt to impose a decision by force, could not possibly be reconciled with a peaceful settlement. In view of these developments, the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking, unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations.

Five. Every step that the Government of India have taken in recent months has been to check the drift to war all over the world. In doing so, they have often been misunderstood and criticised, but they have adhered to their policy regardless of the displeasure of great nations. They cannot help thinking early operations by the Chinese Government against Tibet have greatly added to the tensions of the world in general, which they are sure the Government of China also wish to avoid.

Six. The Government of India have repeatedly made it clear that they have no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet and they do not seek any novel or privileged position for themselves or for their nationals in Tibet. At the same time they have pointed out that cer-

tain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural between neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations. These relations have found expression in the presence of an agent of the Government of India in Lhasa, the existence of trade agencies at Gyantze and Yatung and the maintenance of post and telegraph offices at the trade route up to Gyantze. For the protection of this trade route a small military escort has been stationed at Gyantze for over 40 years. The Government of India are anxious that these establishments which are to the mutual interests of India and Tibet, and do not detract in any way from Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, should continue. The personnel at the Lhasa mission and the agencies at Gyantze have accordingly been instructed to stay at their posts.

Seven. It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests. Recent developments in Tibet have affected friendly relations and the interest of peace all over the world; this the Government of India deeply regret. In conclusion, the Government of India can only express their earnest hope that the Chinese Government will still prefer the methods of peaceful negotiations and settlement to a solution under duress and by force. Ends.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

K. M. PANIKKAR.

H.E. Minister for Foreign Affairs
Central People's Government of P.R.C.,
Peking

(5) Reply dated November 16, 1950, of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to the note of the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet.

On November 1, 1950, the ministry of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China received from H.E. Ambassador Panikkar a communication from the Government of the Republic of India on the problem of Tibet.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in its past communications with the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet has repeatedly made it clear that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government. According to the provisions of the common programme adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the regional autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty. This point has been recognised by the Indian Government in its *aide memoire* to the Chinese Government dated August 26, 1950. However, when the Chinese Government actually exercised its sovereign rights and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realise regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government. This cannot but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China sincerely hopes that the Chinese People's Liberation Army may enter Tibet peacefully to perform the sacred task of liberating the Tibetan people and defending the frontiers of China. It has therefore long since welcomed the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet, which has remained in India, to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peace negotiations. Yet the said delegation, obviously as a result of continued outside obstruction, has delayed its departure for Peking. Further, taking advantage of the delay of the negotiations, the local authorities of Tibet have deployed strong armed forces at Changtu in Sikang province in the interior of China, in an attempt to prevent the Chinese People's Liberation Army from liberating Tibet. On August 31, 1950, the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs informed the Indian Government through Ambassador Panikkar that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was going to take action soon in West Sikang according to set plans, and expressed the hope that the Indian Government would assist the delegation of the

local authorities of Tibet so that it might arrive in Peking in mid-September. The Chinese charge d'affaires, Shen Chien, and later Ambassador Yuan Chung-hsien, both in person, told the said delegation that it was imperative that it should hasten to Peking within September, or that the said delegation should bear the responsibilities and be held responsible for all the consequences resulting from the delay. In mid-October, Chinese Ambassador Yuan again informed the Indian Government of this. Yet still owing to outside instigation the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet fabricated various pretexts and remained in India.

Although the Chinese Government has not given up its desire of settling the problem of Tibet peacefully, it can no longer continue to put off the set plan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to proceed to Tibet. And the liberation of Changtu further proved that through the instrument of Tibetan troops, foreign forces and influences were obstructing the peaceful settlement of the problem of Tibet. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peace negotiations and regardless of whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, no foreign intervention will be permitted. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the liberation of the Tibetan people are also decided.

In showing its friendship with the Government of the Republic of India, and in an understanding of the desire of the Indian Government to see the problem of Tibet settled peacefully, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has kept the Indian Government informed of its efforts in this direction. What the Chinese Government cannot but deeply regret is that the Indian Government, in disregard of the facts, has regarded a domestic problem of the Chinese Government—the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet—as an international dispute calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

The Government of the Republic of India has repeatedly expressed its desire of developing Sino-Indian friendship on the basis of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and of preventing the world from going to war. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is exactly aimed at the protection of the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty of China. And it is on this question that all those countries who desire to respect

the territory and sovereignty of China should first of all indicate their real attitude towards China. In the meantime, we consider that what is now threatening the independence of nations and world peace is precisely the forces of those imperialist aggressors. For the sake of maintenance of national independence and defence of world peace, it is necessary to resist the forces of these imperialist aggressors. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is thus an important measure to maintain Chinese independence, to prevent the imperialist aggressors from dragging the world towards war, and to defend world peace.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes the renewed declaration of the Indian Government that it has no political or territorial ambitions in China's Tibet and that it does not seek any new privileged position. As long as our two sides adhere strictly to the principle of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and that the problems relating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels.

Peking, November 16, 1950.

INDEX


- ADAMS, Gen. Paul D., 159
AFRO-ASIAN Conference, 223
AHMAD, Z. A., 135
AIR Intrusions
 Chou En-lai accuses U.S. & Chiang Kai-shek, 89
 India rejects Chinese explanation, 89
AKSAICHIN
 China's traffic artery through, 88
 Chinese penetration since 1950, 88
 India unaware of Chinese activity, 85
AKSAICHIN Road
 (See Sinkiang-Tibet Road)
BALIGA, Dr. A. V., 77, 78
BANNERJI, Dr. P.K., 156, 183
BARAHOTI
 "North of line of actual control," 138
 Talks in New Delhi on, 63, 167
BHOOTHALINGAM, S., 164
BHUTAN
 Bhutan-India road, 50
 Bhutan-India treaty, 52
 Boundary difference with Peking, 49, 51
 Boundary with Tibet, 54
 Chang Kuo-hua's statement, 50
 Chinese maps, 49
 Chinese position regarding, 54
 Defence of, 50
 Hindi taught in schools, 53
 Relations with India, 51, 52, 53
 Villages in Tibet, 50
BHUTTO, Zulficar Ali, 222, 223
BORDER
 Bhutan-Tibet boundary, 49
 British maps, 61
 Chinese data, 58
 Chinese view of, 55, 58, 60-64, 68-73
 Chou En-lai's report to NPC, 55
 Chu Teh's view, 56,
 "Conditions not ripe for settlement," 64
 Eastern sector, 44
 Historical background, 57
 Indian view of, 43
 Khurnak fort occupied by China, 63
 Kongka pass incident, 77, 78, 79
 Map causes stir, 44
 Middle sector, 48
 National People's Congress resolution, 57
 Nehru's view, 57, 58
 Public acknowledgement of dispute by China, 55, 56
 Sikkim-Tibet boundary, 49
 Simla Conference, Chinese view, 61
 Treaty of 1842, 60
 Western sector, 48
BURMA
 Boundary treaty with China, 129
 Border with China demarcated, 107
CASUALTIES of India-China War
 Indian prisoners, etc., 168
CEASEFIRE & Withdrawal
 China's Nov. 21, 1962, statement, 155
 "Civil posts" left by China, 155, 156, 157, 184
 Demilitarised zone, 157
 Mao Tse-tung on withdrawal, 159
 Violations of ceasefire, 161
CHANDRASEKHAR, Dr. S., 128
CHAUDHURI, Gen. J.N., 160
CHAVAN, Y.B.
 Appointed Defence Minister, 148, 149
 Meets western leaders, 160
CHATTOPADHYAYA, Harindranath, 16
CHEN YI, Marshal
 On Indian asylum to Dalai Lama, 73
CHINA, Peoples' Republic of
 Admission to UN, 11, 247, 248, 250
 Agreement with India, 15, 16
 Burma border settled, 74
 Chinese state created by conquest, 57, 58
 Consulates-general closed down, 161
 Fomenting revolution in India, 239
 "In abnormal state," 79
 Indian ships' visit to, 121
 Negotiations on Tibet, 15
 Nepal border settled, 74
 Recognition by India, 9
 Treaties of friendship signed, 74
 "Two thousand years of friendship," 14
 Ultimatum to India by, 210, 211
CHINESE in India
 Deportation by India, 118, 123
 Peking criticises treatment of, 125
 Registration of, 123, 124
 Repatriation of, 168
 Support for India by, 124
CHOU En-lai
 Attributes motives to India, 58
 On friendship with Pakistan, 224
 Visits India, 15, 17, 87
CIVIL POSTS
 China's seven "civil posts," 156, 184
CIVIL WAR, Chinese
 Nehru's comment, 9
COLOMBO Proposals
 Chinese acceptance in principle, 193
 Chinese attempt to wriggle out of, 196, 197, 198
 Chinese interpretation of, 193, 194
 Clarifications, 190, 191
 Contravened by China, 238
 Disputed areas, 196
 Implementation on ground, 191, 192, 200
 India accepts, 192
 Mrs. Bandaranaike's letter to Chou, 195, 196
 Proposals of the Six, 189
COMMUNIST Party of India
 Recognises McMahon Line, 135
 Vijayawada congress, 134

- CUBA Missile Crisis**
 Peking's condemnation of Moscow, 237
 Turning point in world history, 235
- DALAI Lama**
 Arrival in India, 29
 Chen Yi's view, 73, 74
 "Political activity" in India by, 30, 122
- DANGE, S.A.**, 133
- DATAR, B.N.**, 132
- EISENHOWER, PRESIDENT**, 229
- ENGINEER, Air-Marshal S.M.**, 164
- FIVE Principles Agreement**
 Chinese charge of violation, 16
 Extension proposed, 111
 Lapses, 111
 Nehru-Chou Joint Statement on, 16
 Signing by India & China, 15
 Validity for eight years, 112
- GANDHI, Mrs. Indira**, 31
- GHOSH, Ajoy**, 134
- GOPAL, Dr. S.**, 91
- GOPALAN, A.K.**, 132
- HARRIMAN, Averell**, 159
- HEATH, Edward**, 148
- HIMALAYAN Federation**
 Gen. Chang Kuo-hua's view, 50
 Sikkim and Bhutan in, 49
- HIMALAYAN War** (See India-China War)
- "HINDI-CHINI Bhai Bhai"** Slogan raised, 15, 145
- HULL, Gen. Sir Richard**, 159
- INDIA-CHINA War**
 Air forces not used, 164
 Bomdi La falls, 151
 Clash at Dhola, 143
 Emergency declared in India, 146
 Europeans evacuated, 151
 Fighting in Ladakh, 152
 Fighting south of Thagla, 143
 Galwan valley incident, 139, 140
 Indian planes downed, 166
 Lull broken, 149
 Massive attacks by China, 145
 Middle Sector quiet, 167
 Nehru's campaign to rouse nation, 150, 151
 No foreign bases in India, 162
 Se La bypassed, 149
 Soviet aid to India, 151
 Tawang falls to Chinese, 146
 "Total war," 150
 Walong falls, 149, 178
 Western aid to India, 146, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164
- INDIAN National Congress**, 133
- INDIANS in China**, 125
- JAN SANGH**, 133
- JELEP LA**, 215
- JIGME, Ngapo Ngawang**
 Main prop of Chinese in Tibet, 23
- Reports to Preparatory Committee, 35
- KABIR, Prof. Humayun**, 126
- KALIMPONG**
 Chinese in, 124
 Chinese trade agency in, 16
- KARAM SINGH**, 77
- KASHMIR**
 Chinese involvement in, 210, 211, 212
- KAUL, Lt.-Gen. B.M.**
 Appointed Corps Commander, 143
 Replaced by Lt.-Gen. Maneckshaw, 160
- KHINZEMANE**
 Falls to Chinese, 145
 India accused of occupation, 62
- KOREAN War**
 Chinese "people's volunteers," 13
 Chinese refuse repatriation, 15
 India sends medical mission, 14
 North Korea branded aggressor, 13
- KRIPALANI, Acharya J.B.**
 Criticises Krishna Menon, 80, 81
 Criticises Nehru, 75, 80
- KRISHNAMACHARI, T.T.**
 Appointed minister for defence & economic co-ordination, 149
 Visits USA, 164
- KUNZRU, H.N.**, 132
- LADAKH**
 Indian checkposts in, 66
- LAMAS**
 Dalai and Panchen, 21; visit China, 26
- LONGJU**
 China attacks, 66
 India accused of occupation, 62
 Tass condemns incident, 230
- MACMILLAN, Harold**, 151
- MALAVIYA, C.N.**, 16
- MANECKSHAW, Lt.-Gen. S.**, 160
- MAO Tse-Tung**
 On military strategy, 159
 Views on nuclear war, 227, 228
- MAPS**
 China produces 11 maps, 103, 104
 Chinese maps erroneous, 98
 India produces 27 maps, 100-103
 Nehru takes up question with China, 17, 63
- MASANI, M.R.**, 75, 82, 83
- McMAHON Line**
 Boundary confirmed, 45
 Boundary in north-east, 44
 Burma-China boundary treaty, 142
 Chinese view of, 61, 62, 64
 Chinese version of Chou-Nehru talk on, 18
 Communist Party of India recognises, 135
 Co-ordinates of, 141
 Formalised, 48
 Indian view of, 65
 Manchu Emperor's expedition, 106
 Nehru's amplification, 63

- Nehru's minute, 18
 Principle underlying, 141
 "Product of British aggression," 64
 Simla treaty not ratified by China, 108
 Trijunction of Bhutan, NEFA, Tibet, 141
 United States recognition, 146
- MEHTA, Jagat S., 91, 210
- MENON, V. K. Krishna
 Meeting with Chen Yi, 104
 Quits Government of India, 148
- MILITARY AID to India, 146, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164
- MILITARY Escorts in Tibet, 16
- MOUNTBATTEN, Lord, 164
- MUKERJEE, Hiren, 30
- MURTY, T.S., 91
- NAMBOODIRIPAD, E. M. S., 133
- NARAYAN, Jayaprakash, 32
- NATIONALITIES
 China's policy towards, 20
- NEFA
 Chinese threat to invade, 116, 117
- NEGOTIATIONS
 April 3, 1963, proposal of India, 200
 Arbitration by International Court offered, 100, 180, 185, 200
 Chou En-lai calls for premiers' talks, 86
 December 30, 1962, proposal of Chou En-lai, 186
 Guinea's proposals, 179
 Nehru's Nov. 16, 1959, proposal sought to be implemented, 170
 Nehru invites Chou En-lai, 86
 Nkrumah's proposal, 179
 "No room for negotiations," 201
 Officials' meeting proposed, 182
 Oct. 24, '62 proposal of China, 174, 175
 Peking's appeal to Afro-Asian leaders, 175, 180, 181
 Points of proximity between India & China, 87
 Tanganyika's proposals, 180
- NEHRU
 Assessment of China by, 79
 Criticises China, 131
 Denounced by Peking, 31, 130
 Moved by events in Tibet, 31
 "Running dog of imperialism," 10
 Visits China, 17
- NEHRU, R.K., 104
- NEPAL
 Treaty with China, 74, 129
- NEW CHINA News Agency
 Closure in India, 122
 Staff members leave India, 123
- NITI Pass, 17
- NITZE, Paul, 159
- NKRUMAH, Kwame
 Hosted by China, 130
 Criticises western aid to India, 151
- Proposals of, 179
- NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE, 129, 130, 203
- NOVEMBER 7, 1959, "Line of Actual Control"
 Chou's letter to Nehru, 83, 84, 137
 Compared with Sept. 7, 1962, line, 138, 139
 Indian interpretation of, 156
 Nehru's comment on, 176, 177
- NOVEMBER 16, 1959, Line, 84, 138
- NUCLEAR WAR
 Chen Yi on nuclear weapons, 244
 Liu Shao-chi's views on, 228
 Mao Tse-tung's views on, 227, 228
- OFFICIALS' Report
 Bhutan & Sikkim boundaries, 95
 China refuses discussion of Kashmir boundary, 95
 Chinese officials, 91
 Eastern sector, Indian evidence, 93
 Indian officials, 91
 Middle sector, Indian evidence, 93
 Peking estopped, 96
 Statistical analysis of evidence, 92
 Treaties of 1684 & 1842, 94, 99
 Western sector, Indian evidence 93
- OVERSEAS Chinese
 (See CHINESE IN INDIA)
- PAI, Nath, 164
- PAKISTAN
 Boundary agreement with China, 221, 225
 Chinese military aid to, 224, 225
 Chinese support to, 224, 208, 209
 Concern for India, 218, 219, 220
 Day of protest, 149
 Fighting with India, 208
 Indian protest against Sino-Pak boundary settlement, 222
 Nationalist Chinese delegation in, 220
 Objection to aid to India, 148
 Partnership with China, 214, 217, 224
 Peking's criticism of, 220, 221
 Rann of Kutch dispute, 224
 Territorial adjustments with China, 222, 223
 Trade agreement with China, 223
- PANCH SHEEL (See under 'Five Principles')
- PANCHEN Lama
 Disappears, 42
 Dismissed, 41
 Installed at Shigatze, 25,
- PANT, Govind Vallabh, 31
- PARANJPE, V.V., 91
- PARTHASARATHY, G. 118
- PILGRIMS, Chinese & Indian, 16
- PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY, 133
- RAGHUNATH, K., 242, 243
- RAGHURAMIAH, B., 149

- RANADIVE, B.T.**
 Mao Tse-tung's message to, 10, 83
 Pro-Peking stand of, 133
- RAO, G.N.,** 91
- RIDGEWAY, Gen. Matthew,** 15
- RUSK, Dean,** 164
- RUSSIAN Pilots,** 82
- SAN FRANCISCO Conference,** 15
- SANDYS, Duncan,** 164
- SELF-DETERMINATION**
 Chinese view of, 20
- SEPTEMBER 7, 1962, Line**
 Description of, 138, 139
 Peking rejects, 176
- SHASTRI, Lal Bahadur,** 132
- SIKKIM**
 Anglo-Chinese Convention, 205, 206
 Boundary with Tibet, 49, 54
 Chang Kuo-hua's statement, 50
 China's position regarding, 54
 Chinese intrusions into, 205, 206
 Convention of 1890, 49
 Clash along border of, 217
 Emergency in, 206
 Indian defence structures, 208
 Nathu La, 207, 208
- SIMLA Conference**
 Tibet's participation, 107
 Traditional boundary formalised, 141
 Validity of, 109, 110
- SINKIANG-TIBET Road**
 Road built by China, 88
 Construction between 1956-57, 84, 85
 Cuts through Indian territory, 63
 Indian patrols arrested, 62
- SINO-SOVIET Dispute**
 Camp David talks, 229
 Crux of dispute, 228
 Hinges on Sino-Indian dispute, 234
 Khrushchev criticises China, 238
Pravda comments on, 231, 232, 233, 235, 238
 Sino-Soviet Treaty on Nuclear Technology, 228, 229
 Soviet "collusion with India," 231
- SUKARNO, Dr. Achmad**
 Criticised by China, 10
 Hosted by China, 130
- SUSLOV, Mikhail,** 134
- TAMADEM,** 74
- TASHKENT Declaration,** 233
- THAGLA Ridge,** 138, 139
- THAPAR, Gen. P.N.,** 160
- THIMAYYA, Gen. K.S.,** 151
- TIBET**
 Army of, 22
 Autonomous region of China, 20, 27, 42
 Bank of China branch in, 24
 Chang Ching-wu, Gen., 24
 Chang Kuo-hua, Gen., 24, 25
 Chinese airfields in, 88
 Chinese Communist Party congress, 25
 Chinese forces enter, 10
 China invades, 22, 24
 Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress, 37, 38
 Chinese suzerainty over, 21, 29, 100
 Communes in, 37, 40
 Dalai Lama's report to Preparatory Committee, 28
 Delegation from, 12, 13, 23
 Highways in, 26, 35
 Independent throughout history, 21
 Indian intrusions alleged, 210
 Indian military escorts, 30
 Indian trade agents, 113
 Land confiscated, 38
 Language and script replaced, 39
 Memorandum to Chinese, 25
 Mineral wealth of, 25
 Monasteries lose power, 36
 Mutual aid teams, 37
 National People's Congress resolution, 35
 Nehru's comment on, 10
 Nepal-Tibet treaty, 109
 Neutrality of, 109
 Petition to Nehru, 28
 Pilgrims harassed, 114
 Postal and telegraphic services, 16
 Rest houses in, 16
 Revolt in, 27, 29, 30, 35, 42
 Road construction, 22
 Schools opened, 25
 Sinkiang-Tibet highway, 25
 Sino-Tibetan Agreement, 23, 24
 Theocratic system broken, 36
 Tibetan opposition to reforms, 25
 Tibetans exterminated, 29
 Treaty-making powers of, 46, 48, 109
 Young Pioneers, 28
- TILNEY, John,** 159
- TRADE Agencies,** 16
- TREATIES**
 Kashmir-Ladakh-Tibet Treaty of 1684 and 1842, 46, 48
 Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1857, 46
- TSHAGABPA, Tsepon,** 12
- VIET NAM War,** 244, 245
- VIJAY, P.,** 242, 243

INDIA'S NORTHERN BORDERS



- TERRITORY UNDER CHINESE OCCUPATION
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- TERRITORY UNDER PAKISTAN'S OCCUPATION

